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TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ACCIDENT 
LAW: CLASSICAL TORT LAW AND THE COOPERATIVE 
FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE MOVEMENT 
John Fabian Witt* 
There are two strange discontinuities in accounts of the history of 
American accident law. First, the historical literature's narrow fo- 
cus on the common law of tort contrasts sharply with the eclectic ap- 
proach of contemporary accident law scholars. Contemporary acci- 
dent law debates offer a wide array of policy alternatives to tort litiga- 
tion. To name only some of the most prominent, scholars have 
proposed increased reliance on first-party insurance,' various no-fault 
insurance schemes,2 markets in unmatured tort claims,3 and expanded 
state compensation plans for accidents beyond the sphere of work ac- 
cidents.4 Similarly, recent descriptions of our contemporary accident 
law system characterize it as made up of a number of different kinds 
of institutions, ranging from tort law to private and public insurance 
* Law Clerk to Judge Pierre N. Leval, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Ph.D., 
J.D., Yale University. Many thanks to Miriam Aukerman, Ariela Dubler, Barry Friedman, Law- 
rence Friedman, Glenda Gilmore, Risa Goluboff, Bob Gordon, Henry Hansmann, Bill LaPiana, 
TIoy McKensie, Bill Nelson, Annie Murphy Paul, John Reid, Peter Schuck, Reva Siegel, Howard 
Venable, and the members of the N.Y.U. Legal History Colloquium for helpful comments and in- 
sights on various versions of this Article. Bob Gordon and Reva Siegel's legal history seminar and 
the Yale Law School Center for Law, Economics, and Public Policy summer brown bag lunch 
group helpfully entertained early drafts of this Article. The Samuel I. Golieb Research Fellowship 
in Legal History at N.Y.U. provided invaluable institutional support. 
1 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1550-63 (I987) [hereinafter Priest, Current Insurance Crisis] (arguing that the source of the 
"liability crisis" of the late i98os was the shift from first-party insurance to third-party insurance); 
George L. Priest, Understanding the Liability Crisis, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW I96, 
207-09 (Walter Olson ed., I988) (same); see also Patrick Atiyah, Personal Injuries in the Twenty- 
First Century: Thinking the Unthinkable, in WRONGS AND REMEDIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY I, 33-46 (Peter Birks ed., i996) (advocating the replacement of tort for personal injury 
with market mechanisms, primarily first-party insurance). 
2 See ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC 
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (I965). 
3 See Robert Cooter & Stephen D. Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort Claims: 
Tort Reform by Contract, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW, supra note i, at 174. For a 
critical review of contract-based proposals for reforming American accident law, see Mark Geist- 
feld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability Reform, 72 TEX. L. 
REV. 803 (I994). 
4 See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (i989); 
Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 822-25 (i990); Marc A. Franklin, Re- 
placing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 
808-I4 (i967). 
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programs to no-fault compensation schemes.5 Yet histories of Ameri- 
can accident law are remarkable for the absence of alternative models. 
Indeed, the singular feature of our accounts of the development of 
American accident law is their central concern, one might say obses- 
sion, with the tort case.6 
Second, the history of accident law in the United States is usually 
recounted as separate and apart from the main currents of the political 
and legal history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.7 To be 
sure, the great waves of industrialization in the American economy 
have always been, and will surely always remain, a central interpretive 
tool in explaining changes in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
5 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort 
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75 
(I993); Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
i84 (i987). For a similar description of the English accident compensation system, see P.S. 
ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 389-4I2 (2d ed. I975). For an account of the 
recent history of academic theorizing about alternatives to tort law, see Gary T. Schwartz, Fore- 
word: Tort Scholarship, 73 CAL. L. REV. 548 (i985). 
6 There is a growing scholarly literature using historical data to weigh the virtues and flaws of 
alternative legal regimes. But these studies are not as interested in explaining the development of 
American accident law as they are in debating the efficiency of various liability regimes. See 
PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE 
ORIGINS OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION (2000); MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUSI, COMPEN- 
SATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT 
LIABILITY (i990); James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negli- 
gence and Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 293 (1976); Price V. Fishback & Shawn 
Everett Kantor, Did Workers Pay for the Passage of Workers' Compensation Laws?, iio Q.J. 
ECON. 713 (I995); Price V. Fishback, Liability Rules and Accident Prevention in the Workplace: 
Empirical Evidence from the Early Twentieth Century, i6 J. LEGAL STUD. 305 (i987). 
7 Morton Horwitz's account of tort, contract, and property in the antebellum period pioneered 
the approach to writing the history of private law fields such as torts as central to political history 
broadly construed. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, I780- 
I86o (I977) [hereinafter HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I]. Horwitz's interpretation of tort law in 
the late nineteenth century, however, focuses on intellectual currents in tort law theory rather than 
on the role of tort law in the great social struggles of the day. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, i870-I960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (I992) 
[hereinafter HORWITZ, TR,4NSFORMATION II]. In addition, there is an exciting and still-growing 
body of work that seeks to bring accident law to the forefront of scholarly inquiry into legal and 
social change in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. 
TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 223-92 (993) (ar- 
guing that the law of work-related accidents gave shape to the Foucauldian disciplinary relation- 
ship between employers and employees in the emerging industrial economy); Arthur F. McEvoy, 
The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of i9ii: Social Change, Industrial Accidents, and the Evolu- 
tion of Common-Sense Causality, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 62I (1995) (identifying the Triangle 
Shirtwaist Fire as a catalyst for changes in broad ideas about social causation at the turn of the 
century); Jonathan Simon, For the Government of Its Servants: Law and Disciplinary Power in the 
Work Place, i870-i906, 13 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 105 (I993); Barbara Y. Welke, Unreasonable 
Women: Gender and the Law of Accidental Injury, i870-I920, I9 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369 (I994). 
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law of torts.8 Nonetheless, tort law exists only at the margins of our 
histories of the great battles to define the character of industrializing 
America. Labor movement opposition to the spread of wage labor, 
struggles between capitalists and laborers in the workplace, and the 
political groundswell of farmers' and agrarian parties have been the 
central themes of the histories of the critical half century following the 
end of the Civil War, and these themes have rarely included debates 
and struggles over the law of accidents. Instead, accident law has gen- 
erally been treated as a player at the edges of a great conflict. Tort 
law, our histories assume, is not about the structure of the underlying 
economic system, but rather about addressing the messy by-products 
of that system. In our own time, after all, most scholars and policy- 
makers view accident law as an instrument to facilitate market 
economies by minimizing the economic costs of accidents.9 And so, 
scholars often look back and see in past tort regimes the same ap- 
proach.10 At the very least, scholars tend to assume that accident law 
did not implicate the basic structures of political and social life. Thus 
the histories of the main currents of American political and social his- 
tory make the tacit claim that the way in which the law dealt with the 
accidents produced by capitalism had little to do with the ongoing 
struggles over the legitimacy of the capitalist system itself. For the 
story of that struggle, our histories look elsewhere. 
This Article seeks to redress these two disjunctures in the history of 
American accident law. In the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the United States experienced an accident crisis like none the world 
had ever seen and like none any Western nation has witnessed since. 
By the turn of the century, one worker in fifty was killed or disabled 
for at least four weeks each year because of a work-related accident." 
In the population as a whole, roughly one in every thousand Ameri- 
cans died by accident each year.12 In dangerous industries, accident 
rates were considerably higher. In i890 alone, one railroad worker in 
8 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467 (2d ed. 1985) ("The 
modern law of torts must be laid at the door of the industrial revolution, whose machines had a 
marvelous capacity for smashing the human body."). 
9 The foundational works in the modern economic approach are GUIDO CALABRESI, THE 
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); and RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. I998). There are, of course, competing views of tort law. 
Even critics of the economic-instrumentalist view, however, concede its dominance in current de- 
bates. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 488 (1989) 
("So ingrained is the dominance of instrumentalist tort theory that an alternative approach is now 
scarcely imaginable."). 
10 The classic example is Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 
(I972). 
11 Frederick Hoffman, Industrial Accident Statistics, BULL. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., 
March I915, at 5-6. 
12 Id. at i3. 
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every three hundred was killed on the job; among freight railroad 
brakemen, one in every hundred died in work accidents each year.13 
The most extraordinary rates of death and injury appear to have been 
reached in the anthracite coal mines of Pennsylvania, where each year 
during the i86os and i870s six percent of the workforce was killed, six 
percent permanently crippled, and six percent seriously but temporar- 
ily disabled.14 By comparison to other Western economies, accident 
rates in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States 
were remarkably high. Railroad fatalities, for example, were four 
times more frequent per train-mile in the United States than in Eng- 
land.'5 And by comparison to today, rates of accidental death at the 
turn of the century were astronomical. The annual accidental death 
rate of one in one thousand for the population as a whole in the 
United States in i900 is as great as that of the single most dangerous 
occupation (lumber and timber work) at the opening of the twenty-first 
century.'6 Today, fewer than four in every ten-thousand Americans die 
each year from accidents.17 
Americans in the last decades of the nineteenth century experi- 
mented with a number of alternative institutional mechanisms for 
dealing with the problem of industrial accidents. The common law of 
torts emerged in these years - for the first time - as an accident law 
regime. Workers organized widespread but remarkably little-known 
cooperative insurance societies. Many employers - especially in the 
first decade of the twentieth century - adopted private employer 
compensation programs. Social insurance advocates supported acci- 
dent compensation schemes such as the workmen's compensation stat- 
utes that were enacted in the decade after i910 and that appeared 
likely at the time to develop into much broader social insurance pro- 
grams. 18 
Moreover, each of the different institutional experiments in the late 
nineteenth century embodied not just a distinct solution to the indus- 
trial accident crisis, but also a competing vision of how best to reor- 
13 MARK ALDRICH, SAFETY FIRST: TECHNOLOGY, LABOR, AND BUSINESS IN THE BUILDING 
OF AMERICAN WORK SAFETY, I870-I939, at I5-i6 (I997). 
14 ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, ST. CLAIR: A NINETEENTH-CENTURY COAL TOWN'S EX- 
PERIENCE WITH A DISASTER-PRONE INDUSTRY 253 (I987). 
15 ALDRICH, supra note I3, at 23; Carroll W. Doten, Recent Railway Accidents in the United 
States, 9 PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS'N I55, i67 (I905). 
16 ALDRICH, supra note I3, at 5; supra p. 694. 
17 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, July 24, 2000, at 26 tbl.8, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/datalnvs48-I i.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS]. 
18 For a review of the alternative approaches to accident law during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, see John Fabian Witt, The Accidental Republic: Amputee Workingmen, 
Destitute Widows, and the Remaking of American Law, i868-i922 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dis- 
sertation, Yale University) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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ganize nineteenth-century institutions for the twentieth-century indus- 
trial economy. The employer-specific accident compensation programs 
that grew quickly after the turn of the century, for example, advanced 
a managerial-corporatist approach to the accident problem, in which 
employers and managers took private responsibility for the governance 
of social life.19 Workmen's compensation programs, on the other hand, 
represented the first step toward a broad statist approach to the reor- 
ganization of accident law.20 
This Article focuses on the contrast between the common law of 
torts and the cooperative insurance societies of American workingmen. 
Lawyers and judges constructed the common law of torts as an at- 
tempt to contain the fallout from the industrial economy within the 
framework of classical liberalism. The cooperative insurance societies, 
by contrast, advanced a critique of competitive capitalism; to its pro- 
ponents, cooperative self-insurance against accidents stood as a model 
for the cooperative reconstruction of American economic life. 
The Article first describes the structure of the common law of torts 
as an elaborate working-out of the principles of classical nineteenth- 
century liberalism. The finely wrought doctrinal structures of the 
common law of torts, however, ultimately failed to contain the late 
nineteenth-century accident crisis. In part, the common law of torts 
failed because it was an immensely inefficient and costly mechanism 
for resolving accident cases - a mechanism that proved inadequate to 
compensate accident victims and their families. In another sense, 
however, the failure of the common law of tort was rooted in the con- 
ceptual dilemmas posed for classical nineteenth-century liberalism by 
the accidents of the industrial revolution. 
The Article then turns to the rise and fall of the most important but 
virtually ignored late nineteenth-century alternative to tort law: the 
cooperative first-party insurance movement. After the Civil War, co- 
operative insurance societies became the earliest American first-party 
system of compensation for accidental injury and death. Indeed, by 
the late nineteenth-century, workingmen's insurance societies became 
the leading systematic mechanism for compensating victims of acci- 
dental injury, and they remained such into the first decade of the 
twentieth century. The cooperative societies thus represent a critically 
19 A few legal scholars - mostly of an economic bent - have written, about the employers' 
compensation programs. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic 
Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, i6 GA. L. REV. 775, 797-800 (I982) (discussing the adop- 
tion of private compensation schemes by English firms); Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kan- 
tor, The Adoption of Workers' Compensation in the United States, I9oo-I930, 4I J.L. & ECON. 305 
(I998). 
20 See, e.g., ROY LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, I900-I935, at 45-65 (2d ed. 
I986). 
200I] TO WARD A NE W HISTOR Y OF AMERICAN A CCIDENT LA W 697 
important path not taken by American accident law, one that has been 
virtually written out of the histories of tort law. In particular, the in- 
surance associations presented a remarkably well designed insurance 
mechanism that developed novel solutions to the moral-hazard and 
adverse-selection problems endemic to disability insurance. Moreover, 
the cooperative insurance societies embodied a radical critique of the 
competitive capitalist system that generated industrial accidents in the 
first place. As we shall see, this cooperative critique was itself fraught 
with internal contradictions and tensions. Nonetheless, the coopera- 
tive insurance associations represented America's leading model of co- 
operative economic organization. And in the eyes of the leaders of the 
late nineteenth-century movement to recreate American capitalism on 
a cooperative basis, the societies formed the opening wedge for the co- 
operative transformation of American economic life. 
This Article thus claims that the history of American accident law 
is a story of sharply divergent normative conceptions of political econ- 
omy. Our own accident law regime today is in large part the product 
of the contest among these different visions of accident policy, and in- 
deed, different visions of American politics and society more generally. 
Accordingly, understanding how we have arrived at the accident law 
regime that we have today requires reconstructing the alternate possi- 
ble paths of development with which Americans experimented over a 
century ago. 
The reconstruction of one such path not taken in accident law at 
the turn of the twentieth century begins to explain some of the peculiar 
characteristics of the American tort system today. In most other West- 
ern nations, social insurance programs provide a much higher share of 
accident victim compensation than they do in the United States. The 
American accident law regime in the early twenty-first century, by 
contrast, is characterized by relatively greater reliance on costly tort 
litigation that leaves victims undercompensated, does a poor job of de- 
terring accidents, and satisfies few of its constituencies other than the 
lawyers who profit from it. The story of the rise and fall of the first 
first-party insurance system is a history of the demise of our earliest 
attempt to experiment with alternatives to the tort system. In Great 
Britain, as we shall see, the friendly societies - cooperative insurance 
associations much like their American counterparts described here- 
were incorporated into early state insurance schemes and played an 
important role in the construction of a more systematic disability in- 
surance regime. American cooperative self-insurance societies also 
sought to develop into a quasi-public apparatus for disability insur- 
ance. But the decline and ultimate demise of cooperative insurance 
societies in the United States blunted the possibility of the develop- 
ment of a broader social insurance approach to accident compensation 
in the early twentieth century. 
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Part I of the Article sets the stage for what is to come by describing 
and critiquing the existing histories of American accident law. By 
thinking comparatively about the histories of American accident law 
and accident law in Western Europe, I argue that existing histories of 
the law of accidents in the United States - notwithstanding their di- 
versity - share the common flaw of viewing the development of acci- 
dent law as having flowed ineluctably from either changes in the un- 
derlying economy, on the one hand, or changes in ideas about such 
concepts as causation or the nature of legal science, on the other. 
Comparative studies of Western nations undergoing similar economic 
and intellectual changes, however, indicate that other nations experi- 
mented with a wide array of alternative accident law regimes. Ameri- 
can accident law reformers in the i88os and i89os knew of the various 
European models for accident law, and in fact studied them quite 
closely. As a result, the shape of American accident law in the late 
nineteenth century was more radically contingent than existing ac- 
counts suggest. 
Part II turns to the particular ideological and cultural setting in 
which Americans approached the late nineteenth-century accident 
problem. In particular, a loose collection of ideas about the meaning 
of free labor manhood in the post-Civil War economy distinguished the 
American experience from that of other nations and established the 
basic terms on which the American debate about accident law took 
place. 
Part III describes the emergence of the common law of torts as an 
attempt by American judges and lawyers to grapple with the accident 
problem in the terms of classical liberalism. Part IV then turns to the 
leading late nineteenth-century alternative to the common law of torts: 
first-party or self-insurance against disability and death. First-party 
disability and life insurance in the late nineteenth century took a num- 
ber of different forms, and Part IV discusses several of the leading in- 
surance mechanisms. Cooperative self-insurance societies, however, 
best solved the problems endemic to disability insurance markets. As 
a result, cooperative first-party insurance against disability and death 
quickly emerged as the leading form of first-party insurance, and in- 
deed as the leading systematic mechanism for compensating accident 
victims in the late nineteenth century and into the twentieth. 
Part V examines the cooperative insurance movement in more de- 
tail and describes it as an ingenious solution to a number of the prob- 
lems that to this day plague private disability insurance mechanisms. 
As we shall see, the disability insurance market innovations developed 
by the cooperative associations became increasingly difficult to imple- 
ment in the twentieth century. Thus notwithstanding the genius of 
cooperative insurance as a mechanism for providing disability and life 
insurance in the late nineteenth century, the cooperative first-party in- 
surance associations do not appear to have had a long-term future as a 
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private first-party insurance alternative to tort law. Instead, the long- 
term viability of the cooperative insurance movement rested on the 
possibility that the American societies could, like their European coun- 
terparts, become the building blocks of early social insurance pro- 
grams. 
Ultimately, of course, the cooperative insurance movement failed to 
make the transition to social insurance, and Part VI examines the 
causes of its decline. Nonetheless, at the turn of the twentieth century, 
American insurance cooperatives - like their counterparts across the 
Atlantic - had established the foundations of a system of accident law 
very different from the one we have today. 
I. RETHINKING THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ACCIDENT LAW 
A. Accident Law's Late Nineteenth-Century Origins 
Modern accident law is a remarkably recent development. Indeed, 
the American system of accident law is almost entirely a product of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for it was only then that 
the accident rates of an industrializing economy required the develop- 
ment of new institutions to deal with the fallout from regular injury 
and accidental death. 
Eighteenth-century lawyers and judges in England and in the 
American colonies focused little attention on the law of tort. William 
Blackstone's monumental four-volume treatise on the English common 
law, published between I765 and I769, was largely concerned with the 
technicalities of real property law. For example, Blackstone's treat- 
ment of "private wrongs," as close as he came to the modern concept 
of torts, was cursory and wholly unconcerned with the substantive law 
of torts that would come to preoccupy twentieth-century lawyers.21 
Early and mid-nineteenth-century American lawyers and judges, in 
turn, reorganized the law around the principle of contract.22 Private 
contractual relations became the paradigmatic concept through which 
common law lawyers and judges approached legal problems, and law- 
yers treated as contracts cases many disputes that would be considered 
21 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *II5-43. 
22 See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 7, at I60-2 IO ("The Triumph of Contract"). 
This reorganization was primarily a Northern phenomenon; the nature of Southern states' legal 
systems is a matter of some controversy among historians because the law of slavery generated a 
powerful set of noncontractual guiding principles. Compare MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN 
LAW OF SLAVERY, i8i-i86o: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 33-34 (i98i) (ar- 
guing that the law of slavery reinforced a paternalistic worldview), with JENNY BOURNE WAHL, 
THE BONDSMAN'S BURDEN: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF SOUTHERN 
SLAVERY (i998) (redescribing Tushnet's ostensibly paternalistic legal rules as designed to effectuate 
efficient transactions in the peculiar kind of property that was the slave). 
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torts problems today.23 To be sure, wide swaths of the mid-nineteenth- 
century common law were inconsistent with a contractual theory of 
social relations. Noncontractual status relationships characterized the 
relations of husband and wife and master and servant, to name two 
central social institutions.24 At the same time, a robust tradition of 
public regulation of social life persisted alongside the rhetoric of con- 
tractualization.25 States and municipalities governed communities 
through the power of eminent domain,26 the regulation of marriage 
and sexuality,27 the policing of labor relations,28 the regulation of pub- 
lic markets via the police power,29 and innumerable other spheres of 
regulation.30 Nonetheless, judges, lawyers, and legal scholars margi- 
nalized these noncontractual aspects of American law in favor of the 
organizing principle of contract. 
To say that the categories of property and contract dominated the 
legal discourse, however, is not to say that there was no concept of le- 
gal liability for nonconsensual harm in the American legal system prior 
to the late nineteenth century. The basic principle of legal recompense 
for harm is an ancient one. Sociologists in the Weberian tradition, for 
instance, have long argued that the ancient state originated not in con- 
tract, as Locke and Hobbes argued, but rather in tort.31 On this ac- 
count, payment of damages through a centralized institution replaced 
23 On the role of contract-based approaches to accident cases in the mid-nineteenth century (as 
well as continued reliance on property concepts), see Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development 
of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, I5 GA. L. REV. 925 (i98i); see also HORWITZ, TRANS- 
FORMATION I, supra note 7, at 209-I0. 
24 See KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOP- 
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES i60-208 (i99i); TOMLINS, supra note 7, at 232-58; Reva B. Siegel, 
The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, i86o-i93o, 82 
GEO. L.J. 2I27, 2 I33-4I (I994). 
25 See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (i996) (identifying an American tradition of public regulation 
in the nineteenth century). 
26 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 7II, 749-53, 77 I-74 (i986); Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the 
Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL. L. REV. 2I7, 225-27 (i984). 
27 See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000); Ariela R. Dubler, 
Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, I07 YALE L.J. 
i885, i885-86 (i998); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
i05 YALE L.J. 2 I I 7, 2 I I9-20 (i996). 
28 See TOMLINS, supra note 7. 
29 See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 25, at 83-II3; Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, i985 WIS. 
L. REV. 899. 
30 Examples include usury, bankruptcy, corporations, the creation of banks, and the common 
law of competition. For a classic overview, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE 
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (I956). 
31 See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 904-I0 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
I978). 
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clan vengeance as the mechanism for making amends for injury.32 
And indeed, the Code of Hammurabi, written sometime around the 
year 2000 B.C.E., included a schedule of damages that an injurer had 
to pay to the injured, as did the early Roman Twelve Tables.33 Aris- 
totle's account of corrective justice and the law in the Nicomachean 
Ethics required the restoration of the status quo ante in the event of 
what he called "involuntary" transactions.34 Classical Roman law, too, 
had an ad hoc collection of rules for compensatory justice in instances 
of bodily injury, rules that had evolved out of the early practice of 
buying off family vengeance.35 And by the early modern period, such 
civil law scholars as Hugo Grotius distilled from the collection of Ro- 
man law rules governing private wrongs a single standard of civil li- 
ability for "fault," by which Grotius meant action or inaction "in con- 
flict with what men ought to do."36 
Yet the problem of compensation for accidental human injury 
caused by the regular operations of economic life was new to Western 
legal systems in the mid- to late nineteenth century. Aristotle discussed 
his conception of corrective justice not in relation to accidental injury 
but in relation to intentional acts "such as assault, imprisonment, mur- 
der, robbery with violence, mutilation, abuse, insult."37 Even as late as 
i88i, the future Justice Holmes, like Aristotle more than two thousand 
years before, had no conception of the special problems raised for the 
law of torts by a society facing the statistical inevitability of accidental 
injury from economic activity. According to the views expressed in 
Holmes's The Common Law, liability could only be imposed on those 
who could foresee the possibility of injury and yet still chose to go 
ahead with the injury-creating activity.38 If applied at a high enough 
level of generality, of course, this liability standard could have been 
applied to industrial activities. Under modern industrial conditions, 
after all, a certain number of injuries will follow predictably from a 
32 See id. 
33 James Q. Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation 
of Bodies, or Setting of Prices?, 7 I CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 49-53 (I995). 
34 When "one has received and the other has inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other 
been slain," Aristotle explained, "the suffering and the action have been unequally distributed; but 
the judge tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the assail- 
ant." 4 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. V, ch. 4, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 308, 
405 (W.D. Ross trans., Richard McKeon ed., I947). 
35 See F.H. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW I-29 (I950). 
36 Id.at28. 
37 ARISTOTLE, supra note 34, at Bk. V, ch. 2. I do not mean to say that the Aristotelian concept 
of corrective justice is inapplicable to unintentional harms, but merely that Aristotle's central con- 
cern appears to have been intentional acts. 
38 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 92 (Belknap Press I983) (i88i). 
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decision to proceed with a particular economic activity.39 Yet Holmes 
developed his theory of torts not around industrial injury cases but 
around personal interactions. Thus, for Holmes - or at least for the 
Holmes of i88i - the famous case of Brown v. Kendall,40 in which 
one man accidentally struck another with a stick while striking a dog, 
became the paradigm case for a theory of torts.41 
Even as Holmes formulated his early theory of torts, however, the 
development of industrial manufacturing and railroads was under- 
mining his view of the proper role of foresight and choice in tort doc- 
trine. Indeed, Holmes's early account of the nature of tort law was 
remarkably out of touch with the emerging world of tort litigation. In 
39 See DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN HOLMES: HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY, io8- 
09 (I 995). 
40 6o Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (i850). 
41 See HOLMES, supra note 38, at 84-85. Building on Holmes's support for the strict-liability 
theory of Rylands v. Fletcher, I L.R.-Ex. 265 (i866), David Rosenberg has recently argued that 
Holmes's theory of torts is best understood as having advocated a foresight-based strict-liability 
theory. See ROSENBERG, supra note 39. Rosenberg's interpretation is provocative, and it has the 
great benefit of unsettling stale and anachronistic assumptions about Holmes's thinking. But 
much of it is difficult to square with the historical record. As Rosenberg explains, Holmes de- 
fended the Rylands decision, which held a nonnegligent defendant liable for damages from water 
from a reservoir that flooded a neighboring mine, on the ground that the foreseeably risk-prone 
choice of the defendant had been made "further back" in time, when he chose to have an extra- 
hazardous reservoir on his property. See HOLMES, supra note 38, at 157. On Rosenberg's view, 
the removal back in time of the critical moment of choice and foresight is theoretically consistent 
with a relatively broad view of enterprise liability for injuries incurred in the course of industrial 
life. See ROSENBERG, supra note 39, at I35. But in i88i, as Rosenberg concedes, see id. at I34, 
Holmes showed little awareness of the possible application of his theory of torts to the accidents of 
an industrializing era; he certainly showed no interest in applying the removed foresight test to in- 
dustrial enterprise. Instead, Holmes appears to have treated foreseeable but nonnegligent injuries 
as falling into the category of damnum absque injuria: injuries without remedies. See HOLMES, 
supra note 38, at I 15 ("There are certain things which the law allows a man to do, notwithstanding 
the fact that he foresees that harm to another will follow from them."); see also Robert W. Gordon, 
Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, io HOFSTRA L. REV. 7I9, 736-37 (i982). The 
law of torts, by Holmes's lights, properly followed a policy of "protecting trade" rather than "pro- 
tecting titles." HOLMES, supra note 38, at 8o. Accordingly, Holmes's proposed foreseeability stan- 
dard closely resembled the modern negligence standard in its utilitarian social welfare calculation: 
"[T]he public generally profits from individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, and tends to 
the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable 
and inevitable upon the actor." Id. at 77. Even if Rosenberg's foresight-based strict liability ap- 
proach had been Holmes's approach, such a foresight-based approach would have been open to 
widely varying determinations of liability depending on (i) the temporal remove at which the 
judge or scholar made the foresight determination, and (2) the level of generality at which the 
judge or scholar pitched the required foreseeability of the consequences. Judges who required rela- 
tively immediate foreseeability rather than remote foreseeability, or who required that conse- 
quences be foreseeable with particularity, would have been able to create an extremely narrow li- 
ability regime that could have insulated industrial enterprise from the costs of injuries. On the 
bench, Holmes appears to have been precisely such a judge. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 264-72 (I993); Mark Tushnet, The Logic 
of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REV. 975, I030-33 
(I977). 
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an industrial enterprise of the late nineteenth century, it could be said 
with some certainty that there would be injuries to workers; on a rail- 
road, for example, it was wholly foreseeable that there would neces- 
sarily be a certain number of accidental injuries to passengers and em- 
ployees. Injury in these circumstances was statistically inevitable, yet 
railroads and manufacturing enterprises chose (and chose reasonably, 
by most measures) to go forward with their operations anyway. And 
according to Holmes and his contemporaries on the bench, the mere 
fact of that decision was hardly sufficient to charge them with liability 
in the event of accidents that were not foreseeable in their particu- 
lars.42 
Thus, in the years between the Civil War and the end of the cen- 
tury, a new accident problem pushed tort law to the fore for the first 
time as a central problem in the American legal order. Accident rates 
increased dramatically. Personal injury litigation developed and litiga- 
tion rates skyrocketed. For the first time, middle- and working-class 
people purchased life insurance policies on a widespread basis. Newly 
established accident insurance companies wrote a new kind of policy 
for railway passengers. And legal scholars developed a discrete field 
known as "tort law." Boston lawyer Francis Hilliard's i859 treatise on 
torts, though still framed in Blackstone's terms as a treatise on "pri- 
vate wrongs,"43 was, as Hilliard observed in his preface, the first work 
exclusively devoted to the law of torts.44 Within a decade, Harvard 
Law School added a course on torts to its curriculum,45 and within an- 
other twenty years law libraries swelled with new treatises on torts 
and related fields like railroad and insurance law.46 Indeed, within 
two decades of his i88i lectures on the common law, Holmes was 
compelled to rethink his ideas about negligence, foreseeability, and 
choice in light of the statistical inevitability of accidents in modern life. 
Whereas in i88i he had been preoccupied with interpersonal torts re- 
42 See HOLMES, supra note 38, at 95. 
43 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2 I, at *I I5-43. 
44 See I FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS, OR PRIVATE WRONGS, at iii (Boston, Little, 
Brown & Co. i859). 
45 See C.G. ADDISON, THE LAW OF TORTS, ABRIDGED FOR USE IN THE LAW SCHOOL OF 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. i870). 
46 See, e.g., JAMES BARR AMES, SELECT CASES ON TORTS (Cambridge, i874); MELVILLE M. 
BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF TORTS FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS (Boston, Little, Brown 
& Co. i878); GEORGE BLISS, JR., THE LAW OF LIFE INSURANCE WITH CHAPTERS UPON 
ACCIDENT AND GUARANTEE INSURANCE (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. i872); FREDERICK H. 
COOKE, THE LAW OF LIFE INSURANCE INCLUDING ACCIDENT INSURANCE AND INSURANCE BY 
MUTUAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. i89i); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. i879); WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (St. 
Paul, West Publ'g Co. i896); THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. i869). 
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suiting from chance occurrences, in i897 he observed that the "torts 
with which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents of 
certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or property 
by railroads, factories, and the like."47 These injuries, thrown off by 
the seemingly inexorable progress of industry, created the accident law 
dilemmas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
B. Explaining the Development of American Accident 
Compensation Law 
The sudden development of accident law in the mid- to late nine- 
teenth century has long presented an attractive subject for historical 
explanation. Yet the dominant historical accounts of the rise of 
American accident law fail to recognize the extent to which the late 
nineteenth century was a moment of possibility for alternate paths of 
development. 
Existing histories of the development of American accident law 
may be divided roughly into two kinds of accounts: materialist and 
idealist.48 The materialist accounts explain changes in the law of per- 
sonal injury as responses to industrialization. The standard story in 
the historical literature begins in a pre-industrial era often supposed to 
have been characterized by strict liability to injurers for harm inflicted 
on victims.49 The old common law writ of trespass, on this view, pro- 
vided victims of personal injury (as well as victims of any number of 
different kinds of injury to personal or real property) a means to re- 
cover for harm inflicted, whether or not the injurer acted negligently.50 
Trespass thus protected a static conception of the social order by re- 
quiring corrective justice in instances of violation of the status quo.5' 
This conventional materialist story continues into the dawn of the in- 
47 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, io HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (i897). 
48 A third historical approach focuses not on explaining change in the law of torts but rather on 
describing the substantive content of tort law. The leading example is Rabin, supra note 23. There 
is, of course, considerable overlap among the two categories identified in the text and this third 
category. A fourth category might be said to exist in the fledgling attempts to develop a Fou- 
cauldian disciplinary theory of the law of torts. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 7; Jonathan Simon, 
For the Government of its Servants: Law and Disciplinary Power in the Workplace, i870-i906, I3 
STUD. L. POL. & SOc'Y I05 (I993). 
49 See HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 7; Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negli- 
gence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (I95i). The strict liability thesis about the early- 
modern law of accidents has been widely attacked. See, e.g., PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS 
HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 8I-85 (I997); Gary T. Schwartz, 
Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, go YALE L.J. 
I7I7, I722-34 (i98i). 
50 The writ of trespass, however, required plaintiffs to show that the harm occurred directly as 
a result of the defendant's actions rather than indirectly. 
51 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 299-300; HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 7, at 
35-36; Gregory, supra note 49, at 36i-62; Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 
29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 255 (I929) ("A feudal economy required a morality of trespass...."). 
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dustrial era, when the strict liability standard of the writ of trespass is 
said to have given way to a relatively restrictive negligence principle 
that underwrote industrial development.S2 Where once the common 
law had enforced a corrective justice approach to departures from the 
status quo, now tort rules encouraged economic development by al- 
lowing enterprises to shift the cost of injury-producing activity onto 
workers, passengers, and neighboring property owners. Thus, mid- 
nineteenth-century tort law generally attached liability only upon a 
finding of negligence on the part of the defendant and developed a se- 
ries of defenses that often allowed even negligent defendants to escape 
liability. The doctrine of contributory negligence barred recovery for 
those whose own negligence contributed to their injury; the doctrine of 
assumption of risk denied recovery to injured employees on the ground 
that they assumed the ordinary risks of accidents in the workplace; the 
fellow servant rule provided immunity to employers in cases in which 
employee negligence caused the injury of a fellow worker. Then, in 
the last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twen- 
tieth, growth in the rate of accidents and the new maturity of the 
United States's industrialized economy gave rise to an expansion in 
tort liability.53 In the final stage of the materialist account, when tort 
liability threatened to become too great, states adopted workmen's 
compensation statutes at the behest of employers to limit employee re- 
covery in work accident cases.54 
Idealist accounts of the development of accident compensation law 
tell a similar story but explain historical change by reference to devel- 
opments in the history of ideas or the sociology of knowledge rather 
than developments in the economy. Under this approach, the crystalli- 
zation of the negligence principle in nineteenth-century tort law is said 
to have arisen not out of the developmental imperatives of an industri- 
alizing economy, but rather out of the efforts of the late nineteenth- 
century American legal profession to reconceptualize legal rules as a 
set of ordered and scientific principles.55 Jurists like Holmes took it 
52 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 300-02; HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION I, supra note 7, at 85- 
I08; Gregory, supra note 49, at 368, 382. Like the thesis that the eighteenth-century law of torts 
was characterized by a strict liability rule, the story of the rise of a restrictive negligence principle 
has also been challenged. See, e.g., KARSTEN, supra note 49, at 8-I5, 79-I27; Schwartz, supra note 
49, at I727-34. 
53 See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Ac- 
cidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 59-60 (i967). 
54 For materialist accounts of the adoption of workmen's compensation statutes, see ROY 
LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, 1900-I935, at 45-65 (i968); JAMES WEINSTEIN, 
THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, i900-i9i8, at 40-6i (i968); Friedman & Ladin- 
sky, supra note 53, at 69-72. 
55 See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY I2-I9 
(i980). A less sophisticated idealist account is presented in KARSTEN, supra note 49, at 79-I27. 
Karsten argues that mid-nineteenth-century tort doctrine was inherited by American judges who 
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upon themselves in these years to bring conceptual order and theoreti- 
cal cohesion to the jumble of legal doctrines that comprised the early 
nineteenth-century law of torts. The negligence principle arose as the 
leading candidate for doctrinal conceptualists like Holmes because it 
satisfied the conceptualist desire to unify and systematize tort law at 
an exceedingly high level of generality around a single abstract princi- 
ple.56 Thus, rather than an ad hoc collection of relational standards, 
the law of tort instead consisted of one duty of care that each individ- 
ual owed to all the world.57 Furthermore, the idealist approach holds 
that the shift from a narrow mid-nineteenth-century regime of liability 
for negligence to a twentieth-century regime of liberalized liability for 
accidents arose out of new developments in intellectual history. Thus, 
for example, it is said that widening conceptions of causation, respon- 
sibility, and interdependence prompted lawyers and judges to expand 
the scope of liability.58 
were constrained by English precedents and the "taught legal tradition." Id. at 79. He explains 
changes in tort doctrine in the later in the century as the result of judicial sympathy (the "heart" 
rather than the "head") for the plight of injured plaintiffs. See id. at I9I-29I. A more persuasive 
account along similar lines is presented in Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The 
Fellow Servant Rule, i837-i860, I32 U. PENN. L. REV. 579, 598-600 (i984) (arguing that the fel- 
low servant rule spread across American jurisdictions because of judges' ideas about the meaning 
of ordered and rational precedent). Another article in this loose cluster of "idealist" accounts is Al- 
fred S. Konefsky, "As Best to Subserve Their Own Interests": Lemuel Shaw, Labor Conspiracy, and 
Fellow Servants, 7 LAW & HIST. REV. 2I9, 233-35 (i989), which advances an ideological explana- 
tion of the fellow-servant rule as grounded in republican thought. See also Paul Finkelman, Slaves 
as Fellow Servants: Ideology, Law, and Industrialization, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 269, 283-85 
(i987) (providing an ideological account of the distinct rules for personal injuries sustained by 
hired-out slaves in the antebellum South). Earlier idealist accounts explain the development of the 
negligence principle as part of a general evolution in the law from amoral standards of strict liabil- 
ity to rules that looked to the ethics of a defendant's behavior. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Law 
and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (i908). 
56 WHITE, supra note 55, at 4-I9. 
57 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 66o (i873); 
ADDISON, supra note 45, at iii ("The Law of Torts is the law of those rights which avail against per- 
sons generally, or against all mankind, as distinguished from the law of those rights which avail 
against particular persons ... ."). As Robert Rabin has pointed out, whether late nineteenth- 
century lawyers conceived of the negligence principle as attaching universally to social relations, 
the fact remains that the law of torts was shot through with special relational standards, and even 
included large areas of what Rabin rightly calls zones of "no-duty." Rabin, supra note 23, at 928. 
58 RANDOLPH BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK CITY, 
i870-I910, at i67-96 (I992) (attributing the rapid growth in personal injury litigation in turn-of- 
the-century New York City to a "change of mind" regarding responsibility and causation); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 45-76 (i985) (locating the twentieth-century growth of 
American tort law in a new "general expectation of justice"); McEvoy, supra note 7, at 627; William 
E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New York, 1920-i980, 
47 BUFF. L. REV. II7, I30-32 (i999) (arguing that early twentieth-century New York tort princi- 
ples manifested a new conceptualization of causation, responsibility, and fairness, and explaining 
changes in mid-twentieth-century tort law by reference to the development of new ideas about ac- 
cident preventability); Daniel Polisar & Aaron Wildavsky, From Individual to System Blame: A 
Cultural Analysis of Historical Change in the Law of Torts, I J. POL'Y HIST. I29 (i989) (correlating 
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C. Contingency and the Comparative Perspective 
Recent scholarship foreshadows the beginnings of new approaches 
to the history of American accident law. Arthur McEvoy, for example, 
argues that particular dramatic events such as the Triangle Shirtwaist 
fire of i9ii decisively changed the course of accident law reform.59 
And Barbara Welke contends that as more women encountered acci- 
dental injury and death, ideas about gender helped to shape the law of 
torts even as those ideas about gender were themselves constructed 
and reconstructed in railroad accident litigation.60 
Yet despite the glimmerings of new approaches on the horizon, the 
standard materialist and idealist accounts remain the dominant stories 
of the history of American accident law. Neither approach offers a 
persuasive account of the development of accident law, however, for 
neither approach adequately grasps the contingency of the American 
accident law regime.61 Both materialist and idealist approaches gener- 
ally assume that there is a determinate relation between a particular 
course of social change (industrialization) or a new intellectual devel- 
opment (changing ideas about causation), and a particular regime or 
doctrinal structure in accident law. Such an assumption might be 
plausible within the narrow confines of the common law of torts. 
Wider conceptions of causation, for example, might expand the num- 
ber of persons who could be said to have proximately caused a par- 
ticular injury.62 And as noted at the outset, the existing literature on 
the development of late nineteenth-century American accident law is 
in fact preoccupied with problems arising in traditional common law 
tort cases. By focusing on tort doctrine and tort cases, however, schol- 
personal injury litigation patterns with conceptions of responsibility and blame); see also THOMAS 
L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL 
SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY 240-56 (I977) 
(describing changing ideas about causation in late nineteenth-century America). 
59 See McEvoy, supra note 7, at 626. 
60 See Welke, supra note 7, at 397-98; see also Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Com- 
mon Law Courts, i86-1i930, 2i HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 79, I39 (i998) (concluding that judges in 
torts cases carved out specially tailored rules to accommodate the social circumstances of women 
plaintiffs). In many respects, this Article carries forward the gendered interpretations of Schlanger 
and especially Welke, except that the approach here focuses on the gendered nature of accident 
cases involving men. The great bulk of accident cases involved men, and in particular men injured 
at work. As we shall see, injuries to workingmen generated crises for ideas both of independent 
manliness and of dependent Victorian womanhood in late nineteenth-century American society. 
Cf. Welke, supra note 7, at 37 I (noting that a gendered analysis of accident law could be applied 
equally to men as to women). 
61 This point is sketched in summary fashion in Robert W. Gordon, Tort Law in America: An 
Intellectual History, 94 HARV. L. REV. 903, 907 (i98i) (reviewing WHITE, supra note 55). See also 
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, I25 (i984). 
62 Cf. HASKELL, supra note 58, at 240-56; Thomas L. Haskell, Capitalism and the Origins of 
Humanitarian Sensibility, Parts I and II, in THE ANTISLAVERY DEBATE I07, 107-60 (Thomas 
Bender ed., I 992). 
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ars have missed the dynamic and highly contingent character of 
American accident law in these years. The United States and other 
industrializing nations experimented in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries with an array of policy alternatives to address the 
problem of compensation for accident victims, and the existence of al- 
ternatives to tort litigation ruptures the neat relation between particu- 
lar social or intellectual developments and changes in the accident law 
system. Social or intellectual developments could have produced an 
expanded doctrine of proximate cause, but they could also have pro- 
duced - and indeed, did produce - any number of alternative re- 
sponses, such as novel insurance mechanisms, new private contractual 
arrangements, and state compensation systems.63 
A simple comparative examination of Western accident law sug- 
gests the wide array of alternatives in play during the late nineteenth 
century and dispels the notion of a clear relation between industrializa- 
tion or changing ideas of causation, on the one hand, and a particular 
regime of accident law, on the other. The United States, after all, was 
not alone in facing an unprecedented challenge to its legal institutions. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, industrialized countries in Western 
Europe experienced similar growth in accident rates, though never 
quite as dramatically as the United States. Yet despite undergoing 
very similar processes of industrialization and roughly analogous in- 
tellectual developments, Western European nations developed accident 
law regimes quite different from the legal regime of the mid- and late 
nineteenth-century United States. 
Germany offers the most striking contrast to the development of 
American accident law. As in the United States, industrialization 
came later to Germany than to England.64 Yet although its pattern of 
industrialization resembled that of the United States, Germany's acci- 
dent law took a very different path. Germany moved to a regime of 
strict liability for the most important categories of accidents just as the 
United States and England were generalizing the negligence principle. 
In i838, the Prussian Railway Act created a presumption of railroad 
63 Thomas Grey argues persuasively in a forthcoming article that even the structure of the 
common law of tort could have developed in radically different directions in the years after the 
Civil War. See Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 200I). 
64 Feudal institutions and early-modern craft guilds continued to dominate the economies of 
most German states in the early nineteenth century. In the decades after i848, however, the Ger- 
man economy underwent extraordinarily rapid growth and industrialization. ALAN S. MILWARD & 
S.B. SAUL, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE, I 780-i870, at 367 (2d ed. 
I979); W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 38 
(i960); see DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM I750 TO THE PRESENT I93-230 (i969). 
200I] TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ACCIDENT LAW 709 
liability for injuries arising out of railroad accidents.65 And by the late 
i850s, local Prussian districts had established a welter of compulsory 
welfare plans for miners (Knappschaften) and other industrial workers 
(Unterstutzungskassegesetz), which provided medical care and financial 
support for the victims of industrial accidents.66 Germany followed 
Prussia's lead after the unification of the German Reich in i87i and 
adopted the Prussian rule of a presumption of strict liability for rail- 
road accidents, supplemented by a new vicarious liability rule for 
workplace accidents arising out of negligence in factories and in other 
dangerous non-railroad employments.67 Then in i884 Germany 
adopted the first strict-liability workmen's compensation program, re- 
placing cumbersome accident litigation with more efficient, stream- 
lined administrative processes and limited damages.68 To be sure, 
some forty years later, American jurisdictions developed workmen's 
compensation programs that drew on the German model. But whereas 
state compensation programs in the United States remained limited to 
workplace accidents,69 Germany expanded on its workmen's compen- 
sation model to develop social welfare programs such as sickness and 
health insurance that created broad guarantees of compensation for 
disability more generally.70 
English accident compensation law provides another contrast with 
the American system. Tort law scholars have long observed that many 
late nineteenth-century American courts rejected particular English 
tort doctrines, such as the rule of strict liability for certain hazardous 
65 Andre Tunc, Torts, in II INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ? i-8o, 
at 46 (I975); John G. Fleming, Tort Liability for Work Injury, in I5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO- 
PEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ? 9-47, at 33-34 (I975). The railway company could free itself of 
liability "only by showing either that the damage was due to the injured person's own fault or that 
it was caused by an unavoidable, external accident." Tunc, supra, at 46. 
66 E.P. HENNOCK, BRITISH SOCIAL REFORM AND GERMAN PRECEDENTS: THE CASE OF 
SOCIAL INSURANCE, i880-i914, at 43 (i987); GERHARD A. RITTER, SOCIAL WELFARE IN 
GERMANY AND BRITAIN 2I-22 (Kim Traynor trans., i986); GEORGE STEINMETZ, REGULATING 
THE SOCIAL: THE WELFARE STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS IN IMPERIAL GERMANY I 26-2 7 (I 993). 67 See Tunc, supra note 65, at 46-47. 
68 See STEINMETZ, supra note 66, at I27-28; see also GASTON V. RIMLINGER, WELFARE 
POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EUROPE, AMERICA, AND RUSSIA 90-I30 (I97I); RITTER, 
supra note 66, at 32-82; Detlev Zollner, Germany, in THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 
i88i-ig8i: STUDIES OF GERMANY, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND I, 
2 2-28 (Peter A. Kohler & Hans F. Zacher eds., I982). 
69 Exceptions include relatively narrow cause-based compensation programs, such as the Black 
Lung Benefits Program, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, and state programs 
that compensate for neurological birth defects. See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 5, at 79. 
70 Germany enacted its first sickness insurance plan in i883, one year before enacting its indus- 
trial accident compensation plan. See RITTER, supra note 66, at 32-82. On the extension of Ger- 
man state accident insurance in the early twentieth century, see id. at 83-I30; and Zollner, su- 
pra note 68, at 32-52. 
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activities.71 In this sense, there were significant doctrinal differences 
between the American and English tort systems. But at a more basic 
structural level, the English and American compensation systems di- 
verged sharply beginning in i897, when England adopted its own 
workmen's compensation program, fifteen to twenty years before most 
American jurisdictions.72 By the time the United States developed 
workmen's compensation statutes of its own, England (like Germany) 
had expanded the scope of its social insurance mechanisms to provide 
insurance coverage to accident victims outside of the workplace.73 
In sum, comparable foreign jurisdictions developed very different 
accident compensation systems despite sharing similar economic and 
social histories. In the nineteenth century, Germany moved to strict 
liability and compulsory state compensation approaches even as the 
United States adopted the negligence rule. England adopted a state 
compensation system for work accidents earlier than the United States, 
and then moved decisively toward the use of social insurance mecha- 
nisms to compensate accident victims. 
D. The Comparative Perspective in Late Nineteenth-Century America 
To illustrate the inadequacy of historical accounts that draw over- 
determined lessons from changes in the economy or from new ideas 
about causation, it would be enough to establish merely that countries 
undergoing similar social changes developed quite different approaches 
to accident law. One might still object, however, that such alternative 
paths were either unavailable or unknown to Americans at the time. 
But Americans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
were in fact deeply interested in experiments in accident policy abroad. 
Indeed, beginning in the i88os, the cosmopolitan nature of American 
accident law reform debates suggests the availability of a variety of re- 
alistic alternatives. 
Policymakers and academics in progressive-era America partici- 
pated in a vibrant trans-Atlantic dialogue on the problems of modern 
71 This doctrine is the famous rule of Rylands v. Fletcher. For the American courts' rejection of 
the Rylands rule, see Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 450 (i873); and Losee v. Buchanan, 5i N.Y. 
483, 49I (i873). See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS I34-35 
(6th ed. I995). 
72 See P.W.J. BARTRIP & S.B. BURMAN, THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY: IN- 
DUSTRIAL COMPENSATION POLICY i833-i897, at I90-206 (i983); DAVID G. HANES, THE FIRST 
BRITISH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, i897, at 87-Io6 (i968); HENNOCK, supra note 66, at 
63-79; Epstein, supra note i9, at 797-800; see generally W.C. Mallalieu, Joseph Chamberlain and 
Workmen's Compensation, io J. ECON. HIST. 45 (I950). 
73 Most importantly, England's i9ii National Insurance Act created compulsory national 
health insurance. See A.I. Ogus, Great Britain, in THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE: 
i88i-i98i: STUDIES OF GERMANY, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA, AND SWITZERLAND, 
supra note 68, at Iso, I I5-87. 
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social politics in a wide range of fields.74 Accident compensation was 
no exception; debates in the United States about the best course for ac- 
cident policy took place in a self-consciously international conversa- 
tion. The American labor movement, for example, had been aware 
since the mid-nineteenth century of the more favorable liability rules 
in European jurisdictions, and labor leaders who favored liability law 
reform in the i87os and i88os frequently framed their arguments for 
liberalized employers' liability laws in comparative terms.75 In the late 
i88os, the Quarterly Journal of Economics reprinted German accident 
insurance statutes for its American audience.76 Other commentators 
carefully reviewed the viability of the German approach for U.S. acci- 
dent policy.77 And by the i89os, many American social scientists were 
convinced that European examples of compulsory insurance against 
accident and disability represented the future of American policy.78 
Carroll D. Wright, Chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor 
Statistics from i873 to i888 and the first U.S. Commissioner of Labor 
from i888 until I905, was the first American labor reformer to engage 
in systematic comparative study of foreign accident regimes.79 When 
the Massachusetts legislature directed Wright in i882 to investigate 
the subject of employers' liability, especially among railroad workers, 
Wright focused on the comparative study of employers' liability 
laws.80 Ten years later, while serving as U.S. Commissioner of Labor, 
74 See generally JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND 
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, i870-1920 (i986); DANIEL T. 
RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (i998). 
75 See, e.g., THE LABOR MOVEMENT: THE PROBLEM OF TODAY 54-59 (George McNeill ed., 
Boston, A.M. Bridgman & Co. i887). 
76 F.W. Taussig, Workmen's Insurance in Germany, 2 Q.J. ECON. iii (i888); An Act Concerning 
Insurance in Case of Disability and Old Age, 4 Q.J. ECON. I03 (i890). 
77 See, e.g., B.W. Wells, Compulsory Insurance in Germany, 6 POL. SCI. Q. 43, 64 (i89i); F.W. 
Taussig, Workmen's Insurance in Germany, 8 FORUM I59, i69 (i889). 
78 See, e.g., I7 ANN. REP. OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STAT. OF N.Y. i899, at 559-60, ii62 
(i900) [hereinafter ANN. REP. N.Y. LABOR STAT.] (arguing that the "clear ... fact that every trade 
has its own inevitable risks" had led European nations to move to compulsory insurance plans and 
urging United States jurisdictions to abandon "the unjust provisions of the old common law"); 
Charles R. Henderson, Workingmen's Insurance, 4 AM. J. SOC. 695, 696 (i899); Edward Cum- 
mings, Workingmen's Insurance, 6 J. POL. ECON. 556, 558 (I898) (reviewing WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
WILLOUGHBY, WORKINGMEN'S INSURANCE (I898)); John Cummings, Book Review, 6 J. POL. 
ECON. 556 (I898). 
79 Wright was perhaps an unlikely candidate to bring a cosmopolitan perspective to American 
accident compensation. He was born in i840 in a small New Hampshire town. After the Civil 
War, Wright developed a successful law practice and began a promising political career in the state 
senate. In i873, he received a political appointment as chief of the state's new labor statistics col- 
lection effort. When local Republican Party politics defeated his political aspirations in the late 
i870s, Wright made labor statistics his new career. See JAMES LEIBY, CARROLL WRIGHT AND 
LABOR REFORM: THE ORIGIN OF LABOR STATISTICS 7-38 (i960). 
80 See I4 ANN. REP. OF THE MASS. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR I883, at 3-52 (Boston, Wright 
& Potter Printing Co.) [hereinafter ANN. REP. MASS. LABOR STAT.]. 
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Wright hired John Graham Brooks to write a report on German insur- 
ance schemes.81 By the end of the i89os, Wright's continuing belief 
that international examples could inform American law reform led him 
to appoint William Franklin Willoughby as the Department of Labor's 
full-time representative in Europe. Willoughby proceeded to catalog 
the social legislation experiments of European nations in mind- 
numbing detail, and in i898 he prepared a broad survey of European 
workingmen's insurance schemes.82 In Willoughby's view, Continental 
experimentation with compulsory insurance regimes, along with the 
proliferation of voluntary insurance programs, presented a multiplicity 
of possible approaches to a problem of increasingly "great practical 
importance" in the United States.83 
Wright and his team of researchers were hardly the only students 
of American liability law interested in foreign examples. State bureaus 
of labor statistics followed Wright's example, and in the i88os and 
i89os they issued a number of comparative studies of employers' li- 
ability rules.84 Similarly, in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
as workmen's compensation legislation became a topic of serious dis- 
cussion in American legislatures, an array of reformers and academics 
traveled to Europe under the aegis of such organizations as the Russell 
Sage Foundation, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the 
U.S. Department of Labor to see for themselves how other nations 
dealt with accident compensation.85 Moreover, such trans-Atlantic 
policy exchange went both ways. In the i88os, German economists 
81 See JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS, FOURTH ANNUAL SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER 
OF LABOR: COMPULSORY INSURANCE IN GERMANY INCLUDING AN APPENDIX RELATING TO 
COMPULSORY INSURANCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE I I (Washington, D.C., Gov't 
Printing Office I893); JAMES E. MOONEY, JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS: PROPHET OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE: A CAREER STORY 22 (i968). 
82 WILLIAM FRANKLIN WILLOUGHBY, WORKINGMEN'S INSURANCE (New York, Thomas Y. 
Crowell & Co. i898). For a discussion of Willoughby's work, see RODGERS, supra note 74, at 30, 
39, 63, 66. 
83 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 82, at iii-v; see also William Franklin Willoughby, The French 
Workmen's Compensation Act, I2 Q.J. ECON. 398 (i898). 
84 See, e.g., i i ANN. REP. OF THE BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR & INDS. OF N.J. FOR THE YEAR 
ENDING OCT. 3I, i888 (Trenton, John L. Murphy Publishing Co. i889) [hereinafter ANN. REP. 
N.J. LABOR & INDS. STAT.]; I 7 ANN. REP. N.Y. LABOR STAT., supra note 78, at 559-60, I i62. 
85 See, e.g., 24 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANN. REP. OF THE COMM'R OF LABOR: WORKMEN'S 
INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE (I909) (2 vols.); LEE K. FRANKEL & 
MILES M. DAWSON, WORKINGMEN'S INSURANCE IN EUROPE (i910) (Russell Sage Foundation 
study of European social insurance); FERD. C. SCHWEDTMAN & JAMES A. EMERY, ACCIDENT 
PREVENTION AND RELIEF: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE SUBJECT IN EUROPE WITH SPECIAL 
ATTENTION TO ENGLAND AND GERMANY (i91 I) (National Association of Manufacturers study of 
European accident compensation programs); see also Paul Monroe, An American System of Labor 
Pensions and Insurance, 2 AM. J. SOC. 50I (i897). 
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came to the United States to study, among other things, the accident 
insurance programs of American cooperative insurance societies.86 
American accident law reform in the late nineteenth century was 
thus a remarkably cosmopolitan affair in which reformers drew on an 
array of different accident compensation models from Western Europe 
and Britain.87 For Wright, Brooks, and Willoughby, as well as for the 
panoply of groups that followed them, the great attraction of compara- 
tive study of accident law regimes was that it suggested a wide range 
of possible approaches to the problem of accidents in an industrializing 
society. 
II. AMPUTEE WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE 
CRISIS OF FREE LABOR 
A. The Late Nineteenth-Century Accident Crisis 
Before turning to some of the different accident law regimes with 
which Americans experimented in the post-Civil War years, we need to 
take fuller account of the underlying accident problem. As we have 
seen already, Western industrializing nations developed a number of 
different responses to the accident compensation problem of the nine- 
teenth century. But it is not surprising that Germany, England, and 
the United States each developed new accident compensation schemes 
during roughly the same years in the mid- to late nineteenth century. 
For though the accident problem was especially acute in the United 
States, most Western economies faced a similar problem: the explosion 
of accident rates in societies that were rapidly becoming urban and in- 
dustrial. 
To a certain extent it was the specter of modern warfare that forced 
industrializing nations to develop new institutions and policies to deal 
with injury, disability, and death. In the United States in particular, 
the ghastly toll of the Civil War highlighted the need to address the 
fallout from disability and death in an era of new technologies for 
causing injury. Not counting deaths from disease and sickness, 
ioo,ooo Union soldiers were killed in battle during the war, as were at 
86 See AUGUST SARTORIUS VON WALTERSHAUSEN, THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES, i879-i885, at I7I-2I9 (David Montgomery & Marcel van der Linden eds., i998) 
(i885). 
87 For further American discussions of accident compensation framed as comparative studies, 
see I.M. Rubinow, Labor Insurance, I2 J. POL. EcON. 362, 375-78 (I904); and Adna F. Weber, Em- 
ployers' Liability and Accident Insurance, I7 POL. SCI. Q. 256, 26i-83 (I902). 
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least 50,000 Confederate soldiers;88 members of the Union Army alone 
suffered 400,000 nonfatal wounds and injuries.89 
The unprecedented onslaught of human injury made a lasting im- 
pression on the men and women who witnessed it.90 Watching the 
fighting at the First Battle of Bull Run in i86i, one Union nurse wrote 
that the sight of the battlefield was "perfectly appalling." Men lay 
"bleeding, torn and mangled; legs, arms and bodies are crushed and 
broken as if smitten by thunderbolts."9' Frederick Law Olmsted, 
working for the United States Sanitary Commission, recorded the 
waves of wounded and sick he witnessed while organizing hospital 
transports during the i862 Peninsula Campaign. The "wounded," he 
wrote, poured in "by every train," "packed as closely as they could be 
stowed in the common freight cars"; "[t]hey arrived, dead and alive to- 
gether, in the same close box, many with awful wounds festering and 
alive with maggots." "The stench," Olmsted reported, "was such as to 
produce vomiting."92 In the same year, an eyewitness to the horrific 
violence at Antietam recorded having seen "the most appalling sights 
upon the battlefield." The ground was "strewn with the bodies of the 
dead and the dying." "[P]iles of dead men" revealed the "writhing ag- 
ony in which they died," with "arms and legs torn from the body or the 
body itself torn asunder."93 
Wartime casualties generated a vigorous effort to organize effective 
delivery of medical care to wounded and sick soldiers on the battle- 
field. The Sanitary Commission, a semipublic body of volunteers, in- 
spected medical facilities and operated battlefield ambulance and tri- 
age operations in the hopes of creating a "grand system of sanitary 
care and succor in the Federal army."94 And though the Union Army 
Medical Department was slow to develop the organizational coherence 
necessary to deal effectively with the unprecedented number of inju- 
88 HORACE HERNDON CUNNINGHAM, DOCTORS IN GRAY: THE CONFEDERATE MEDICAL 
SERVICE 5 (1958). 
89 GEORGE WORTHINGTON ADAMS, DOCTORS IN BLUE: THE MEDICAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNION ARMY IN THE CIVIL WAR 3 (I952). 
90 As Allan Nevins put it in his classic account of the Civil War, Americans by i863 had come 
to realize that no recent conflict "had cost so much in life .. . as this one threatened to cost." 3 
ALLAN NEVINS, THE WAR FOR THE UNION: THE ORGANIZED WAR i863-i864, at 3 (I97 I). 
91 Emma E. Edmonds, July 2I, i86i, in CIVIL WAR MEDICINE: CARE & COMFORT OF THE 
WOUNDED 34 (Robert E. Denney ed., I994). The thunderbolt analogy is particularly striking. The 
causes of the battlefield devastation, of course, were all too human. Nonetheless, Edmonds con- 
ceived of the causes as acts of god rather than acts of men. 
92 4 THE PAPERS OF FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, DEFENDING THE UNION: THE CIVIL WAR 
AND THE U.S. SANITARY COMMISSION, i86i-i863, at 363 (Jane Turner Censer ed., i986). 
93 I BERNARD BAILYN, ROBERT DALLEK, DAVID BRION DAVIS, DAVID HERBERT DONALD, 
JOHN L. THOMAS & GORDON S. WOOD, THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE 6i6-I7 (I992). 
94 U.S. SANITARY COMM'N, THE SANITARY COMMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY: A 
SUCCINCT NARRATIVE OF ITS WORKS AND PURPOSES iii (n.p., i864). 
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ries, by the end of the war Union doctors were experimenting with 
new methods of sanitation, hygiene, and treatment.95 
The Civil War even gave rise to the United States's first major ex- 
periment in public policy for disability and injury in peacetime. For 
many veterans, of course, wartime injuries remained disabling well af- 
ter the war itself had ended. Thus, in the wake of the war, the federal 
government developed institutions and programs designed to reinte- 
grate the injured Civil War veteran into postwar society. The Na- 
tional Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, created just before the 
end of the war, sheltered veterans whose medical conditions and eco- 
nomic circumstances required inpatient care; by i900, the National 
Home had housed a total of nearly ioo,ooo Union veterans.96 More- 
over, the system of Civil War pensions provided aid to tens of thou- 
sands of disabled veterans in the years after the war.97 To be sure, 
Civil War pensions and veterans' homes never expanded to encompass 
disabled citizens generally. And by the last years of the nineteenth 
century, the veterans' pension program had devolved into a corrup- 
tion-laden spending program with little connection to disability pol- 
icy.98 Yet the Civil War veterans' programs presaged the emergence of 
a series of attempts to deal with the growing problem of accidents in 
late nineteenth-century American civilian life. Indeed, in the first dec- 
ades of the twentieth century, the Civil War veterans' programs would 
lay the groundwork for accident compensation policies aimed at the 
nation's beleaguered industrial army. 
Even in peacetime, however, the process of industrialization gener- 
ated an unprecedented problem of accidental death and injury in 
Western economies. Thus, although the Civil War's role in generating 
a new set of ideas and attitudes about the problem of bodily injury 
ought not be underestimated, observers of the industrial scene in the 
i88os were struck by the fact that the peacetime economy produced 
more death and injuries than the war that preceded it.99 
95 See ADAMS, supra note 89, at i98-99; see also FRANK R. FREEMON, GANGRENE AND 
GLORY: MEDICAL CARE DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR i66-8o (i998). On the Confederate 
Army's medical care, which was hamstrung by a lack of resources, see CUNNINGHAM, supra note 
88, passim. 
96 PATRICK J. KELLY, CREATING A NATIONAL HOME: BUILDING THE VETERANS' WELFARE 
STATE i860-i900, at 2 (I997). 
97 THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF 
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES i09 tbl.2 (I992). 
98 See id. at I I 6-30. 
99 See, e.g., I3 ANN. REP. OF THE BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR AND INDS. OF N.J. FOR THE 
YEAR ENDING OCT. 3I, i890, at 367 (Trenton, W.S. Sharp Printing Co. i89i) ("[T]he destruction 
of human life is much greater in the peaceful pursuits of industry than in war; and if it were possi- 
ble to enumerate them, it would be found far greater than during the four years of destruction in 
the late civil war."). 
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There is, of course, nothing surprising about the observation that 
industrialization generated heightened accident rates. Standard ac- 
counts of the history of legal change during the late nineteenth century 
take as their starting point the cascade of injuries from railroads, ma- 
chines, mechanized workplaces, streetcars, and the many other dan- 
gerous incidents of modern economic life.100 Yet it is worth exploring 
the question in more detail because some historians have challenged 
the idea that industrialization and urbanization were accompanied by 
growth in accident rates. Economic historian Paul Uselding, for ex- 
ample, uses data on the mortality rates of workers in various occupa- 
tions to conclude that industrial manufacturing work was no more 
dangerous than nonindustrial occupations. 101 Similarly, historian 
Randolph Bergstrom concludes from coroners' data on accidental 
death rates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, accident rates were 
generally constant over time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 102 
The available statistics, however, furnish good reason to doubt the 
accuracy of Uselding's and Bergstrom's conclusions. It is notoriously 
difficult to measure accidental injury and death rates during the nine- 
teenth century. Statistics gathered in the middle part of the century by 
state railroad commissions, and subsequently by state bureaus of labor 
statistics, chronically underestimated accident rates because they relied 
almost entirely on employer self-reporting.103 Apparent changes in ac- 
cident rates in the early statistics often reflected little more than 
changes in the effectiveness of data gathering. Moreover, the great dif- 
ficulty in measuring accident rates in the late nineteenth century is 
that while fatality rates provide the most reliable statistics, improve- 
ments in medical care during the period in question make mortality 
rates an unreliable measure of accident rates generally. The pressures 
that the Civil War placed on the American medical establishment 
100 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 467. 
101 See Paul Uselding, In Dispraise of the Muckrakers: United States Occupational Mortality, 
1890g-9io, I RES. ECON. HIST. 334, 348-5, (0976). 
102 See BERGSTROM, supra note 58, at 40-57. 
103 In some cases, the underreporting of accidents resulted from primitive record-keeping prac- 
tices in nineteenth-century firms, especially in smaller, less sophisticated firms. See I7 ANN. REP. 
N.Y. LABOR STAT., supra note 78, at 567-68. In other cases, underreporting resulted from employ- 
ers' incentives to keep state factory inspectors, who could order the installation of expensive safety 
devices, away from their workplaces. In any event, observers commonly agreed that accidents 
were vastly underreported. In i890, for example, the New York State factory inspector explained: 
I do not think that the tables given [of work accidents in the state] contain more than a 
small fraction of the accidents which happened in New York city. Notwithstanding the 
fact that it is a misdemeanor punishable by severe penalties for an employer or his re- 
sponsible agent not to report accidents within forty-eight hours after their occurrence, the 
information that such accidents have occurred is carefully suppressed from the inspec- 
tors, and it is by accident that the facts are oftentimes obtained. 
Id. at 563. 
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prompted the development of modern organizational structures in hos- 
pitals and gave rise to the modern nursing profession.104 More impor- 
tantly still, the i87os and i88os witnessed the widespread introduction 
of germ theory and antiseptic surgery into American hospitals, funda- 
mentally transforming the practice of medicine and dramatically im- 
proving the survival rates for surgeries such as amputations.105 If 
more and more injuries that would have resulted in death in the i86os 
were being treated successfully by i900, then even relatively constant 
accidental death rates over the course of the late nineteenth century 
suggest sharply increased rates of serious accidental injury.106 
Nonetheless, the statistics that are available indicate that accident 
rates in Western nations grew sharply in the mid-nineteenth century. 
In England, the percentage of all deaths resulting from violent causes 
rose by over 350% between I700 and the mid-i8oos, even though 
deaths from homicide and execution fell sharply after the late I700s. 107 
Similarly, in France, accidental deaths per ioo,ooo individuals almost 
doubled, from fifteen in the late i820S to twenty-eight by i860.108 
Accident rates in the United States are more difficult to determine, 
but they too appear to have increased dramatically during the mid- 
and late nineteenth century. The i850 census was the first to count 
deaths from accidents. During the next thirty years, the share of 
deaths attributable to accident among men aged ten to fifty increased 
by over 70%, from 7% to I2%.109 Growth in the share of deaths at- 
104 See ADAMS, supra note 89, at I76-84; CUNNINGHAM, supra note 88, at 267-73; 4 NEVINS, 
supra note 90, at 3 I I-I4. 
105 See CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S Hos- 
PITAL SYSTEM I22-65 (i987); see also LESTER S. KING, TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN MED- 
ICINE: FROM BENJAMIN RUSH TO WILLIAM OSLER i8o-8i (i99i). 
106 Uselding, in concluding that nonindustrial and industrial occupations were equally hazard- 
ous, relies on the dubious assumption that the mortality rates of men within a particular occupa- 
tion reflected the dangerousness of that occupation. See Uselding, supra note ioi, at 349. Useld- 
ing's comparison of industrial and nonindustrial occupational death rates does not account for the 
fact that advances in medical care were likely to be more readily available to industrial workers 
and workers in urban areas than to nonindustrial or agricultural workers. See id. at 34I-48. 
Similarly, although Bergstrom purports to account for improvements in medical care over time, see 
BERGSTROM, supra note 58, at 53, the evidence he advances for his conclusion that "accident rates 
were not rising" between i870 and i9io appears to rest largely on fixed ratios of accidental injuries 
to accidental deaths, see, e.g., id. at 4I tbl.I3 (presenting relatively constant rates of accidental 
death per capita over time). 
107 See Cornelius Walford, On the Number of Deaths from Accident, Negligence, Violence, and 
Misadventure in the United Kingdom and Some Other Countries, 44 J. STAT. SOC'Y LONDON 444, 
450, 452, 485 (i88i). The actual growth is likely to be considerably higher than 350o because the 
figures for I700 were collected for London only, whereas nineteenth-century figures were collected 
from a wider range of locales. It is likely that in 1700 (as in the nineteenth century) accidental 
death rates were higher in London than in the agricultural countryside. See id. at 454. 
108 Id. at 476. 
109 I compiled these figures from the published census reports from i850 to i88o. See J.D.B. DE 
Bow, SUPERINTENDENT, U.S. CENSUS, MORTALITY STATISTICS OF THE SEVENTH CENSUS OF 
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tributable to accidents was especially pronounced in the North. In 
southern states such as Alabama, Louisiana, and South Carolina, acci- 
dents accounted for roughly the same percentage of deaths among men 
aged ten to fifty in 1870 as in I850, ranging from 5% to 9%.11O In 
northern states such as Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, by contrast, 
accidents accounted respectively for 6% and 7% of the deaths of men 
aged ten to fifty in I850, and I2% and I5% of such deaths in I870.111 
And among particular classes of accidents, the increased share of 
deaths attributable to accidents was even greater. In i86o, railroad 
accidents accounted for only o.6% of deaths among males aged ten to 
fifty; by i890, that figure jumped to almost 3%, a fivefold increase.'12 
It was commonly accepted, moreover, that accident rates in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth-century United States were considera- 
bly higher than in Europe.'13 And by comparison to late twentieth- 
century and early twenty-first-century accident rates, late nineteenth- 
century rates of accidental injury and death were staggering. In I9I2, 
the best study of deaths from accidental injury estimated 82,500 deaths 
per year;'14 today, the population of the United States has tripled, but 
the number of accidental deaths has remained virtually constant.115 
Workplace injuries were far and away the leading category of acci- 
dental injury and death in turn-of-the-century America, representing 
THE UNITED STATES, i850, at 17-20 (Washington, D.C., A.O.P. Nicholson i855); SEC'Y OF THE 
INTERIOR, STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, (INCLUDING MORTALITY, PROPERTY, &C.,) IN 
i86o, at 52-55 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office i866); 2 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, EMBRACING THE TABLES OF DEATHS, BIRTHS, SEX, AND AGE, NINTH CENSUS 
20-22 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office i872) [hereinafter VITAL STATISTICS]; JOHN S. 
BILLINGS, REPORT ON THE MORTALITY AND VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES AS RE- 
TURNED AT THE TENTH CENSUS (JUNE i, i88o), pt. I, at 44-53 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing 
Office I885). 
110 DE Bow, supra note iog, at 50-53 (Alabama); id. at 99-III (Louisiana); id. at 250-55 (South 
Carolina); 2 VITAL STATISTICS, supra note io9, at 22-25 (Alabama); id. at 84-87 (Louisiana); id. at 
i64-67 (South Carolina). 
111 I compiled these figures from the published census reports from i850 to i870. Changes in 
the i88o census report make it difficult to calculate state-by-state death figures. See DE Bow, su- 
pra note io9, at I32-37 (Massachusetts); id. at 235-39 (Pennsylvania); 2 VITAL STATISTICS, supra 
note iog, at 96-99 (Massachusetts); id. at I56-59 (Pennsylvania). 
112 I compiled these figures from the published census reports from i86o to i890. See JOHN S. 
BILLINGS, REPORT ON VITAL AND SOCIAL STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE ELEV- 
ENTH CENSUS: i890, PART I. - ANALYSIS AND RATE TABLES 740-45 (Washington, D.C., Gov't 
Printing Office i896); SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, supra note I09, at 53-55. 
113 One early twentieth-century study of railroad fatalities found that in the years from i89i to 
I903, fatalities were four times more common per mile of train line in the United States than in 
England. See Doten, supra note I5, at I55, i67; see also ALDRICH, supra note I3, at I7 (stating 
that in i889 the fatality rate for railroad employees in the United States was nearly fifty percent 
higher than in Great Britain). 
114 Hoffman, supra note i i, at I7. 
115 See NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS, supra note I7, at 26 tbl.8 (stating that there 
were 97,835 deaths from accidents and adverse effects in the United States in i998). 
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close to one third of all accidental deaths and one half of all accidental 
injuries.116 Indeed, accidents were the leading cause of death among 
workers in hazardous industries such as railroads and mining.117 In 
i890, railroad workers' death rates were 3I4 per hundred thousand 
workers per year. Coal miners' fatality rates were comparable, rang- 
ing from 2I5 deaths per hundred thousand workers per year in bitu- 
minous coal mines to 300 deaths per hundred thousand workers per 
year in anthracite coal mines.118 Certain subsets of workers in these 
dangerous industries had even higher rates of accidental death; train- 
men, whose jobs required that they operate the coupling devices be- 
tween cars, and brakemen, who operated the train's handbrakes, died 
in work-related accidents at rates of goo and II4i deaths per hundred 
thousand workers per year, respectively.119 Moreover, in i890 railroad 
and mine workers alone represented more than one in twenty Ameri- 
can wage-earners.'20 In short, a significant portion of the nation's la- 
bor force was subject to extraordinarily high work-accident rates.121 
It is clear that nineteenth-century observers believed that the num- 
ber of accidental injuries was increasing rapidly. Moreover, they were 
certain that the cause of the perceived increase in injury rates was the 
increased mechanization of industrial life.122 Muckraking journalists 
of the early twentieth century, of course, voiced this complaint quite 
116 See Hoffman, supra note II, at I, I7 (stating that there were two million accidental injuries 
and deaths per year total and one million accidental injuries and deaths in the workplace per year; 
82,500 accidental deaths per year total and 25,000 accidental workplace deaths per year). By com- 
parison, in the i990s, work accidents represented approximately twenty-five percent of all acci- 
dents. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER, M. SUSAN MARQUIS, ALLAN F. ABRAHAMSE, SANDRA H. 
BERRY, PATRICIA A. EBENER, ELIZABETH G. LEWIS, E. ALLAN LIND, ROBERT J. MACCOUN, 
WILLARD G. MANNING, JEANNETTE A. ROGOWSKI & MARY E. VAIANA, COMPENSATION FOR 
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (i99i) [hereinafter COMPENSATION FOR 
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES]. 
117 Other occupations in which accidents were the leading cause of death included rubber fac- 
tory operatives, boatmen and canalmen, quarrymen, telegraph and telephone linemen and electric 
lightmen, and brick- and tile-makers and terra cotta workers. See BILLINGS, supra note II 2, at 
980-83. 
118 ALDRICH, supra note I3, at I5, 284-85, 300-OI. 
119 Id. at i5. 
120 See id. 
121 See id. In i900, approximately one percent of the population fell victim to a work accident 
resulting in death or disability lasting more than four weeks. By contrast, in i990, less than one 
percent of the population suffered any injury - workplace related or otherwise - requiring medi- 
cal attention or causing a restriction in activities. See DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL 
TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 3 
(i996) (stating that in i985, 2.3 million Americans suffered serious injuries and I43,000 died as a 
result of injuries sustained in accidents). I calculated these percentages by reference to the popula- 
tion statistics in HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE STATES OF THE UNITED STATES: Two CENTUR- 
IES OF THE CENSUS, 1790-I990, at 103-04 (Donald B. Dodd ed., 1993). 
122 Cf, e.g., P.W.J. BARTRIP & S.B. BURMAN, THE WOUNDED SOLDIERS OF INDUSTRY: IN- 
DUSTRIAL COMPENSATION POLICY, i833-i897, at i4 (i983) (describing perceptions of work acci- 
dents in England). 
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vigorously. "The radical revolution in industrial methods," contended 
a typical article in the New York magazine The Independent, "has in- 
volved a vast increase of danger to the laborers."'123 Accidental death 
and injury, wrote another journalist, were "the inevitable concomitants 
of high-speed machine production." Yet the rate of accidents had in- 
creased to such an extent, he argued, as to be "unjust, wasteful of 
money and human life, and generally intolerable."1124 All in all, the 
muckraking press agreed that the accident problem had become "one 
of the most extraordinary conflicts in our industrial history,"1125 repre- 
senting nothing short of "a state of continual war between capital and 
labor."126 
More sober observers agreed that the rate of accidents was grow- 
ing. In the United States, census takers continually added new catego- 
ries to their listing of deaths by accident and injury. The I850 census 
measured the number of accidental deaths from burns, drownings, 
scaldings, and other "accidents."1127 The i86o census added new cate- 
gories, including one for "accidents, railroad,"1128 and the 1870 census 
added "[m]ining accidents," "[i]njuries by machinery," and accidents 
from "[flailing bodies."1129 In France, the chief of the General Statisti- 
cal Department concluded in i865 that the number of accidental 
deaths was increasing throughout the Western world at a rate greater 
than the rate of population growth.130 And in England, students of 
accident statistics in the i88os believed that the ratio of deaths from 
accidental injury to deaths from all causes had been increasing since 
the beginning of the century.131 
Many also agreed that industrialization caused the increases in ac- 
cident rates. The first statistical studies of accidents in England in the 
i85os centered on the problem of railroad accidents, to which an "un- 
usual degree of public attention" had "recently [been] directed."1132 
123 Chauncey B. Brewster, Industrial War or Peace, INDEP., June 29, i9iI, at I4I7. 
124 Robert W. Bruere, The Welfare War, HARPER'S MAG., Oct. i9i I, at 674. 
125 Id. 
126 Brewster, supra note I23, at I4I7. 
127 See DE Bow, supra note i09, at I7-20. Individual state reports in the i850 census occasion- 
ally listed additional categories such as "explo[sion] ... steam" (Louisiana), "accident ... railroad" 
(Louisiana and Massachusetts), and "accident ... machinery" (Massachusetts and New York). Id. 
at 99-III, 132-37, i83-87. 
128 See SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, supra note i09, at 4,52-55. 
129 FRANCIS A. WALKER, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 
XiX, i8-21 (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office i872). "Falling bodies" appears to have been a 
reference to falling objects (linked, no doubt, to the construction of increasingly tall buildings), not 
falling cadavers. 
130 Walford, supra note 107, at 476. 
131 Id. at464. 
132 F.G.P. Neison, Analytical View of Railway Accidents, i6 J. STAT. SOC'Y LONDON 289, 289 
(i853). See generally F.G.P. Neison, Analytical View of Railway Accidents, 17 J. STAT. SOC'y 
LONDON 2 I 9 ( I85 4). 
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Subsequent nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century studies of 
accidents continued to focus on railroads and also expanded to facto- 
ries and other mechanized workplaces.133 "[T]he general feeling," ex- 
plained a U.S. Department of Labor investigator, "is that the introduc- 
tion of high power and complicated machinery has resulted in the 
increase in the number and severity of accidents."1134 One English ob- 
server even posited that the accidental death rate bore an arithmetical 
proportionality "to the quantity of mechanical force in use."'135 It 
comes as no surprise, then, that the first accident insurance company, 
founded in I845 in London, dedicated itself entirely to insuring rail- 
way passengers against accidents;136 by i864, the Travelers' Insurance 
Company became the first company to take up the same line of busi- 
ness in the United States. 137 
Whether or not there was an increase in the rate of accidents dur- 
ing the late nineteenth century (and it appears that there was), the in- 
dustrial revolution devised myriad new and unfamiliar mechanisms for 
inflicting harm on the human body. If age-old sources of injury, ill- 
ness, and premature death had been more or less integrated into the 
fabric of everyday life, new industrial causes of accident and death 
stood out in bold relief against the background of traditional and fa- 
miliar sources of human suffering. "[T]he various and continually 
multiplying uses of steam and of electricity," observed one accident in- 
surance expert in i89i, "are surrounding us with a thousand dangers 
which not only were unknown to our fathers, but which were strange 
to the boyhood and to the early manhood of those who have hardly 
reached middle age."'138 Charles Francis Adams, a railroad commis- 
sioner in Massachusetts and later commissioner of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and head of the Union Pacific Railroad, re- 
marked in 1879 that "there are few things of which either nature or 
man is, as a rule, more lavish than human life; - provided always 
that the methods used in extinguishing it are customary and not un- 
duly obtrusive on the sight and nerves."'139 By contrast, those features 
of industrial life that developed novel methods of human destruction 
were "anxiously investigated by ingenious men."'140 Adams sensibly 
pointed out that given the extraordinary technological feat represented 
133 See, e.g., Doten, supra note 15, at 155; Katharine Pearson Woods, Accidents in Factories and 
Elsewhere, 4 PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS'N 303, 303 (i895). 
134 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 82, at 7. 
135 Walford, supra note 107, at 464. 
136 James R. Pitcher, Accidents and Accident Insurance, 12 FORUM 131, 133 (i89i). 
137 See id. 
138 Id. at 136. 
139 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR., NOTES ON RAILROAD ACCIDENTS i (New York, G.P. Put- 
nam's Sons i879). 
140 Id. at 2. 
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by the development of the railroad, the number of railroad accidents at 
the close of the I870s - even if appalling by some standards - was 
cause for celebration. Who, after all, could have thought merely a half 
century before that "a body weighing in the neighborhood of two hun- 
dred tons, moving over the face of the earth at a speed of sixty feet a 
second and held to its course only by two slender lines of iron rails" 
could ever have been made as safe as it was?141 But while ancient and 
familiar sources of tragedy appeared to be caused by some combina- 
tion of natural forces, acts of God, and fate, railroad accidents seemed 
to have human causes that were direct and immediate. As Carroll 
Wright of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics observed in 
I883, disability and death arising out of age-old sources could be 
chalked up to mere chance. In railroad accidents, by contrast, Wright 
claimed that most Americans believed that "[n]o man dies without a 
cause, though the cause and the causer may remain alike unknown."''42 
B. Amputee Workingmen, Destitute Widows, 
and the Crisis of Free Labor 
i. The Multiple Ideals of Free Labor. - Although European ex- 
amples played an important role in influencing the direction of Ameri- 
can accident law reform, Americans interpreted the industrial accident 
problem in terms of an ideological framework unique to the United 
States. 
By the I84os and i85os, increasing numbers of Americans in the 
North viewed free markets in labor as the centerpiece of economic and 
political freedoms. To be sure, some Americans saw in the wage labor 
relation what Southern slaveholder and ideologue George Fitzhugh 
called "a more perfect compulsion" of the worker.143 And not all of 
these critics of free labor were Southerners; a number of labor reform- 
ers in the antebellum North argued that labor markets reduced the 
wage worker to the dependent condition of "wage slavery."'144 Still, 
William Lloyd Garrison captured the increasingly dominant strain of 
thinking about free labor when he observed that the wage laborer, un- 
like the slave, was a "free agent." The wage laborer, after all, "con- 
141 Id. at 269; see also i i ANN. REP. N.J. LABOR & INDS. STAT., supra note 84, at 3 ("But what is 
still more remarkable is the comparatively small number of accidents to travelers, and that this 
danger has been constantly diminishing."). 
142 I4 ANN. REP. MASS. LABOR STAr., supra note 8o, at 68. 
143 GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 32 (C. Vann Wood- 
ward ed., Harvard Univ. Press i960) (i857). 
144 AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE 
MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION I9-2I (i998); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMO- 
CRATIC: NEW YORK CITY & THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, I788-i850, at 33I- 
32 (i984). 
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tract[ed] for his own wages" and "own[ed] himself." He was "the 'lord 
of his presence' . . . though he may be 'lord of no land beside."''145 
The Civil War cemented the ideal of free labor as the core of the 
American national ideology. The Thirteenth Amendment - ratified in 
i865 - prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude except as a pun- 
ishment for crime. Many Americans, of course, flouted the commit- 
ment to free labor announced in the Thirteenth Amendment. In the 
South especially, peonage, sharecropping, vagrancy statutes, and con- 
vict labor recreated many of the conditions of slavery. Nonetheless, 
the free labor ideal stood as the central legacy of the great national 
conflict; as a political ideal, it was virtually unchallengeable in the 
decades after the close of the Civil War.146 
The centrality of the free labor ideal, however, obscured the fact 
that Americans understood the core value of free labor in a number of 
quite different ways.147 Such conceptions of free labor overlapped in 
important respects, and many Americans subscribed to more than one 
of them. But the competing perspectives on the meaning of free labor 
held very different implications for the challenges of adapting the free 
labor ideal to an industrializing economy. According to some, for ex- 
ample, the chief virtue of free labor was its efficiency; on this view, 
free labor served as a better inducement to productive work than 
mechanisms of coerced labor.148 For others, the legitimacy of free la- 
bor rested on its capacity to provide a family wage that allowed 
workingmen to support wives and children. 149 For our purposes, how- 
ever, two competing conceptions of free labor emerged in the years 
following the Civil War: the classical liberal ideal of autonomy and the 
labor movement's ideal of substantive independence. 150 
(a) The Liberal Ideal of Autonomy. - For some, the central value 
of free labor was its commitment to liberalism and individual auton- 
omy.151 Atlantic Monthly editor William Dean Howells, for example, 
145 STANLEY, supra note I 44, at 2 I. 
146 The two leading accounts of this history are ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE 
MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 6, 74-I0 (I970); 
and ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, i863-i877 (i988). 
147 See ERIC FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY (i983); Wil- 
liam E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, i985 WIS. 
L. REV. 767. 
148 See Jonathan A. Glickstein, "Poverty is Not Slavery": American Abolitionists and the Com- 
petitive Labor Market, in ANTISLAVERY RECONSIDERED i98 (Lewis Perry & Michael Fellman 
eds., I979). 
149 See STANLEY, supra note I44, at I38-40; see also NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMAN- 
HOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, I780-i835, at 2 I (I977). 
150 The former conception of free labor was held quite strongly by supporters of state accident 
insurance systems; private employer accident compensation schemes embodied the latter. 
151 See DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS 
i862-i872, at 379-80 (i967); Forbath, supra note I47, at 786-94. For a discussion of the early nine- 
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argued that "order" and "government" could be rescued from the 
heightening "chaos" and "anarchy" of the industrial economy only by 
the adoption of a liberal approach to American self-government. 
Howells contended that individual "moral self-control," rather than 
state action, held the key to liberty and order in these industrial 
times.'52 Similarly, leading liberals such as E.L. Godkin of The Nation 
saw in the Union's triumph in the Civil War a vindication of the prin- 
ciples of classical liberalism. Free labor, for Godkin, meant the promo- 
tion of consensual relationships among autonomous private actors over 
the compulsory or coercive relations that had characterized the slave 
South. 
(b) The Labor Ideal of Independence. - Leaders in the American 
labor movement, by contrast, saw in the free labor ideal a substantive 
commitment to independence rather than autonomy. Though similar 
in some respects to the liberal ideal of autonomy, independence stood 
for a different principle. Those who valued autonomy supported the 
maintenance of procedures for unconstrained freedom of choice, with- 
out regard to the substance of the choices that individuals made. Free 
markets in labor thus formed a critically important part of the liberal 
conception of procedural justice, for labor markets institutionalized the 
consensual formation of labor relations.153 The labor movement, how- 
ever, valued not procedures for the realization of autonomous choice, 
but rather substantive outcomes that guaranteed citizens' independ- 
ence.154 In particular, the labor movement drew on the long tradition 
of "republicanism" in political thought that prized the public virtues of 
an independent citizenry over the privatized good of autonomous indi- 
viduals.155 
From the workingman's perspective, the spread of wage labor 
markets posed a potential threat to free labor ideals of independence. 
teenth-century origins of the relationship between free labor values and liberal political thought, 
see GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 2 76-86 (I993). 
152 W.D. Howells, Editorial, 29 ATLANTIC MONTHLY I24, I26 (i872); see also MONTGOMERY, 
supra note I 5i, at 379-80. 
153 For a discussion of liberalism as a "procedural" theory of politics, see MICHAEL SANDEL, 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS (i996); and MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE I20-2 I (i982) [hereinafter SANDEL, LIBERALISM]. 
154 See LEON FINK, WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY: THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 3-I5 (i983); Forbath, supra note I47, at 800-ii; DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WOR- 
KER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE 
MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 43-5I (I993); DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL 
OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 2 2-44 (i987). 
155 See generally JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IM- 
AGINATION (I992); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU- 
TION (i967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (I975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREA- 
TION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-I787 (i969). 
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Wage labor, after all, resembled slavery in that it rested on the sale of 
human labor power. To be sure, the free labor sale of labor power was 
only for a term, not for life. But as labor leaders observed, an ostensi- 
bly free laborer forced by circumstances into a lifetime of back-to-back 
employment contracts was, in effect, required to sell his labor power 
for life.156 Confidence in the political virtues of free markets in labor 
thus rested in large part on the idea that wage laborers would, in time, 
become independent proprietors. In Lincoln's famous words, "[i]f any 
continue through life in the condition of the hired laborer, it is not the 
fault of the system." Instead, Lincoln contended, prolonged wage la- 
borer status manifested "either a dependent nature which prefers it, or 
improvidence, folly, or singular misfortune."157 
2. The Dilemmas of Free Labor. - By the late I87os and i88os, 
each of these conceptions of free labor faced new challenges. Increas- 
ing interdependence and inequalities of wealth, for example, threat- 
ened liberals' aspirations toward an ideal of autonomy. In an urban- 
izing and industrializing world, it was not entirely clear that the 
boundaries of individual autonomy could be meaningfully established. 
Moreover, the disparate resources of the rich and the poor raised the 
possibility that ostensibly consensual interactions might become rela- 
tions of coercion. 
Similarly, the spread of wage labor undermined the prized inde- 
pendence of the American workingman. Already in i870, over two 
thirds of all gainfully employed Americans were hirelings rather than 
independent proprietors or master craftsmen. 158 Subsequent years saw 
further increases in the proportion of workingmen who were wage- 
earners. By i873, the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor an- 
nounced that wage labor had become "a system more widely diffused 
than any form of religion, or of government, or indeed, of any lan- 
guage."'159 And in the ensuing decades, the work of state labor statis- 
tics departments came to focus virtually exclusively on the problems of 
wage-earners. "It is characteristic of the condition of the free laborer 
today," wrote one accident insurance expert at the turn of the century, 
"that he possesses no capital."160 Indeed, "his only means of livelihood 
is the sale of his labor power."'161 The Lincolnian dream of the wage 
laborer's rise to independence, it seemed, was increasingly out of step 
156 See MONTGOMERY, supra note I5i, at 379-80; STANLEY, supra note I44, at 93. 
157 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 479 (Roy P. Basler ed., I953); MONT- 
GOMERY, supra note I 5 i, at 3 I . 
158 See MONTGOMERY, supra note I 5i, at 2 9-30. 
159 STANLEY, supra note I44, at 62 (citing 4 ANN. REP. MASS. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR 440 
(Boston, Wright & Potter i883)). 
160 Rubinow, supra note 87, at 362. 
161 Id. 
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with the social structure of a free labor economy in which wage- 
earning was not a temporary phase but a permanent condition. 
Moreover, many American workingmen understood their inde- 
pendence as workers to be closely linked to their capacity to support 
and maintain their wives and children in a secure domestic life sepa- 
rate and apart from the market. Yet even as wage labor was under- 
mining the independence of workers in the labor market, social condi- 
tions began to undermine the free labor system's capacity to preserve 
an independent domestic sphere. Many Americans thus began to 
worry that low wages and cyclical unemployment would force in- 
creasing numbers of young people to avoid marriage altogether.'62 
And in the final years of the nineteenth century, widespread public 
concern about child labor and prostitution indicated that the free labor 
system was failing in its aim of shielding women and children from the 
exigencies of the marketplace.'63 
3. Industrial Accidents and the Dilemmas of Free Labor. - By the 
turn of the century, industrial accidents stood at the center of Ameri- 
can anxieties about the viability of free labor ideals in an industrial 
economy. Indeed, notwithstanding concern over declining autonomy, 
the spread of wage labor, cyclical unemployment, declining marriage 
rates, and an apparent rise in prostitution, industrial accidents in- 
creasingly provided the most vivid manifestation of the crises of free 
labor ideals. 
In part, growing concern for the accident problem resulted from 
the startling imagery of the industrial accident victim. Unlike other 
industrial problems, industrial accidents left visible and deeply dis- 
turbing marks on their victims. As Lewis Hine documented in his 
photographic essays on injured workingmen and their families, the 
startling violence of encounters between flesh and machine was readily 
apparent in the form of missing limbs and scarred bodies.'64 As a re- 
sult, by the first decade of the twentieth century the industrial injury 
became a symbol for a wide array of industrial problems. 
The importance of industrial accidents was more than symbolic, 
however. In i893 Carroll Wright wrote that of all the subjects[] 
within the whole range of social economics," the single most important 
problem was "the economic insecurity attending the [nation's] great 
162 See STANLEY, supra note I44, at I38-74. 
163 See id. at 2 i8-63. On anxieties about women in commerce in the late nineteenth century, see 
also BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE 
AMERICAN REFORM TRADITION (i987); RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION 
IN AMERICA, i900-i9i8(i982). 
164 For photographs, see CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW I44, I49, I53, 
I56 (i9io). 
2001] TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ACCIDENT LAW 72 7 
industries."''65 And of all the sources of such economic insecurity, so- 
cial insurance student William Willoughby argued that accidents 
loomed largest. Unlike workingmen in Europe, Willoughby claimed in 
the mid-i8gos, American workers rarely looked to outside assistance 
for infirmities of old age or sickness. But accidents were difficult to 
anticipate. And even for those American workers who sought to make 
provisions for the possibility of accidental injury or death, the typical 
over-optimism of individuals frequently left injured workingmen and 
their families less than fully prepared. Thus according to Willoughby 
it was in the "field of accidents alone" that free labor ideals were se- 
verely threatened.'66 And by the first decade of the twentieth century, 
such organizations as the American Association for Labor Legislation 
listed industrial accidents as the first and most important problem 
facing working-class families.'67 
Not everyone thought that accidents posed the most significant 
problem for American wage-earners. Looking back from the perspec- 
tive of the 1930S on his career as a social insurance expert at the 
opening of the century, I.M. Rubinow named accidents the first of "the 
Four Horsemen that ride roughshod over lives and fortunes of millions 
of wage workers": accident, illness, old age, and unemployment.168 Yet 
in 1913, Rubinow had argued that accidents were "not [] the most se- 
rious of the economic dangers confronting the wage earners," and ob- 
served that "historically various forms of sick-insurance and old age 
165 Carroll D. Wright, Letter of Transmittal, in FOURTH SPECIAL REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF LABOR: COMPULSORY INSURANCE IN GERMANY INCLUDING AN APPENDIX 
RELATING TO COMPULSORY INSURANCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE 9, 9 (Washington, 
D.C., Gov't Printing Office, i895) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
166 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 82, at 282-83. Willoughby explained: 
In regard to the question of the provision of old-age pensions, or a national system of 
sick insurance for the benefit of the laboring classes, it can possibly be alleged, with con- 
siderable show of reason, that conditions in the United States are so different from what 
they are in Europe, that the action of the latter furnishes but an indifferent guide as to 
what should be done here. The same, however, cannot be claimed in the case of accidents 
to labor. Here, on the contrary, the necessities for measures of reform are even more 
pressing than in Europe. Accidents are, if anything, more frequent, and the demand that 
the workingmen who are injured should be indemnified by their employers is equally im- 
perative. 
Id. at 327-28; see also Cummings, supra note 78, at 56o (reviewing WILLOUGHBY, supra note 82, 
and focusing on the special problem of work accidents). 
167 See, e.g., Henry R. Seager, Outline of a Program of Social Legislation with Special Reference 
to Wage-Earners, in LABOR AND OTHER ECONOMIC ESSAYS I3I (I93I) (listing "industrial acci- 
dents" as the first of the "principal contingencies which threaten standards of living"); Henry R. 
Seager, Outline of a Program of Social Reform, in id. at 79-80 (arguing in an essay originally pub- 
lished in I907 that protecting "those who have been reduced to poverty because of some accident 
or misfortune" presents the chief challenge for social reform legislation). 
168 I.M. RUBINOW, THE QUEST FOR SECURITY 20-2 I (I934). 
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relief preceded accident insurance."'169 Similarly, Columbia University 
economist Henry Seager had contended that illness was muchuh more 
serious than accidents in its effect on standards of living."1170 
Even Rubinow and Seager, however, conceded that the industrial 
accident problem most captured the attention of Americans.171 In 
part, this preoccupation arose out of the fact that accidents - espe- 
cially work accidents - posed particularly acute problems for work- 
ing-class families. Industrial accidents disproportionately affected 
wage-earning men supporting dependent wives and children. In i890, 
accidents accounted for more than five times as many deaths among 
men aged fifteen to forty-five as among women of the same age.172 
Similarly, an i899 study found that of i847 persons injured in New 
York work accidents, only 85 were women.173 New immigrant groups 
from Southern and Eastern Europe were especially hard hit; as early 
as i890, Hungarians, Bohemians, and Italians were three of the four 
nationalities with the highest accidental death rates.174 And among 
working-age men in important industrial occupations such as railroad 
work, mining, logging and timber work, and bricklaying and masonry, 
workplace accidents were the leading cause of death and incapacity;175 
according to one i890 study of the mining trade, deaths from work ac- 
cidents accounted for sixty percent of all workingmen incapacitated 
from pursuing the trade.'76 
Moreover, by comparison to other Western nations, the United 
States seemed especially laggard in its response to the industrial acci- 
dent problem. "It would be difficult to think of another field of social 
169 I.M. RUBINOW, SOCIAL INSURANCE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AMERICAN CONDI- 
TIONS 49 (I 9 I 3). 
170 HENRY ROGERS SEAGER, SOCIAL INSURANCE: A PROGRAM OF SOCIAL REFORM I7 (I9I0). 
171 See RUBINOW, supra note i69, at 49; SEAGER, supra note I70, at 24-25 (listing industrial ac- 
cidents as first among "the causes of human misery"). 
172 See BILLINGS, supra note i09, at 52, 53. 
173 I7 ANN. REP. N.Y. LABOR STAT., supra note 78, at 573. 
174 See BILLINGS, supra note i09, at 455. Scandinavians were the fourth leading group in death 
rates by nationality. 
175 See supra p. 7I9. In i900 the mortality rate ranged from 590 per ioo,ooo for men between 
fifteen and twenty-four years of age, to 820 per ioo,ooo for men between twenty-five and thirty- 
four years of age, to I070 per ioo,ooo for men between thirty-five and forty-four years of age. See 
i BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO I970, at 6i (I975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
UNITED STATES]. Among railroad workers and miners, the mortality rate from work accidents 
alone was over 3oo deaths per ioo,ooo workers, making work accidents the leading cause of death 
among these classes of workers. In addition, state surveys of the causes of incapacity among 
workingmen identified accidental deaths as the leading cause of incapacitation among many 
classes of industrial workers. See I4 ANN. REP. N.J. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR & INDUS. 2 I4 
tbl.7 (I89I). 
176 See I3 ANN. REP. N.J. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR & INDUS. 407 (I89I). 
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or legal reform in which the United States is so far behind other na- 
tions," announced the New York Bureau of Labor Statistics in Igoo.'77 
Finally, unlike sickness and old age, the work accident seemed to 
raise questions about the relationship between the well-being of the la- 
boring classes and the conditions of production in an industrializing 
age. Sickness and old age, of course, had been constant companions of 
the human experience for millennia. And although many of the health 
problems of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could be 
traced to unsanitary or toxic working conditions, the connections were 
remote and attenuated.'78 The work accident, by contrast, placed the 
status of the modern factory worker, railroad hand, or miner in bold 
relief and compelled victim and observer alike to ask hard questions 
about the relationships among capital, labor, and the public. 
Accordingly, many turn-of-the-century students of industrial condi- 
tions believed that industrial accidents posed greater difficulties for 
working-class families in the United States than virtually any other so- 
cial problem. But just as there were differing interpretations of the 
core meaning of the free labor ideal, so too were there differing inter- 
pretations of the precise nature of the industrial accident problem. 
(a) Accidents and the Liberal Ideal of Autonomy. - Personal in- 
jury and death from accidents threatened liberal aspirations to create a 
state and a legal system based on the organizing principle of individual 
autonomy. Every accident, after all, provided clear evidence of the so- 
cial reality that individuals were heavily interdependent. As accident 
rates increased, the ideal of autonomy seemed for many Americans less 
and less relevant to contemporary social conditions.'79 Moreover, the 
accident epidemic's disproportionate impact on the laboring classes 
appeared to implicate the growing economic inequality of the late 
nineteenth century.'80 
(b) Accidents and the Iniquities of Competitive Wage Labor Capi- 
talism. - From the perspective of the labor movement, the industrial 
slaughter of workplace accidents became in the i88os and i89os one of 
the primary manifestations of the undermining of workingmen's inde- 
177 I 7 ANN. REP. N.Y. LABOR STAT., supra note 78, at I i62. 
178 On the development of workplace health science expertise, see CHRISTOPHER C. SELLERS, 
HAZARDS OF THE JOB: FROM INDUSTRIAL DISEASE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH SCIENCE 
(I997)- 
179 Thus, it was a truism in discussions of the accident problem that industrializing nations were 
shifting from an age of "individualism" to an age of collectivism. 
180 See, e.g., ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF LABOR AND 
INDUSTRIES OF NEW JERSEY FOR THE YEAR ENDING OCTOBER 3IST, i888 (i889) ("It certainly is 
true that the whole number of fatal accidents on our railroads, to passengers and others, consti- 
tuted but 7 per cent of the aggregate deaths due to accident or injury in i88o. This fact, neverthe- 
less, is not stated to condone the annual railroad slaughter, nor does it tell the whole story; for of 
these railroad casualties, a very large proportion happen to employees, to whom the railroad is a 
veritable juggernaut."). 
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pendence. Across a wide array of labor unions, workers demanded 
safer workplaces and the expansion of employers' liability.'8' Indeed, 
industrial accidents stood as a glaring indictment of the iniquities of 
the underlying system of competitive wage labor capitalism. 182 
Eugene Debs, for example, viewed the accident problem on the rail- 
roads as dangerously undermining the manly independence of the 
American workingman. Workers disabled from their occupations by 
accidents were rendered dependent on their employers' largesse by the 
narrow scope of employers' liability. As a result, industrial accidents 
defeated free labor's promise of independence for workingmen as, 
in Debs's words, "manly men." Industrial accidents left railroad 
workers, again in Debs's phrase, little more than "squaw men," unable 
to fill the masculine free labor role of family provider.'83 
(c) Accidents and the Crisis of the Family Wage. - The independ- 
ence that free labor promised workingmen was closely tied to the late 
nineteenth-century ideal of domesticity and the family wage system. It 
was the manly free laborer, after all, whose independence guaranteed 
the preservation of a separate domestic sphere. By the turn of the cen- 
tury, however, the problem of work accidents for the ideals of free la- 
bor manhood had come to threaten the household as well. Crystal 
Eastman's study of work accidents in Pittsburgh noted that the "most 
appalling feature" of industrial accidents was that they "fell exclusively 
upon workers, bread-winners." There were no "aged helpless persons" 
or "idle merry-makers" or "unresponsible children" among the victims 
of work accidents, she observed. Rather, the people who perished in 
work accidents were "those upon whom the world leans."''84 
For Eastman and other like-minded onlookers, the devastating ef- 
fects of industrial accidents on the domestic life of working class fami- 
lies - the "effect of industrial fatalities upon the home," in Eastman's 
words'85 - stood as the most salient aspect of the work accident 
181 See, e.g., Edward W. Searing, Employers' Liability Law, I AM. FEDERATIONIST 93, 94-95 
(i894) (arguing on behalf of the American Federation of Labor for expanded employers' liability in 
New York State); INDEPENDENT ORDER OF KNIGHTS OF LABOR, Declaration of Principles, art. 
VII, in OFFICIAL HANDBOOK: INDEPENDENT ORDER KNIGHTS OF LABOR (i896) (unpaginated) 
(announcing support for "[tihe adoption of measures providing for the health and safety of those 
engaged in mining, manufacturing and building industries, and for the indemnification of those 
engaged therein for injuries received through lack of necessary safeguards"). 
182 See Samuel Gompers, Editorial, Industrial Slaughter and the "Enlightened" Employers, I4 
AM. FEDERATIONIST 548, 548 (1907) (arguing that "[t]o expose workmen to unnecessary risks, to 
save a few dollars at the expense of human lives, limbs, and earning capacity, is positively inhu- 
man, a disgrace to our boasted civilization and progress"). 
183 NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST 6i (i982). 
184 EASTMAN, supra note i64, at I i9. 
185 Id. at I32; see also id. at 223 ("To study industrial accidents from the 'home' side has been 
my business for a year."). 
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problem.'86 Edward T. Devine of the Charity Organization Society of 
the City of New York, for example, argued that the gravest effects of 
industrial accidents were their "consequences on the character and 
permanent social standing of the family."'87 Charitable organizations, 
he continued, saw "people becoming chronic dependents and begging 
for charitable assistance, who never would have gotten in that position 
except for the accident to the wage earner."'88 Families that had 
"heretofore been entirely independent and self-supporting" were 
thrown by the accidental injury of the male wage-earner into the ranks 
of the "dispossessed," "pawning their furniture," "using up what little 
savings-bank account they have had," and "obliged to turn in humilia- 
tion and permanent injury to the charitable societies or to relatives 
and friends."'89 
Indeed, the accident epidemic appeared to be creating a new class 
of industrial invalids. According to the Massachusetts Bureau of La- 
bor Statistics in I902, it seemed that "[t]he stress of modern industrial 
life" was simply "too severe for persons of weak physique."'90 The cri- 
sis of "[a]ccidents due to the contingencies of employment" appeared to 
have enlarged the class of "industrial defectives who, in increasing 
numbers, are shown in every enumeration of the population.'' The 
Bureau estimated that over two percent of the population fell into the 
class of "defectives."''92 The majority of crippled and maimed workers, 
according to the Bureau, was injured working as laborersers" in 
transportationion" and in "[m]anufactur[ing]."''93 
In other states, fears about the effects of industrial occupations on 
workers' health and safety produced an outpouring of similar studies 
by state bureaus of labor statistics. In i887, for example, Pennsylvania 
186 See id. at 223-39. Concern for the effects of industrial accidents on families and on wives is 
evident in virtually all the state reports issued on the work accident problem around igio. See, 
e.g., 17 ANN. REP. N.Y. LABOR STAT., supra note 78, at 576-78 (detailing persons dependent on 
earnings of victims of accidents and sources of support of persons injured and their dependents); 
DON D. LESCOHIER, INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY IN MINNESOTA, 
PART II OF THE TWELFTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR, INDUSTRIES AND 
COMMERCE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, I 909-i 9 I 0, at I 5 5-5 7 (I 9 I 0). 
187 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE ACCOMPANYING THE FIRST REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 5 i8 OF THE LAWS 
OF i909 To INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS, 
MAR. i6, 91io, at 8 (91io) (statement of Edward T. Devine). 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 Mass. Bureau of Statistics of Labor, The Physically Defective Population in Massachusetts 
in Relation to Industry, I902 LABOR BULL. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. I, I. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 2. 
193 See id. at 3 tbl. 
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launched a study of employer compensation of injured workingmen.'94 
When the Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics sur- 
veyed the condition of its labor force in i887 and i888, it asked work- 
ers a battery of questions about their physical condition: "Are you 
compelled to exercise more than ordinary care to prevent accidents to 
self and others?" "What bodily ailments are peculiar to your trade?" 
"At what age do persons [in your trade] begin to decline physically so 
as to affect their work and wages?"''95 In New Jersey, the Bureau of 
Statistics of Labor and Industries issued in i888 a report on railroad 
accidents and employers' liability that found "a fearful slaughter of 
employees - one which is increasing at a rate out of all proportion to 
the expansion of the railroad mileage ... or to the increase in the total 
number of persons employed."''96 And in i889, the New Jersey Bureau 
began to issue regular annual reports on the "Effect of Occupation on 
the Health and Duration of the Trade-Life of Workmen,"''97 noting 
that "whether a man loses an arm in war or in a machine shop, he is 
equally disqualified for work."''98 
C. Alternative Legal Approaches and the Accident Crisis 
The industrial accident problem thus precipitated a crisis for the 
free labor system that emerged from the Civil War. Yet for different 
groups of Americans the accident problem meant different things. 
Liberals in the classical vein understood the accident crisis as posing a 
threat to autonomy in what appeared to be an increasingly interde- 
pendent world. Workingmen, by contrast, viewed the onslaught of 
work accidents as a manifestation of the underlying injustices of com- 
petitive wage labor capitalism and of the dangers capitalism posed for 
the family wage of independent workingmen and dependent wives and 
children. 
For each of the various ways of understanding the nature of the ac- 
cident problem, Americans proposed a different solution. Thus, in the 
decades spanning the turn of the century, Americans devised a number 
of alternative policy prescriptions designed to address the problems 
that industrial accidents posed for the free labor system. Many of 
these alternatives were short-lived. As early as the i840s, for example, 
the Pennsylvania mining trade press discussed accident compensation 
194 Rep. of the Bureau of Indus. Statistics, in IS ANN. REP. SEC'Y OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF 
COMMONWEALTH OF PA. pt. 3 (i887) ("Industrial Statistics"). 
195 i887-i888 WIS. BUREAU OF LABOR & INDUS. STAT. BIENNIAL REP. i89 tbl.V. 
196 I I ANN. REP. N.J. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR & INDUS. i6 (i888). 
197 I2 ANN. REP. N.J. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR & INDUS. pt.I (i889). 
198 I3 ANN. REP. N.J. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LABOR & INDUS. 367 (i890); see also I MONT. 
BUREAU OF AGRIC., LABOR & INDUS. ANN. REP. pt. i, at I2-I32 (i893) (surveying working condi- 
tions of various occupations and detailing disability, death, and funeral benefits available to work- 
ers through employers and cooperative self-insurance schemes). 
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funds financed by a tax on coal sales.'99 Several decades later, Mary- 
land briefly experimented with a system of compulsory employer- 
financed relief funds.200 Other proposals developed later, in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Private employer compensation 
plans, for example, became a significant alternative in the first decade 
of the twentieth century, as did compulsory state accident insurance 
mechanisms.20' 
But in the decades immediately following the Civil War, two lead- 
ing alternative approaches to accident law emerged in the United 
States: the common law of torts and cooperative self-insurance against 
disability and death. Each represented one of the leading late nine- 
teenth-century strands of free labor thought. And in turn, each em- 
bodied one of the leading normative models for how best to solve the 
problems that beset the industrializing free labor economy. 
III. THE DILEMMAS OF CLASSICAL TORT LAW 
"The general principle of our law," Oliver Wendell Holmes ex- 
plained in his i88i masterpiece The Common Law, "is that loss from 
accident must lie where it falls."202 By "accident," Holmes meant inju- 
ries occurring "without fault."203 To be sure, Holmes observed, there 
were some who advocated shifting liability in such instances of fault- 
less harms. On this view it was said that "[e]very man" had "an abso- 
lute right to his person . . . free from detriment at the hands of his 
neighbors."204 Alternatively, the law could have opted to divide the 
damages between equally faultless (or equally at-fault) actors. Yet the 
law did "none of these things," explained Holmes, and instead for rea- 
sons of policy left accidental harms to lie where they fell.205 
Holmes's words have become the classic expression of the late nine- 
teenth-century law of accidents.206 Yet there was an important differ- 
199 ALEXANDER TRACHTENBERG, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
COAL MINERS IN PENNSYLVANIA, i824-I9I5, at I9 (I942). 
200 See KATHERINE A. HARVEY, THE BEST-DRESSED MINERS: LIFE AND LABOR IN THE 
MARYLAND COAL REGION, i835-I9io, at 4I (i969). 
201 For a discussion of private employer-based accident compensation systems, see Witt, supra 
note i8, at ch. 4. See also Epstein, supra note i9, at 797-800 (discussing the adoption of private 
compensation schemes by English firms). On early developments in social insurance approaches to 
accidents, see Witt, supra note i8, ch. 5. 
202 HOLMES, supra note 38, at 76. 
203 Id. (quoting Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Den. I93 (N.Y i843)) (internal quotation marks omit- 
ted). 
204 Id. at 68. 
205 Id. at 77. 
206 The proposition that accidental losses properly lie where they fall was well settled before, 
and especially after, Holmes's memorable words. See, e.g., Clarke Butler Whittier, Mistake in the 
Law of Torts, I5 HARV. L. REV. 335, 335 (I902) (observing that "accidents will happen and losses 
will occur when neither party is at all in fault" and arguing that shifting the costs of such accidents 
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ence between Holmes's approach to the problem of accidental harm 
and the approach of most of the elite of the American bar. For 
Holmes, the principle that the law favored the active doers of the 
world over its passive victims seems to have been a part of his Dar- 
winian perspective on human affairs.207 Those who fell by the way- 
side in the competitive struggle for life, in Holmes's view, were simply 
the losers in an ongoing evolutionary battle from which only the fittest 
would emerge. Law could do little to aid those who came out on the 
bottom of such natural and inevitable processes. 
For most of the elite of the American bar, however, the proposition 
that losses from faultless injuries properly lay where they fell repre- 
sented something very different from Holmes's evolutionary sensibili- 
ties. Tort doctrine as elaborated in the late nineteenth century by elite 
American lawyers and judges represented an attempt to work out in 
practice the principles of classical liberal thought in an age of enter- 
prise and accident. Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars constructed a 
grand doctrinal architecture for the law of accidents, centered first and 
foremost on defining the proper bounds within which individuals were 
free to act as they chose, unchargeable with liability for harms to oth- 
ers. In this sense, the elaboration of liberal principles embodied in the 
late nineteenth-century law of torts sought to rationalize and bring or- 
der to the increasingly messy world that lay outside the covers of the 
law reporters, treatises, and bar association reports. 
Yet even as classical tort doctrine reached its apogee in the last 
years of the century, the accumulated wisdom of the elite of the bar 
and bench was coming under sharp criticism for its inadequate grasp 
of the late nineteenth-century accident problem. The abstract doc- 
trinal structure of American tort law perched precariously atop a rising 
mountain of accidents from machinery, railroads, streetcars, and eleva- 
tors. Personal injury lawyers and their runners, insurance company 
agents, industrial employers, and injured workers pushed and chal- 
lenged the justifications offered for the law of torts. And in the end, 
the liberal project of organizing tort law to embody principles on 
which individuals could be free to act within a zone of uninfringed 
autonomy was an impossible task. As critics of tort law would begin 
to point out by the turn of the century, late nineteenth-century tort law 
was "useless"); Shaw v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 45, 67 (i857) (Shaw, C.J.) 
(discussing "cases of pure accident, to which all human beings are constantly exposed, for which no 
person is in fault, and in which all losses and damages occasioned thereby must lie where they first 
fall"). 
207 For a discussion of Holmes's social Darwinism, see G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF I5I-52, 290-9I, 360 (I993); and Robert W. 
Gordon, Law as a Vocation: Holmes and the Lawyer's Path, in THE PATH OF THE LAW IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Steven Burton ed., forthcoming 2000). 
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had no good answer to precisely the problem that Holmes had identi- 
fied in i88i as the centerpiece of the classical law of torts: the acciden- 
tal victims of nonnegligent harm. 
A. Classical Legal Thought and the Law of Torts 
For the last twenty-five years or so, historians of American law 
have fundamentally rethought the character of legal thought during 
the late nineteenth century. Where once Gilded Age lawyers, judges, 
and legal scholars were depicted as advocates of a laissez-faire social 
Darwinism that presaged the reactionary Supreme Court of the New 
Deal,208 historians have now redescribed the same lawyers, judges, and 
scholars as the founders of classical legal thought, a finely wrought set 
of doctrinal structures derived from classical eighteenth- and nine- 
teenth-century liberalism.209 Thus, a new generation of histories of 
208 See, e.g., ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF 
BAR AND BENCH, I887-I895, at 229-30 (i960) (describing the conflict between laissez-faire judi- 
cial conservatives and progressive reformers). 
209 In large part this revisionist project has sought to disentangle Holmes's complex and mis- 
leading views from those of the late nineteenth-century bar more generally. Holmes, of course, fa- 
mously decried what he saw as the social Darwinist conceptions that underlay turn-of-the-century 
American constitutional law. See Lochner v. New York, I98 U.S. 45, 75 (I905) (Holmes, J., dis- 
senting) ("The I4th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."). Yet it now 
appears that Holmes himself may have been the only real social Darwinist on the Court, and one of 
the few among the elite of the bar. For examples of early revisionist approaches, see Robert W. 
Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, io HOFSTRA L. REV. 7I9 (I982) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Holmes' Common Law]; Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Prac- 
tice in the Age of American Enterprise, i870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL 
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., I983); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical 
Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 185o- 
1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3 (i980); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation 
of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (I985); 
Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: 
Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, i863-i897, 6i J. AM. HIST. 970 (I975); and 
William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in 
Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 5I3 (I974). More recent accounts building on the 
earlier work include I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42-43, I00-I04 
(I99I); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 256-57, 279-8I (I998); 
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (i998); OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE 
MODERN STATE, I888-I9I0 (I993); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE 
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (I993); HORWITZ, 
TRANSFORMATION II, supra note 7; Paul D. Carrington, The Constitutional Law Scholarship of 
Thomas McIntyre Cooley, 4I AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 368 (997); Eben Moglen, Holmes's Legacy and 
the New Constitutional History, io8 HARV. L. REV. 2027 (1995); Robert C. Post, Defending the 
Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. I489 (I998); and Ste- 
phen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. 
REV. I (I99I). For a critical review of the historiography of Lochner revisionism, see Gary D. 
Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 22I (I999); and for an incisive 
commentary on the constitutional law implications of Lochner revisionism, see Barry Friedman, 
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public law emphasizes the doctrinal coherence of constitutional law in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.210 Accounts of the 
private law of the period, in turn, focus on the creation and elabora- 
tion of a "scientific" theory of contracts.211 By contrast, the law of 
torts has been little discussed in the historical literature on classical le- 
gal thought.212 Yet the law of torts played a critical role in the classi- 
cal conceptual system of private law. Tort law at once marked the 
boundaries between private individuals (separating persons from one 
another) and the boundary between public and private (separating in- 
dividuals from the state). 
The central proposition of nineteenth-century political liberalism 
was the idea that individuals may act as they choose, consistent with 
the like rights of others. In John Stuart Mill's classic formulation, "the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised community against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others."'213 Similarly, for the German-born American political theo- 
rist Francis Lieber, as for American constitutional law commentators 
like Christopher Tiedeman, civil liberty consisted in the restraint of 
encroachments by one individual on the rights of another;214 in Tiede- 
man's words, the "right to do any thing that does not involve a tres- 
pass or injury to others."'215 The first American tort law scholars em- 
phasized this same principle. Francis Hilliard's i859 torts treatise- 
The Lesson of Lochner (Dec. Io, i999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library). 
210 See CUSHMAN, supra note 209; FISS, supra note 209; GILLMAN, supra note 209; Kennedy, 
supra note 209; McCurdy, supra note 209; Siegel, supra note 209. 
211 E.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. I (I983). 
212 There are important exceptions, of course. HORWITZ, TRANSORMATION II, supra note 7, at 
5i-63, includes an excellent discussion of the doctrine of causation in the late nineteenth century. 
Gordon, Holmes' Common Law, supra note 209, at 727-28, 737-39, includes brief and incisive dis- 
cussions of the classical legal approach to the law of torts. G. Edward White's TORT LAW IN 
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (i980) also touches on some of these themes. 
213 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY I3 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press i989) 
(I859). 
214 See FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 39-40 (Theodore D. 
Woolsey ed., 3d ed., rev., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. I877); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, 
THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 76 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 
i890) [hereinafter TIEDEMAN, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION] ("[T]he doctrine of natural rights 
may be tersely stated to be a freedom from all legal restraint that is not needed to prevent injury to 
others ... ."); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER 
IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT, at vii 
(St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. i886) (arguing that individual and minority rights are "free 
from all lawful control or interference by the majority, except so far as such control or interference 
may be necessary to prevent injury to others in the enjoyment of their rights"); id. at 67 ("No man 
has a right to make such a use of his liberty as to commit an injury to the rights of others."); see also 
id. ? 3o, at 64-68. 
215 TIEDEMAN, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 2 I4, at 76. 
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the first in the English language - announced that "the liability to 
make reparation" rested "upon an original moral duty, enjoined upon 
every person, so to conduct himself or exercise his own rights as not to 
injure another."'216 Similarly, Michigan law professor, judge, and na- 
tionally renowned tort jurist Thomas Cooley explained that civil lib- 
erty was properly established by "such limitations and restraints" on 
individual action "as are needed to prevent what would be injurious to 
other individuals. "217 
If tort law marked the bounds of individuals' liberty, it also sepa- 
rated the private sphere of individual action from the public sphere of 
state coercion. Self-help in the enforcement of legally defined bounda- 
ries between individuals was not an option, for obvious reasons.218 
Liberalism therefore required a state. Yet the creation of the state 
generated additional difficulties for the preservation of civil liberty. As 
Lieber observed, liberalism entailed the protection of the individual 
not just against the encroachments of other individuals, but also 
against the state itself.219 Tort law thus needed to articulate a bound- 
ary between the public and private spheres, as well as the bounds of 
private rights as between persons. The law of torts, in short, stood as 
the keystone of classical legal thought's conceptual architecture. 
The burden of the law of torts in classical legal thought, then, was 
no less than to elaborate a conceptual framework that allowed each 
person the free exercise of his rights consistent with the like free exer- 
cise of others' rights. But therein lay an insuperable dilemma. On the 
one hand, the free exercise of a person's rights could (and did) generate 
causal ripples outside one's own sphere of autonomous action. Often 
these causal effects caused injury to others, despite the exercise of rea- 
sonable prudence and care to avoid such injuries. If the harms thus 
caused were chargeable back to the actor, his own sphere of autono- 
mous action would be compromised. On the other hand, a person 
freely exercising his rights could himself be the victim of injury caused 
by the reasonable and prudent exercise of the rights of others. If 
harms thus caused were not compensable, his sphere of autonomous 
action too would be cast into doubt. 
Accordingly, those who articulated classical tort law faced an on- 
going problem in elaborating the principles of a liberal approach to ac- 
cidents for cases of nonnegligent harms to faultless victims. A negli- 
gence standard would allow individuals to act freely within their 
216 I HILLIARD, supra note 44, at 82. 
217 THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 226 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. i88o). 
218 Cooley explained that self-help "would be subversive of civil government" in all but a nar- 
row, sharply limited class of cases. COOLEY, supra note 46, at 45. 
219 LIEBER, supra note 2 I4, at 39-40. 
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rights, without compromising those rights by charging them with the 
costs of harms that they could not reasonably avoid. But such a negli- 
gence standard would also leave remediless the faultless victim of 
harm caused by someone else's free exercise of rights. A strict liability 
standard, by contrast, would rectify such harms but would also impose 
charges on the free exercise of the nonnegligent injurer's rights. 
In the case of the faultless victim of nonnegligent harm, liberal 
principles were indeterminate. The rights claims of injurers could be 
rearticulated as the rights claims of victims. A negligence standard for 
injurers was a strict liability standard for victims, because it imposed 
costs on them in the absence of negligence. A strict liability standard 
for injurers, in turn, was a negligence standard for victims, because it 
rectified injuries only in the absence of fault on the part of the vic- 
tim.220 Neither rule offered a conceptual basis for carving out coher- 
ent spheres of individual autonomy. 
B. Elaborating Classical Tort Law 
I. Damnum Absque Injuria: Defining the Bounds of Rights and 
Duties. - A long-established maxim of the common law held that 
there could be no wrong without a remedy; Chief Justice John Mar- 
shall had rested a key point in Marbury v. Madison on this proposi- 
tion.221 But the preoccupation of the first generation of torts treatise 
writers was to show that the maxim was inaccurate as a description of 
the law of civil wrongs. Indeed, at the heart of classical tort law was 
the adoption and explanation of the category of damnum absque inju- 
ria, or loss without a legal remedy. C.G. Addison, for example, began 
his i870 torts treatise with the proposition that there were injuries that 
had no legal remedy,222 and he went on to set out the "many cases 
where persons have suffered serious injury from the acts and doings of 
others of which the law takes no cognizance."223 Francis Hilliard, too, 
laid out numerous cases of interpersonal damages without a remedy at 
220 For examples of this argument in today's tort theory literature, see JULES L. COLEMAN, 
MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW I74-80 (i988); JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 229- 
30 (I992); and Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four TestsforLiability in Torts, I4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 585, 587-9I (I985). Of course, a strict liability standard for injurers is a negligence rule for 
victims only if a victim's contributory negligence is a defense to liability for the injuries. 
221 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I37, i63 (I803) ("The very essence of civil liberty cer- 
tainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he re- 
ceives an injury."). 
222 See ADDISON, supra note 45, at 2 (discussing "damage without wrong"). 
223 Id. at 43. 
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law,224 as did Shearman and Redfield in their influential i869 treatise 
on negligence cases.225 
The negligence standard itself generated the most important class 
of injuries without remedy. The first and primary category of "excus- 
able trespasses" in James Barr Ames and Jeremiah Smith's casebook, 
which was in use at Harvard Law School from i874 until the end of 
the century, consisted of injuries from mere "accident and mistake."226 
Yet in the case of the faultless victim of nonnegligent harm, the law's 
creation of a class of damnum absque injuria posed a difficult concep- 
tual problem: what principle could allow one person to cause injury to 
another without compensating the victim? Some, like Clarke Butler 
Whittier of Stanford Law School, simply saw shifting the cost of inju- 
ries from one undeserving person to another as a useless incurring of 
administrative costs.227 Oliver Wendell Holmes, at once an architect 
of classical legal thought and its greatest critic, observed that the "pre- 
vailing view" in i88i was that the "cumbrous and expensive machin- 
ery" of the state "ought not to be set in motion" merely to shift costs 
among equally undeserving individuals.228 Others saw in strict liabil- 
ity a standard that would threaten to bring all economic action to a 
halt: "We must have factories, machinery, dams, canals and railroads," 
explained New York Judge Robert Earl in defense of the negligence 
standard.229 Holmes similarly pointed out that as "the public generally 
profits by individual activity," there was "obviously no policy in 
throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon 
224 i HILLIARD, supra note 44, at i i9 ("It is further said, that the maxim, so use your own that 
you injure not another's property, is supported by the soundest wisdom. But the injury intended is 
a legal injury; an invasion of some legal right . . ..") (footnote omitted); see also id. at II9-2 I (list- 
ing instances of damnum absque injuria). 
225 See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 46. Cooley neatly solved the contradiction between 
the competing maxims by explaining that the maxim of no wrongs without a remedy was "a mere 
truism" that stated only the tautological claim that rights and remedies were reciprocal. COOLEY, 
supra note 46, at i9. The law provided remedies only for the defense of rights, but a right, in turn, 
was defined as that for which the law provided a remedy. Id. at 20. Under this approach, no legal 
wrong was without a remedy, but thus reformulated, the common law maxim was trivial. 
226 I JAMES BARR AMES & JEREMIAH SMITH, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
56-76 (Cambridge, Harvard Law Review Publ'g Ass'n, 2d ed. i893). 
227 See Whittier, supra note 206, at 335. 
228 HOLMES, supra note 38, at 77. 
229 Losee v. Buchanan, 5i N.Y. 476, 484 (I873); see also Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 
2Io, 2i6-I7 (i866) (arguing that "[i]n a country where wood, coal, gas and oils are universally 
used," a strict liability standard would "create a liability which would be the destruction of all civi- 
lized society"). Judge Earl served on the New York Court of Appeals until the court's reorganiza- 
tion in i867, at which time the judges on the old court were reassigned to the new Commission on 
Appeals, charged with deciding the backlog of cases that had accumulated under the prior court. 
See 2 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 262-63 (i906). 
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the actor."230 Even Seymour Thompson, editor of the American Law 
Review and a progressive voice in the American legal profession, ar- 
gued that the "law justly ascribes" the consequences of nonnegligent 
harms "to inevitable misfortune, or to the act of God, and leaves the 
harm resulting from them to be borne by him upon whom it falls."'231 
Any contrary rule, Thompson contended, would "impose so great a re- 
straint upon freedom of action as materially to check human enter- 
prise."232 Thus, individuals were not responsible for any damage they 
accidentally and unavoidably did to their neighbor.233 Still others con- 
tended, often in ways that overlapped with the utilitarian arguments 
of Earl, Holmes, and Thompson, that the negligence standard rested in 
an imagined social contract: individuals gave up their "natural rights" 
to the inviolability of person and property in return for the like aban- 
donment of rights by their neighbors.234 
At the core of these defenses of the negligence standard in classical 
legal thought was the sense that a strict liability standard threatened 
to collapse the distinction between public and private. It is a striking 
fact that the leading libertarian torts theorist of the late twentieth cen- 
tury, Richard Epstein, advocates a strict liability standard.235 As 
commentators have observed, Epstein's cause-based liability standard 
requires significant state intervention to enforce loss-shifting as be- 
tween equally faultless parties - curiously, perhaps, given his liber- 
tarian politics.236 Much like Epstein, classical torts lawyers sought to 
construct a liberal torts jurisprudence that would guarantee liberty 
within the bounds of a set of lines drawn around the individual. Un- 
like Epstein, however, the late nineteenth-century bar believed that the 
threat to the private sphere represented by state intervention required 
the adoption of a negligence standard rather than a strict liability ap- 
proach. "The human mind, from its limitedness of vision," explained 
230 HOLMES, supra note 38, at 77. 
231 2 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN RELATIONS NOT RESTING IN 
CONTRACT I234 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. i88o). For a discussion of Thompson as a legal 
progressive, see PAUL, supra note 208, at 43-44, 54-60, 22I. See also GILLMAN, supra note 209, at 
II5-06. 
232 2 THOMPSON, supra note 23i, at I235. 
233 See id. at I234-35. 
234 See, e.g., Losee, 5 I N.Y. at 484. 
235 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. I5I, 203-04 
(I973); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 54-87 (I974) (discussing the 
theoretical underpinnings of punishment and compensation). 
236 See George P. Fletcher, The Search for Synthesis in Tort Theory, 2 LAW & PHIL. 63, 69-70 
(i983) ("The [strict liability standard] calls into question [Epstein's] well-known reputation as a 
libertarian legal theorist. The argument hat harm to the victim can be converted into the defen- 
dant's own harm suppresses the reality of the state's intervention to shift the loss."). Epstein, of 
course, might contend that the rules would be self-enforcing or that individuals would adopt pri- 
vate contractual arrangements. This response would surely underestimates the work that the state 
would have to do in enforcing the strict liability system. 
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Francis Wharton, "is incapable of perfect diligence."237 Minor mis- 
takes were thus inevitable in the private lives of individuals. Simi- 
larly, Holmes suggested that the principle of strict liability for injuries 
would "make a defendant responsible for all damage, however remote, 
of which his act could be called the cause."238 But if minor mistakes, 
chance injuries, and remote damages licensed the state to intervene in 
the private realm, there could be little or no room for individual action 
free from state control. If, as Holmes suggested, "[s]tate interference is 
an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good,"239 then state shifting 
of costs among equally faultless parties merely threatened to overex- 
tend the state into the private sphere. A cause-based strict liability 
standard, in short, involved the state in pervasive and ongoing reallo- 
cation of resources in the private sphere. 
By contrast, a negligence standard appeared to guarantee that in- 
dividuals in the private sphere would be insulated from state interfer- 
ence in the exercise of their rights. So long as actors causing damages 
remained within the bounds of their legal rights, they were no more at 
fault than faultless victims. "No one is responsible for an injury 
caused purely by inevitable accident, while he is engaged in a lawful 
business," explained Thomas Shearman and Amasa Redfield.240 So 
long as an injury was the result of a "lawful act, done in a lawful 
manner," wrote C.G. Addison, "there is no legal injury, and no tort 
giving rise to an action for damages."'241 In Minnesota lawyer Edwin 
Jaggard's formulation, "[t]he exercise of ordinary rights" was not ac- 
tionable "even if it causes damages."242 It was only when one went 
outside of one's own sphere of autonomy and thus inflicted a "legal in- 
jury" or an "invasion of some legal right," clarified Hilliard, that one 
incurred liability for damages.243 
237 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE ? 66, at 67 (Philadelphia, 
Kay & Bro. i874). 
238 HOLMES, supra note 38, at 73. Holmes explained that the standard of strict cause-based li- 
ability "when [an] act has brought force to bear on another through a comparatively short train of 
intervening causes, in spite of [an actor's] having used all possible care" required "the same liabil- 
ity, however numerous and unexpected the events between the act and the result." Id. at 74. On 
the development of new ideas about remote causation, see HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION II, supra 
note 7, at 5i-63; Herbert Hovenkamp, Pragmatic Realism and Proximate Cause in America, 3 J. 
LEGAL HIST. 3, i6-i8 (i982); and HASKELL, supra note 58, at 240-56 (describing changing ideas 
about causation in late nineteenth-century America). 
239 HOLMES, supra note 38, at 77. 
240 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 46, at 3. 
241 ADDISON, supra note 45, at 2. 
242 I EDWIN A. JAGGARD, HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS I45 (St. Paul, West Publ'g Co. 
i895). 
243 I HILLIARD, supra note 44, at ii9; see also Victory v. Baker, 67 N.Y. 366, 368 (I876) ("[I]f, in 
the lawful exercise of [the defendant's property] right, and without negligence on his part, a third 
person sustains an injury from its use by the owner, the owner is not answerable."); Munger v. To- 
nawanda R.R. Co., 4 N.Y. 349, 360 (i850) ("[A]s the defendants [a railroad company] were in the 
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No one better captured the way in which the negligence standard 
functioned to protect the distinction between public and private than 
Michigan jurist Thomas Cooley.244 Cooley grew up in the famous 
"Burned-Over District" of western New York, and his upbringing ap- 
pears to have left its mark on the mature jurist. Upstate New York in 
the i83os had been home to Martin Van Buren and the New York 
wing of Jacksonian democratic politics.245 Moreover, as a young man 
in the District, Cooley witnessed first-hand the raging evangelical 
movements sweeping through the Erie Canal area in the i830S.246 As 
historian Peter Walker writes, "[t]he most extravagant religious reviv- 
alism, antimasonry, abolition, millennialism, prohibition, spiritualism, 
woman's rights, the Mormon church, the Millerities, either in their ori- 
gins or their first significant manifestations converged in the Burned- 
Over District."247 These reform movements clustered around attempts 
to free the individual to make self-determining choices.248 In Walker's 
explanation, "the common lesson taught in the district" was that the 
good life "depended upon the actions of autonomous man."249 
In Cooley's famous treatise on Constitutional Limitations, it was 
Cooley's background in the politics of antebellum Jacksonian democ- 
racy that came through most strongly. Constitutional Limitations em- 
phasized the dangers of legislation that extended special privileges to 
lawful exercise and enjoyment of their rights ... the law did not enjoin it as a duty on the defen- 
dants to take care not to injure [the plaintiffs' oxen which had wandered onto the tracks]."). The 
attempt to rest tort decisions on the lawful exercise of one party's rights was especially apparent in 
landowner liability cases, in which the plaintiff's relationship to the boundaries of the defendant's 
sphere of sovereign property ownership was the critical factor. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Atl. Alcatraz 
Asphalt Co., 56 N.Y.S. i8, 2 I (App. Div. i899); Sterger v. Vansicler, 3o N.E. 987, 989 (N.Y. i892). 
244 Cooley was born in i824, the tenth of fifteen children in a prosperous farming family. By the 
mid-i84os, Cooley had moved to the rural village of Adrian, Michigan, and opened up a law prac- 
tice. After joining and organizing for the Free Soil Party and later the Republican Party, Cooley 
managed to get appointed to draft a compilation of the state's statutes. His work on the statutory 
compilation, in turn, led to appointments to the University of Michigan Law School faculty and in 
i864 to the Michigan Supreme Court. With the publication of the i868 treatise Constitutional 
Limitations, JOSEPH STORY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (Thomas M. Cooley 
ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. i868), Cooley became a nationally recognized jurist. Cooley fol- 
lowed Constitutional Limitations with a treatise on taxation, THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF TAXATION INCLUDING THE LAW OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS (i876). Then, in i879, 
Cooley published a treatise on torts. See COOLEY, supra note 46. 
245 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON, I 7 7-80 (I945). 
246 PETER F. WALKER, MORAL CHOICES: MEMORY, DESIRE, AND IMAGINATION IN NINE- 
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN ABOLITION 338 (I978). 
247 Id. at 337; see generally WHITNEY R. CROSS, THE BURNED-OVER DISTRICT: THE SOCIAL 
AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF ENTHUSIASTIC RELIGION IN WESTERN NEW YORK, i8oo-i850 
(I950); PAUL E. JOHNSON, A SHOPKEEPER'S MILLENNIUM: SOCIETY AND REVIVALS IN 
ROCHESTER, NEWYORK, i8I5-i837 (I978). 
248 See WALKER, supra note 246, at 337-39. 
249 Id. at 338. 
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some and jeopardized the principle of equal rights for all.250 Cooley's 
torts treatise, by contrast, drew inspiration from the Burned-Over Dis- 
trict's reform ideal of moral autonomy. So long as an actor remained 
within the bounds of his legal rights and duties he was, in Cooley's 
conception, unchargeable by the state for harms falling on others. 
Thus the "lawful and proper exercise by one man of his rights" was 
never grounds for liability.251 In Cooley's view, then, the faultless vic- 
tims of purely "accidental" injuries were without legal recourse be- 
cause there existed no "injuria" - no legal wrong - that the state 
could attach to another actor.252 To hold otherwise was to threaten 
state infringement of individual autonomy. As Cooley explained, 
thatht which it is right and lawful for one man to do cannot furnish 
the foundation for an action in favor of another."253 
2. Contributory Negligence. - Of course Cooley had not really 
solved the persistent problem of defining the bounds of individual lib- 
erty; he had merely restated it. Indeed, for Cooley and his peers, the 
faultless victim of nonnegligent harm remained a deeply destabilizing 
force in late nineteenth-century tort law. Much of the doctrinal edifice 
of the law of torts in the late nineteenth century can thus be under- 
stood as a series of attempts to deal with the persistent problem of the 
faultless victim of nonnegligent harm. In particular, judges and com- 
mentators promulgated rules designed to highlight wrongdoing on the 
part of victims. If the victims of injury acted outside of the bounds of 
their rights and duties, after all, the conceptual dilemma of the fault- 
less victim and the nonnegligent injurer disappeared. 
Contributory negligence was probably the most important such 
doctrine in the late nineteenth-century law of torts.254 In virtually 
every American jurisdiction a victim was unable to recover if the vic- 
tim's own negligence - no matter how slight- had contributed to her 
injuries.255 Thus, "[b]etween two wrong-doers," or between a nonneg- 
250 See STORY, supra note 244; David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Races of Local 
Constitutionalism, I47 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 509-22 (i999); Carrington, supra note 209, at 370. 
251 COOLEY, supra note 46, at 8i. 
252 Id. at 8o. 
253 Id. at8i. 
254 Peter Karsten has recently argued that historians have exaggerated the importance of con- 
tributory negligence in the nineteenth century. See KARSTEN, supra note 49, at 95-IOI. The point 
here, however, is not to gauge the social consequences of the contributory negligence rule, but 
rather to place it in the ideological system of late nineteenth-century tort doctrine. 
255 See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 46, ?? 35-52, at 35-57. The exceptions were Illi- 
nois, Kansas, and Georgia, which in the mid-nineteenth century adopted rules allowing recovery 
for gross negligence even in the face of relatively slight negligence on the part of the victim. See 2 
THOMPSON, supra note 23i, at I023-24; COOLEY, supra note 46, at 676-78; SHEARMAN & RED- 
FIELD, supra note 46, ? 37, at 37-38. By the latter part of the century, however, the doctrine of con- 
tributory negligence emerged in these jurisdictions. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 477. Tennes- 
see appears to have flirted with a comparative negligence standard in which the contributory neg- 
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ligent defendant and a negligent plaintiff, "the law will leave the con- 
sequences to rest where they have chanced to fall."256 In case after 
case, the deciding question was whether any negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff had contributed to the injuries from which she suffered.257 
Indeed, no fewer than sixty-eight percent of the negligence decisions 
digested by the West Publishing Company between i86o and i88o 
raised questions of contributory negligence.258 The contributory negli- 
gence rule relieved much of the pressure on the negligence standard. 
3. Assumption of Risk. - In other cases of nonnegligent injuries, 
tort law justified the absence of a remedy by the consent of the victim 
to bear the risk of accident. The doctrine of assumption of risk at- 
tached predominantly to work accidents. Summed up in the maxim 
volenti non fit injuria - roughly translatable as "there is no legal in- 
jury to one who consents" - the doctrine held that "[n]o action can be 
maintained for damages resulting from conduct suffered by consent" of 
the victim.259 Though employers owed employees a duty of due care 
in the provision of machinery, appliances, and competent fellow- 
servants, the doctrine of assumption of risk held that "an employer 
may relieve himself of all common law liability for accidents occurring 
to his servants, through defects in materials or in the character of fel- 
low servants, by giving explicit warning of such defects, and notice 
that he does not intend to remedy them."260 Similarly, when an em- 
ployee learned of defects in machinery or incompetence in his fellows, 
either before or during the course of his service, the employee was 
"deemed to assume the risk of danger thus known."'261 In some in- 
stances courts even held that the rule applied to all defects within the 
constructive knowledge of an employee - that is, defects not actually 
known to an employee, but that should have become known to the 
employee through "the exercise of ordinary observation or reasonable 
skill and diligence."262 
ligence of a plaintiff was a factor for consideration in the jury's assessment of damages. See 
COOLEY, supra note 46, at 677-78. 
256 COOLEY, supra note 46, at 672. 
257 See, e.g., Dexter v. McCready, 5 A. 855 (Conn. i886); Toledo & W. Ry. Co. v. Goddard, 25 
Ind. i85 (i865); Monongahela City v. Fischer, 2 A. 87 (Pa. i886). 
258 A Westlaw search of ("272K!" & DA(AFT i859 & BEF i88i)), NY-CS database (Dec. 8, 
2000), which produces all cases digested under the heading "Negligence" during this time period, 
yields 968 results. A search of ("2 72K!" & (contribut! /5 negligent) & DA(AFT i859 & BEF i88i)), 
NY-CS database (Dec. 8, 2000), which produces the subset of cases that raise the issue of contribu- 
tory negligence, yields 66i results. 
259 I JAGGARD, supra note 242, at i99. 
260 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 46, ? 94, at I I0. 
261 2 THOMPSON, supra note 23i, at iio8. 
262 Id.; see also SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 46, ? 94, at I I I ("[Wihere the servant's ac- 
tion is founded upon the assumption that the master ought to have known of the defect which 
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Tort law's resort to the implied consent of victims, however, was 
fraught with problems of its own. Conventional wisdom in late nine- 
teenth-century tort law held that for reasons of public policy persons 
could not contract out of liability for their own negligence. Certain en- 
titlements were simply not alienable. Such waivers of liability were 
suspect for arising out of coercion. Moreover, such waivers appeared 
to give rise to the risk of harm to third parties who might be injured 
by carelessness that had been licensed by a person's belief that he had 
been held harmless against costs arising out of his negligence.263 
C. Pressure from Below: The World of Accident Litigation 
and the Rise of Faultless Injuries 
Even as the elite of the American bar worked out the elaborate 
doctrinal structure of classical tort law, a rising tide of personal injury 
litigation pressed harder and harder on weaknesses in the doctrine. 
Hilliard wrote his torts treatise in i859 in response to the "very large 
and increasing proportion of actions of tort, which are continually 
arising in our courts of justice."264 Twenty years later, after the publi- 
cation of the third edition of Hilliard's treatise and the issuance of 
many additional works on the subject, Cooley decided that yet another 
torts treatise was warranted. The "new inventions and improvements" 
of the machine age, he explained, were having a "powerful tendency" 
to create "new occupations" and "more frequent controversies."265 
What was most remarkable about tort litigation, and particularly 
personal injury litigation, in these years was the unprecedented charac- 
ter of the wave of litigation itself. Of particular interest to treatise 
writers like Hilliard, for example, was the problem of how to deal with 
the constant stream of new problems raised in torts cases, especially 
the continual development of new theories for causes of action. Time 
and again common law judges in the United States, as well as in Eng- 
land, were faced with new kinds of tort claims. The novelty of a par- 
ticular claim or the "absence of any precedent for a particular action," 
Hilliard cautioned, was good but hardly conclusive evidence that a suit 
failed to state a cognizable claim.266 Yet it was precisely the avalanche 
of such novel claims that was steadily undermining the gilded struc- 
ture of the law of torts. For in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
personal injury law underwent a paradigm shift that ushered in what 
caused the injury, it is clearly a sufficient defence to show that the servant had equal means of 
knowledge." (citing Loonam v. Brockway, 28 How. Pr. 472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. i864))). 
263 For a discussion of the problems raised by contracting out of tort liability and the closely re- 
lated assumption of risk doctrine, see infra section III.D.2. 
264 I HILLIARD, supra note 44, at x (emphasis removed). 
265 COOLEY, supra note 46, at i. 
266 I HILLIARD, supra note 44, at 83-84. 
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would, by the turn of the century, become a crisis for the classical legal 
order. 
i. From Loss of Services to Loss of Wages: The Transformation of 
the Personal Injury Suit. - In the eighteenth-century common law, as 
we have seen, lawyers and judges had little occasion to discuss legal 
actions by the victims of personal injury. There was, however, an im- 
portant category of cases that arose out of personal injuries. Personal 
injuries, after all, caused damages not only to the immediate victim of 
bodily harm, but also to a person who possessed rights in the life and 
services of the victim. Thus, when eighteenth-century common law- 
yers turned to actions for damages from personal injury, they were 
likely to address something quite different from the scenarios that later 
faced mid- and late nineteenth-century judges. In particular, eight- 
eenth-century lawyers discussed not actions for damages for the lost 
wages or medical costs of the victim, but rather actions for damages to 
a master for the loss of services resulting from an injury to a member 
of the master's household.267 Tapping Reeve, the leading American 
authority on the law of domestic relations at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, explained that in the event of injury to a wife, "the husband 
may bring an action in his own name, to recover damages which he 
sustained, by reason of the battery."268 By the same token, a father 
was entitled to an action "when his minor child is beaten" and the fa- 
ther "has lost the services of that child, or has been put to expense by 
means thereof."269 
267 On the action for loss of services, see John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of 
Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the 
Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 7I7, 72 2-3I (2000). 
268 TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME; OF PARENT AND CHILD; OF 
GUARDIAN AND WARD; OF MASTER AND SERVANT; AND OF THE POWERS OF COURTS OF CHAN- 
CERY 63 (New Haven, Oliver Steele i8i6). 
269 Id. at 20I. As one mid-nineteenth-century court observed when looking back into the history 
of litigation over injuries, "[n]umerous instances are to be found in the common law books of ac- 
tions by masters for personal injuries to servants." Hall v. Nashville & Chattanooga R.R. Co., I 
Tenn. Cases (Thompson) 204, 205 (Tenn. i859). In contrast, wives, children, and servants had no 
cause of action for injuries to their husbands, fathers, and masters. Blackstone observed that in 
cases of injury to domestic relations, only "the wrong done to the superior of the parties related" 
was cognizable at common law. "[T]he loss of the inferior by such injuries," however, was "totally 
unregarded." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2 I, at *I42-43. The rationale was simple: 
[T]he inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, 
as the superior is held to have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer 
no loss or injury. The wife cannot recover damages for beating her husband, for she hath 
no separate interest in any thing during her coverture. The child hath no property in his 
father or guardian; as they have in him, for the sake of giving him education and nur- 
ture.... And so the servant, whose master is disabled, ... suffers no injury, and is there- 
fore intitled to no action, for any battery or imprisonment which such master may hap- 
pen to endure. 
Id. 
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The action for loss of services had its roots in the early-modern 
family-based structure of production and social organization. In a 
household economy, the roles of wife, servant, and child were closely 
intertwined and often overlapping.270 Husbands expected wives and 
children to render service to the household, and acquired a familial 
authority and governance over even those household servants not re- 
lated by blood. The household economy remained the central mode of 
economic life in the United States into the early nineteenth century.271 
And in the South, of course, the household model of production per- 
sisted until the Civil War.272 Indeed, in the South, masters brought ac- 
tions to recover damages from third parties and independent contrac- 
tors for injuries to their slaves up until the abolition of slavery.273 
In the I82os and I83os, however, the shape of economic life in the 
North underwent a critical shift. New mills and factories, especially in 
New England and New York, separated out production from the 
sphere of domestic life.274 In precisely the same years, the slow trickle 
of personal injury cases became a steady stream.275 Moreover, 
whereas eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century personal injury liti- 
gation generally took the form of an action for loss of services, now 
wage-earners with households of their own, independent of the firm 
270 Thus Blackstone called them the "three great relations in private life." i BLACKSTONE, su- 
pra note 2i, at *4I0. 
271 See ELIZABETH BLACKMAR, MANHATTAN FOR RENT, I785-i850, at 5i-6o (i989); ALAN 
DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN I7-i8 (I976); 
JOHNSON, supra note 247, at 43-46; MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE 
FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, I790-i865, at 25 (i98i). 
272 On household economics in the South, see generally PETER W. BARDAGLIO, 
RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH- 
CENTURY SOUTH (I995); ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION HOUSEHOLD: 
BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH (i988). 
273 The contrast between ready recovery for injuries to hired-out slaves, on the one hand, and 
limited common law employers' liability rules for free labor, on the other hand, has been explored 
by a number of historians. See, e.g., THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 
i6i9-i860, at I47-58 (i996); TUSHNET, supra note 22, at 45-50. 
274 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 247, at 43-47; CHRISTOPHER CLARK, THE ROOTS OF RURAL 
CAPITALISM: WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS, I780-i860, at 94-95, I05-06 (i990); JONATHAN 
PRUDE, THE COMING OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER: TOWN AND FACTORY LIFE IN RURAL 
MASSACHUSETTS, i8io-i86o (i983). 
275 TOMLINS, supra note 7, at 30I-03, 33I-33, 34I-47 (discussing Barnes v. Boston & Worcester 
R.R. (Mass. i839) (unreported case)); see, e.g., Murray v. S.C. R.R. Co., 26 S.C.L. (i McMul.) 385 
(i84i); Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (i842). On the novelty of this line 
of cases, see A.W. Brian Simpson, A Case of First Impression: Priestley v. Fowler (1837), in 
LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW IOO, IOI, II3-29 (I995); and Epstein, supra note I9, at 
77 7-79. 
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for which they worked, brought actions to recover lost earnings, medi- 
cal costs, and pain and suffering caused by injuries to themselves.276 
The emerging wage system and the new structure of domestic life 
lay at the heart of this new form of tort litigation.277 The free wage 
laborer distinguished himself from the domestic household laborer of 
times past and the unfree laborer of the American South by virtue of 
his capacity to support an independent domestic sphere of his own. 
The free laborer incapacitated by injury thus needed some means to 
maintain the stream of wages in order to support his household. The 
tort suit offered one mechanism for providing such compensation. 
2. Obstacles to Personal Injury Litigation (I): Persistent Patterns 
of Deference and Authority. - In addition to the growing volume of 
cases, what was new about mid-nineteenth-century personal injury 
litigation was its central concern with the means of support for wives 
and children. As A.W.B. Simpson observes, the rise of personal injury 
litigation as a provider of compensation in the event of accident ac- 
companied the decline of traditional household-centered systems of 
care for the injured and sick.278 Yet the transformation hardly oc- 
curred overnight. Personal injury litigation faced a host of obstacles 
during this period, obstacles rooted both in cultural institutions and in 
legal institutions. 
On the cultural side, persistent eighteenth-century patterns of 
authority and deference between master and servant slowed the 
growth of personal injury litigation. Nineteenth-century textile mills, 
for example, often modeled their labor management practices on the 
relations of authority, discipline, and deference in the household 
economies that they sought to replace. In Rhode Island and south- 
central Massachusetts, leading textile mill entrepreneur Samuel Slater 
sought in his early textile mills to assert "traditional community val- 
ues" through the use of a "family system" in which the mill took the 
place of the eighteenth-century household.279 In the New England 
mills of the famous Boston Associates, the "boardinghouse system" 
took in countless young female mill hands as the core of the 
276 The Priestley case presents an interesting transitional case. It was brought by the nineteen- 
year-old victim's father, but apparently only because of the victim's minority; loss of services was 
not at issue. See Simpson, supra note 275, at ioi. 
277 The shifting paradigm in accident litigation was especially evident in wrongful death actions 
and in the enactment of the wrongful death statutes in the United States beginning in i847. Par- 
ticularly in the United States, the wrongful death statutes were conceived as a means of providing 
support to widows and dependent children. See Witt, supra note 267, at 73i-46. 
278 See Simpson, supra note 275, at I23-25. 
279 See PRUDE, supra note 274, at 36-64. The "family system" was also used in Pennsylvania 
textile mills. See ANTHONY F.C. WALLACE, ROCKDALE: THE GROWTH OF AN AMERICAN VIL- 
LIAGE IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION i8o (I978). 
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workforce.280 Like Slater's "family system," the Boston Associates' 
boardinghouse approach sought to "recreate the traditional communi- 
ties of their childhood, communities in which corporate hierarchy and 
deference, as well as neighborliness, were valued."'281 In Philadelphia's 
textile mills, by contrast, numerous small mill owners eschewed the 
family or boardinghouse approaches. But here, first-generation immi- 
grant mill owners drew on traditions of guild obligation to create a 
very similar ethos of employer paternalism.282 
Personal injury litigation was thus exceedingly rare in the Northern 
textile mills of the early to mid-nineteenth century.283 To be sure, per- 
sonal injury litigation was rare in textile mills partly because the mills 
did not present quite the same danger as the railroads and the mines. 
Yet as Herman Melville observed in his use of the textile factory steam 
engine as an extended metaphor for the dangers of the whaling boat in 
Moby-Dick, whirring bobbins and shuttles surely presented special 
dangers of their own.284 In any event, the various brands of employer 
paternalism in the mills often led, as in Lowell, Massachusetts, to em- 
ployer relief plans designed to aid disabled employees.285 
In many instances, the apparent scarcity of personal injury litiga- 
tion arising out of the textile mills was due less to employer paternal- 
ism than to the domination of labor markets and entire towns by par- 
ticular employers or groups of employers. In isolated mill towns, suing 
an employer often meant antagonizing the most powerful men in the 
region and jeopardizing not only one's employment prospects, but also 
one's housing, church membership, and even access to town poor re- 
280 ROBERT F. DALZELL, JR., ENTERPRISING ELITE: THE BOSTON ASSOCIATES AND THE 
WORLD THEY MADE 33 (i987). 
281 TERESA ANNE MURPHY, TEN HOURS' LABOR: RELIGION, REFORM, AND GENDER IN 
EARLY NEW ENGLAND 20 (I992); see also DALZELL, supra note 280, at 31-36 (discussing the labor 
philosophy of the Boston Associates). 
282 See Philip Scranton, Varieties of Paternalism: Industrial Structures and the Social Relations 
of Production in American Textiles, 36 AM. Q. 235 (i984); see also PHILIP SCRANTON, PRO- 
PRIETARY CAPITALISM: THE TEXTILE MANUFACTURE AT PHILADELPHIA, i8oo-i885, at 247-5I 
(i983) (discussing paternalism in small Philadelphia textile mills). 
283 All that we can say for certain at this point is that there appear to be no reported accident 
cases arising out of the early textile mills. 
284 See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 287 (Arion Press I979) (i85 I) ("For, when the line is 
darting out, to be seated then in the boat, is like being seated in the midst of the manifold 
whizzings of a steam-engine in full play, when every flying beam, and shaft, and wheel, is grazing 
you."). Lewis Hine's photographs of injured workers at the turn of the twentieth century also 
make readily apparent the horrific harm that textile machinery could inflict on the hands and fore- 
arms of child laborers. 
285 The relative lack of danger in the textile mills compared to the railroads and mines meant 
that employer relief plans in paternalistic mills took the form of sickness relief rather than accident 
or disability relief. Yet the plans were no doubt useful to the victims of injury in work accidents. 
See Abel C. Thomas, Plan for Mutual Relief (i840), in THE LOWELL OFFERING: WRITINGS BY 
NEW ENGLAND MILL WOMEN (i840-i845), at i99, I99-200 (Benita Eisler ed., I977) (arguing that 
an employer relief plan was needed and could be financed by small monthly wage deductions). 
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lief. As one turn-of-the-century labor union leader observed, "when a 
workman goes to law with his employer, he, as it were, declares war 
against the person on whom his future probably depends."286 The re- 
sult was that workers only brought legal claims "when the injury [was] 
very great" and the worker was prepared to leave the employer's 
service.287 In many textile mill company towns, workers would have 
been reluctant to bring suit even in these circumstances. The "family 
system" of mill hiring meant that very often multiple members of a 
single family worked under the roof of a single mill; litigating work ac- 
cidents in such circumstances might have meant abandoning not one 
but several jobs.288 Moreover, from early in the nineteenth century, 
textile entrepreneurs from Rhode Island and Massachusetts to the 
Carolinas had built their mills in isolated "factory villages" where they 
owned the local stores, housing stock, and schools, as well as much of 
the real estate for miles around.289 Labor markets in towns such as 
Lowell, Massachusetts;290 Philadelphia's Manayunk section;29I and 
southern towns such as Lancaster, Rock Hill, and Clinton, South 
Carolina, for example, were dominated by single cotton mills.292 
Similarly, in the I830s the textile mills in south-central Massachusetts 
employed nearly two and a half times as many workers as worked in 
the region's entire nontextile sector.293 Furthermore, mills in a given 
region often entered into agreements not to hire workers who had 
286 GEORGE E. MCNEILL, A STUDY OF ACCIDENTS AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE 129 (1900) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
287 Id. 
288 On the increasing prevalence of the family-based approach in the Lowell mills as the labor 
market for young single native women declined, see THOMAS DUBLIN, WOMEN AT WORK: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK AND COMMUNITY IN LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS, i826-i860, at 138 
(I979). On the family system in south-central Massachusetts and Rhode Island, see PRUDE, supra 
note 274, at 43, 87, which observes that by i83i about two out of three workers in Slater-owned 
mills had a family member working in the same mill. 
289 Slater built the town of "Slatersville" for one of his early mills. PRUDE, supra note 274, at 48; 
see also DAVID L. CARLTON, MILL AND TOWN IN SOUTH CAROLINA, i880-1920, at 89-io9 (i982) 
(describing South Carolina mill towns and the mills' control of housing, churches, stores, and 
schools); DUBLIN, supra note 288, at 75-77 (describing the broad vision of corporate paternalism 
and practices of company housing in Lowell mills); JACQUELYN DOWD HALL, JAMES LELOUDIS, 
ROBERT KORSTAD, MARY MURPHY, LUANN JONES & CHRISTOPHER B. DALY, LIKE A FAMILY: 
THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN COTTON MILL WORLD (i987) (describing mill towns in North 
Carolina). 
290 See DUBLIN, supra note 288, at 75-76. 
291 See CYNTHIA J. SHELTON, THE MILLS OF MANAYUNK: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIAL 
CONFLICT IN THE PHILADELPHIA REGION, I787-i837, at ioo-oi (i986) (explaining that mill 
hands in Manayunk typically depended on the same mill owner for employment, housing, access to 
church membership, and access to poor relief). 
292 See CARLTON, supra note 289, at 52-53. 
293 PRUDE, supra note 274, at 7I. 
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worked in another mill unless the worker had received an honorable 
discharge from the prior mill.294 
Manchester, New Hampshire, for example, was designed by the 
Boston Associates as a company town for the Amoskeag mills.295 
Though Manchester itself quickly grew into a town in its own right, 
the company's influence persisted well into the twentieth century. For 
close to a century, two thirds of the employment opportunities in Man- 
chester remained dependent in some way on the company.296 As Amo- 
skeag's historians Tamara Hareven and Randolph Langenbach ex- 
plain, "[t]here was hardly a person in Manchester between I838, when 
construction began, and I936, when the mills shut down, whose life 
was not in some way affected by the Company."9297 Between the com- 
pany's domination of the local labor market and the company's ag- 
gressive employee welfare plans, which were formalized late in the 
century, the Amoskeag mills succeeded in creating an atmosphere 
marked by considerable, if often reluctant, deference to management 
among the workforce.298 In the words of one Manchester resident and 
Amoskeag employee: "If you told the boss to go to hell, you might as 
well move out of the city. The boss had the power to blackball you for 
the rest of your days."299 
In industries characterized by such local power in the labor market, 
injured workers were often forced to appeal to their employers for as- 
sistance rather than risk suing them. Early in the nineteenth century, 
laborers on canal digs injured in blasting accidents in isolated camps, 
for example, appealed to their employers for assistance.300 Later in the 
century at Amoskeag, appeals to the mill rather than litigation charac- 
terized the aftermath of work accidents.301 As one employment office 
clerk at Amoskeag during the first decade of the twentieth century re- 
membered, injured employees brought lawsuits "every once in a 
while."302 In general, however, the company "worked out" a settle- 
294 See DUBLIN, supra note 288, at 59. 
295 TAMARA K. HAREVEN, FAMILY TIME AND INDUSTRIAL TIME: THE RELATIONSHIP BE- 
TWEEN THE FAMILY AND WORK IN A NEW ENGLAND INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY 9-io (i982). 
296 Id. at 14. 
297 TAMARA K. HAREVEN & RANDOLPH LANGENBACH, AMOSKEAG: LIFE AND WORK IN AN 
AMERICAN FACTORY-CITY I I (1978). 
298 See HAREVEN, supra note 295, at 38-68. 
299 HAREVEN & LANGENBACH, supra note 297, at ii. Worker deference to the company was a 
complex combination of sincerely held affective bonds on the one hand, and rational calculation as 
to the power of the company over workers' lives on the other hand. As Hareven and Langenbach 
explain, workers not only feared the power of the company, but developed "a strong identification 
with the corporation." Id. 
300 See PETER WAY, COMMON LABOUR: WORKERS AND THE DIGGING OF NORTH AMERICAN 
CANALS, I780-i860, at I48-5I (I993). 
301 See HAREVEN & LANGENBACH, supra note 297, at I33. 
302 Id. 
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ment with injured workers who were presumably loathe to sue the 
city's most important establishment.303 Similar practices characterized 
dominant firms in the Pittsburgh steel industry; by the end of the cen- 
tury, the crippled watchman had become a "social type" as steel mill 
owners put disabled workingmen in low-exertion jobs.304 
Mining often involved even more isolated working conditions than 
those found in the textile mills. Moreover, mining, along with railroad 
work, was one of the two most dangerous occupations in the mid- and 
late nineteenth century. Yet in large part because of the isolation and 
local power of many mining companies, mining accidents never be- 
came as important as railroad accidents in the development of nine- 
teenth-century tort law.305 Some historians, to be sure, have suggested 
that company mining towns were not as despotic as has usually been 
thought - at least not relative to the alternatives available to the 
working class families who lived in them.306 Nonetheless, the local 
power of mining companies appears often to have been enough to de- 
ter the filing of lawsuits by accident victims and their families in min- 
ing communities around the country. In the intermountain West be- 
tween the eastern slope of the Rockies and the Sierra Nevadas, coal 
mine operators controlled as much as a fifth of the total labor market 
and often collaborated among themselves on hiring practices.307 In 
many frontier mining camps, the absence of government was the 
camps' most striking characteristic.308 Mine operators backed by state 
troops and private police were virtually unchallengeable in company 
mining towns such as the fenced and guarded Thurber, Texas.309 
Company towns in the bituminous coal fields of western Pennsylvania, 
southern Appalachia, and northern Illinois were dominated by mining 
303 Id. 
304 See EASTMAN, supra note I64, at I56. 
305 Even a cursory glance at the treatises on tort law readily suggests the importance of railroad 
cases and the extreme paucity of mining cases. By another measure, the West Publishing Company 
digested only six mining-related personal injury cases before i900 in the mining state of Pennsyl- 
vania as compared with 203 railroad cases involving injuries to persons on or near the tracks - a 
category that excluded passenger and work accidents. Search of Westlaw, PA-HN-ALL database 
(Dec. 2, 2000) (search of cases containing "260wiI8" or "32ox(G)" in the TOPIC field and "BEF 
i900G" in the DATE field). Even as late as I907, individual mining disasters generated little litiga- 
tion. See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 200, at 4I-42. 
306 See CRANDALL A. SHIFFLETT, COAL TOWNS: LIFE, WORK, AND CULTURE IN COMPANY 
TOWNS OF SOUTHERN APPALACHIA, i880-i960, at I45-6i (i99i); PRICE V. FISHBACK, SOFT 
COAL, HARD CHOICES: THE ECONOMIC WELFARE OF BITUMINOUS COAL MINERS, i890-I930, at 
152-70 (I992). 
307 See RONALD C. BROWN, HARD-ROCK MINERS: THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST, i860-I920, 
at I3, I28 (I979). 
308 See ELIZABETH JAMESON, ALL THAT GLITTERS: CLASS, CONFLICT, AND COMMUNITY IN 
CRIPPLE CREEK 53-59 (i998) (describing altercations between mine owners and striking miners). 
309 See JOHN S. SPRATT, SR., THURBER, TEXAS: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A COMPANY COAL 
TOWN, at xix, 6, 13 (Harwood P. Hinton ed., i986). 
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companies that owned the local real estate, housing stock, roads, and 
stores.310 Even where no single mining company became dominant, as 
in the famed anthracite fields of northeastern Pennsylvania, personal 
injury litigation was often futile. In a region in which the average du- 
ration of any one mining enterprise was less than one year, the short 
lifespan of anthracite mining operations made employers effectively 
judgment proof; most mines would have closed down long before the 
resolution of any legal action.311 
3. Obstacles to Personal Injury Litigation (II): The Law of Evi- 
dence. - If patterns of authority, deference, and power inhibited the 
growth of personal injury litigation, the law itself presented a number 
of doctrinal obstacles to bringing accident cases in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. We have already seen that the substantive doc- 
trines of liability in tort were sharply limited during the period. The 
negligence and contributory negligence standards, supplemented by 
the assumption of risk and fellow servant rules in the critical category 
of work accident cases, surely served to deter many would-be claim- 
ants. Moreover, quite apart from substantive rules of tort liability, a 
number of procedural doctrines discouraged accident litigation. 
No set of procedural rules presented more problems for would-be 
personal injury plaintiffs than the law of evidence did. For much of 
the nineteenth century, an array of witness disqualification rules 
barred testimony from precisely those most likely to know what had 
happened: the parties, any real parties in interest, any interested wit- 
nesses, and the husbands and wives of the parties. Eighteenth-century 
English treatise writer Lord Chief Baron Jeffrey Gilbert had explained 
that certain classes of persons were "totally excluded from all Attesta- 
tion ... for want of Integrity and Discernment."'312 Among these were 
the insane;313 those convicted of "Falsehood and other Crimes against 
the common Principles of Honesty," so-called "crimen falsi"';314 and re- 
ligious nonbelievers, whose oaths to tell the truth were meaningless.315 
Most important in Gilbert's account, however, were those witnesses 
whose interest in a suit was a "Ground for Distrust," either because 
310 See MILDRED ALLEN BEIK, THE MINERS OF WINDBER: THE STRUGGLES OF NEW IM- 
MIGRANTS FOR UNIONIZATION, i890s-i930s, at i8 (I996); JOHN H.M. LASLETT, NATURE'S 
NOBLEMEN: THE FORTUNES OF THE INDEPENDENT COLLIER IN SCOTLAND AND THE AMERI- 
CAN MIDWEST, i855-i889, at 42-43 (i983); PRISCILLA LONG, WHERE THE SUN NEVER SHINES: 
A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S BLOODY COAL INDUSTRY 8o (i989); SHIFFLETT, supra note 306, at 
I45-6i. 
311 See WALLACE, supra note I4, at 258-6i. 
312 ANON. [Sir Geoffrey Gilbert], THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 86 (photo. reprint I979) (Dublin, 
I754). 
313 See id. at I03-04. 
314 Id. at ioo-oi. 
315 See id. at I03. 
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they were the actual parties to the action or merely because they stood 
to gain or lose depending on its outcome.316 
The disqualification rules laid down by Gilbert were readily 
adopted by American courts in the early republic.317 The result, as le- 
gal historians John Langbein and William Nelson have each observed, 
was the effective exclusion from the common law courts of cases that 
would have relied on oral testimony.318 Oral contracts made without a 
witness, for example, were exceedingly difficult to sue on, for neither 
the plaintiff nor the defendant could testify to the making of the con- 
tract.319 By the same token, actions arising out of accidental injuries 
were required to go forward (if at all) without the testimony of the per- 
son who as often as not knew best what had happened.320 One can 
only imagine how difficult it was to bring an action in railroad- 
crossing cases occurring on isolated stretches of track, with few or no 
witnesses. Similarly, in work accident cases, a disabled worker unable 
to testify on his own behalf relied by necessity on the testimony of his 
fellow employees, all of whom would presumably be reluctant to tes- 
tify against their employer if they wished to keep their jobs on good 
terms. As two early twentieth-century observers noted, it was quite 
common for coworkers to "refuse to testify against their employer 
through fear of being dismissed from employment."'321 
By the i840s, law reformers in the United States began to abolish 
the witness disqualification rules. Massachusetts courts had gradually 
narrowed the rules for several decades;322 the Supreme Judicial Court 
abolished the disqualification of atheists in i8i8,323 and by the i820S 
the agent of a party could testify to the contents of contracts made on 
behalf of his principal.324 Moreover, in many states legislation abol- 
ished the disqualification rules for particular kinds of cases, including 
suits on gaming debts325 and actions to collect allegedly usurious 
316 Id. at 87. 
317 See, e.g., Starr v. Tracy, 2 Root 528, 529 (Conn. Super. Ct. I797); Connor v. Bradey, I Ant. 
NP. Cas. 99, 99-i00 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. i809); see also ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND 
PROMISSORY NOTES 44-73 (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke i8io). 
318 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF 
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, I760-i830, at 24-25, I56 (I975); John H. Lang- 
bein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View From the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. 
L. REV. ii68, II74-75 (i996). 
319 See NELSON, supra note 3i8, at 6o, I56. 
320 See Langbein, supra note 3 i8, I I74. 
321 CLYDE J. CROBAUGH & AMOS E. REDDING, CASUALTY INSURANCE 495 (I928). 
322 NELSON, supra note 3i8, at I56-5 7. 
323 See Hunscom v. Hunscom, I5 Mass. (I4 Tyng) i84, i84 (i8i8). 
324 Cf. NELSON, supra note 3i8, at I56-5 7 (noting that exceptions to the rule prohibiting inter- 
ested parties from testifying made the rule virtually meaningless). 
325 See An Act to Prevent Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, ch. 46, i8oi N.Y. Laws 70. 
200I] TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ACCIDENT LAW 755 
loans.326 The core of the disqualification rules remained intact, how- 
ever, into the i84os and i85oS.327 General statutory abolition of the 
disqualification rules began in Michigan, which abolished the disquali- 
fication rule for nonparty interested witnesses in i846.328 Connecticut 
admitted party testimony in civil cases in i848.329 New York abol- 
ished the disqualification of interested nonparty witnesses in the fa- 
mous Field Code of that same year.330 The Code also allowed parties 
to call their opponents to testify,331 and in i857 New York allowed 
parties to testify on their own behalf.332 Massachusetts, following 
close behind, abolished its party disqualification rules in i857 as 
well.333 And though Southern states took longer than Northern states 
to abolish the disqualification rules, the entire array of disqualification 
rules collapsed by the I87oS.334 
Although the witness disqualification rules no longer hindered per- 
sonal injury litigation in most Northern states by the end of the i850s, 
the mid-nineteenth-century law of evidence created new obstacles even 
as it struck down the old. In the very years in which the common law 
of evidence swept out the witness disqualification rules, new doctrines 
developed that excluded particular kinds of testimony rather than par- 
ticular classes of witnesses.335 In particular, the hearsay rule devel- 
oped to exclude out-of-court statements by persons not testifying at 
trial.336 
Of particular interest is the interaction of the hearsay rule and its 
exceptions with the corporate or organizational context of personal in- 
326 See An Act to Prevent Usury, ch. 430, i837 N.Y. Laws 486. 
327 In the i830s, criticism of the disqualification rules mounted. In particular, law reformers 
drew on a new legal technology - cross-examination - to sort out truths and falsehoods in oral 
testimony. The disqualification rule's guarantee of disinterestedness thus became considerably less 
important to common law factfinding. See John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitution- 
alization of American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, I79I-1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 864-66 
(I999). 
328 22 Mich. Rev. Stat., ch. I02, ? 99 (i846). 
329 Conn. Rev. Stat., tit. I, ch. x, ? I4I (i849). 
330 FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS: CODE OF PRO- 
CEDURE ? 35 I, at 246 (Albany, Charles Van Benthuysen i848). 
331 See id. ? 344, at 242. 
332 George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, I07 YALE L.J. 575, 7I0 (I997); Witt, supra 
note 327, at 854-58. 
333 NELSON, supra note 3I8, at I57. 
334 See Fisher, supra note 332, at 673-74, 709-I I. 
335 See C.J.W. ALLEN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND I4 (I997) (arguing 
that the "main problem" faced by analysts of nineteenth-century evidence law is accounting for the 
shift from "the old exclusionary rules about competency of witnesses" to the "exclusionary, rule- 
based system that began to govern testimony given in court"); see also Langbein, supra note 3 I8, at 
II94, I20I (concluding that the hearsay rule and the modern exclusionary doctrines of the law of 
evidence are products of the early nineteenth century). 
336 See, e.g., I FRANK S. RICE, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE ? 2 I I, at 
367 (Rochester, Lawyers' Co-Operative Publishing Co. i892). 
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jury litigation. One of the long-established exceptions to the hearsay 
rule is that the admissions of a party may be offered as evidence 
against her.337 Simon Greenleaf's early American evidence treatise, for 
example, observed that "the declarations of a party to the record" 
were, "as against such party, admissible in evidence."338 When a rail- 
road company or a corporate employer was the defendant in an action 
for personal injury, however, the disembodied nature of the defendant 
required that the plaintiff call not the party itself but one of its agents. 
How, after all, could a corporation testify except through its agents? 
Today, the modern rule for agent admissions establishes that a 
statement is not hearsay if it is "a statement by the party's agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or em- 
ployment."339 Courts interpret this rule expansively to encompass all 
statements "naturally made in the course of the agency," including 
post-accident statements by agents involved in the accident.340 
In contrast, the nineteenth-century party admission rule sharply 
limited the admission of agents' statements as evidence against a cor- 
porate principal. The nineteenth-century rule was closely linked to the 
now-antiquated evidence doctrine of the "res gestae": statements "con- 
temporaneous with" the event in question so that they were said to 
form "one transaction"'341 with (or "spring out of'342) the event. Thus, 
the nineteenth-century party admission rule allowed the admission of 
only the statements that an agent made "at the time of, and in relation 
to, some act then being performed in the scope of the agent's duty"343 
in other words, statements "made at the same time, and constituting 
part of the res gestae."344 
The res gestae rule had its origins in commercial contract cases in 
the early part of the century.345 But by the last thirty years of the 
337 See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE ? 262, at 774 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. I992). 
338 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE ? I7i, at 225 (Boston, Little & 
Brown, 5th ed. i850). 
339 FED. R. EVID. 8oi(d)(2)(D); see also 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW ? I078, at i62 (James H. Chadbourn ed., I976). 
340 4 WIGMORE, supra note 339, ? I078, at i66 n.2 (quoting Slifjka v. Johnson, i6i F.2d 467, 469 
(2d Cir. I947)); see, e.g., Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 
Holland v. Tuller, 292 F.2d 775, 782-85 (D.C. Cir. i96i). 
341 IRICE, supra note 336, ? 2I2, at 375. 
342 Gandy v. Humphries, 35 Ala. 6I7, 624 (i86o). 
343 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 337, ? 259, at 454. 
344 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE ? II3, at I45-46 (Isaac E. 
Redfield ed., I2th ed., Boston, Little & Brown i866). "[W]here his right to act in the particular 
matter in question has ceased," however, "the principal can no longer be affected by his declara- 
tions, they being mere hearsay." Id. ? I I3, at I49. 
345 See, e.g., Lundie v. Cosper, 20 Ala. I23, I26 (i852); Williams v. Kelsey, 6 Ga. 365 (I849); Wa- 
terman v. Peet, ii Ill. 648, 649 (i850); Snow v. Warner, 5I Mass. (io Met.) I32, I37 (i845); Salem 
India Rubber Co. v. Adams, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 256, 265 (I839); Richardson & Price v. Cato, 29 
Tenn. (io Hum.) I38, I40 (I849). 
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nineteenth century, accident cases formed the most important share of 
agent-admission cases; indeed, in the i86os streetcar and railroad in- 
jury lawsuits became the paradigmatic res gestae cases.346 In the i866 
edition of Greenleaf's treatise, for example, the editor's discussion of 
the doctrine centered on the case of a post-accident admission of negli- 
gence by a streetcar driver. Such an admission was not admissible 
against the streetcar company, Isaac Redfield explained, "being made 
after the injury was inflicted."347 In subsequent decades, an outpour- 
ing of cases in the reporters testified to the power of the res gestae rule 
to exclude statements that plaintiffs sought to introduce in personal in- 
jury litigation. The pre-accident statements of a railroad company 
roadmaster as to the incompetence of an injured worker's fellow em- 
ployee were excluded as not being part of the res gestae.348 Similarly, 
the declarations of a conductor as to the poor condition of a railroad 
track made a "moment before the accident" were "inadmissible" as not 
part of the res gestae.349 Post-accident statements, though made 
"within an hour, describing the cause of the accident," were not compe- 
tent against the principal,350 nor were statements made ten to thirty 
minutes after an accident as to the excessive speed of the railroad 
346 A collection of representative cases includes: Lincoln Coal Mining Co. v. McNally, I5 Ill. 
App. i8i, i84-85 (i884) (holding declarations of defendant coal mine's servants inadmissible when 
not forming part of the res gestae of the accident); Patterson v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 
i9 NW. 76I, 765-66 (Mich. i884) (holding the post-accident statement of railroad company ser- 
vant inadmissible); Forsee v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 63 Miss. 66, 72 (i885) (holding the post- 
accident declaration of a railroad ticket agent inadmissible); Meyer v. Va. & Truckee R.R. Co., i6 
Nev. 34I, 344-46 (i88i) (finding post-fire statements of the defendant's agent inadmissible when 
not part of the res gestae); Erie & W Va. R.R. Co. v. Smith, I7 A. 443, 445-447, I25 Pa. 259, 264 
(i889) (deeming the post-accident declaration of a defendant railroad corporation's servants as to 
character of engine inadmissible). An exception to the rule existed for statements tending to prove 
that a corporation had notice of a particular employee's incompetence or a particular piece of ma- 
chinery's dangerousness. See, e.g., Chapman v. Erie Ry. Co., 55 N.Y. 579, 584-85 (i874) (admitting 
the pre-accident statements of a supervisor tending to show that the principal knew of his fellow 
servant's incompetence). Accident cases continue today to pose some of the most difficult cases for 
the party admission doctrine. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 339, ? I078, at i66 ("The most difficult field 
in the application of this principle is that of tortious liability."). 
347 GREENLEAF, supra note 344, ? II3, at I34; see also I RICE, supra note 336, ? 230, at 449 
(citing railroad cases). 
348 McDermott v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 73 Mo. 5i6,5i8-i9(i88i). 
349 The Res Gestae of an Accident, 4 WKLY. L. BULL. 872, 872 (i878); see also The Res Gestae of 
an Accident, io CENT. L.J. 23, 23 (i88o) (citing Mobile & Montgomery R.R. Co. v. Ashcraft, 48 
Ala. Is (i872)); id. (statement of stage driver that coach was overloaded inadmissible as evidence 
for the plaintiff) (citing Maury v. Talmadge, i6 F. Cas. ii82, ii84 (D. Ohio i840) (No. 93I5)); id. 
(declarations of boat pilot) (citing Ready v. Steamboat Highland Mary, 20 Mo. 264 (i855)). 
350 The Res Gestae of an Accident, supra note 349, at 24 (i88o); Case Note, 4I CENT. L.J. 397, 
397 (i895) (citing St. Louis Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Kelley, 3I S.W. 884, 884-85 (Ark. i895)); 
see also Evidence, 40 CENT. L.J. I66, i66-67 (i895) (discussing Barker v. St. Louis Iron Mountain 
& Southern Railway Co., 28 S.W. 866, 866-67, I26 Mo. I43 (MO. i894) (holding a conductor's 
declaration made eight to ten minutes after accident not admissible as not within the res gestae)); 
The Res Gestae of an Accident, supra note 349, at 872 (i878). 
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car.35' Even written post-accident reports by agents to their principals 
were held to be inadmissible against the principal as outside of the res 
gestae unless they "had been promulgated by the company as official 
documents adopted by and proceeding from it."352 
The res gestae rule also operated to exclude a wide array of state- 
ments that plaintiffs sought to admit under other exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. In one particularly brutal case, the dying declaration of 
the plaintiff's husband was held inadmissible. While still lying on the 
tracks, after the wheels of a railroad car had been removed from his 
body, the deceased had managed to say that the "handhold" had let 
him down. But the Alabama Supreme Court explained that this 
statement "was no part of the main fact" as it had been "made after 
the car was removed from over the body."353 Similarly, though mid- 
century courts permitted the introduction of "all declarations of pain, 
suffering, . . . [and] expressions of pain and distress at the time of such 
suffering,"354 toward the end of the century courts increasingly applied 
the res gestae rule to exclude contemporaneous expressions of pain and 
suffering.355 
4. The Rise of Personal Injury Litigation and the Personal Injury 
Lawyer. - Restrictive common law tort doctrines and inflexible evi- 
dentiary rules, however, could not stanch the outpouring of new tort 
litigation in the i86os and i87os. The number of accident cases and 
the number of lawyers both shot up after I870. At least part of the 
reason that accident litigation had been slow to come to mining and 
textile regions was the relative scarcity of lawyers in such isolated ar- 
eas. In urban areas after i86o, however, there was no dearth of attor- 
neys. From the end of the Civil War to the turn of the century, a 
boom in the number of lawyers - and especially in the number of 
351 Vicksburg & Miss. R.R. Co. v. O'Brien, ii9 U.S. 99 (i886). 
352 Notes of Recent Decisions, 30 CENT. L.J. 2, 3 (i890) (citing Carroll v. E. Tenn., Va. & Ga. Ry. 
Co., io S.E. i63 (Ga. i889)). The mid- and late nineteenth-century doctrine appears to have lim- 
ited the scope of agents' admissions to "spontaneous exclamationss]" which constitute a specific 
hearsay exemption today. See Note, 40 CENT. L.J. i67, i67-68 (i894) ("If ... the court is satisfied 
that the agent, without time to premeditate, expressed truly and spontaneously his thoughts in re- 
gard to a fact within his knowledge and in issue ... the evidence would be admissible."); see also 6 
WIGMORE, supra note 339, ?? I756a-I757, at 234-37 (discussing confusion in the early case law 
between res gestae and spontaneous exclamations). 
353 Res Gestae - Admissibility Of Declarations as a Part of - Railroad Accidents, 36 CENT. 
L.J. I70, I72 (i893) (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Pearson, I2 So. I76, I79 (Ala. i893)). 
354 IRICE, supra note 336, ? 2I2, at 377 (citing cases). 
355 See id. at 384 ("Apparent abuses resulting from receiving descriptive declarations of pain in 
negligence cases, has led to a reconsideration of the rule; and the better opinion now is that a party 
seeking to recover damages on account of his own suffering cannot give in evidence, in his own 
behalf, his own descriptive declarations of suffering, as distinguished from apparently spontaneous 
manifestations of the distress."). 
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first- and second-generation immigrant lawyers - occurred alongside 
even more dramatic growth in the number of personal injury lawsuits. 
Even as late as the mid-nineteenth century, remarkably few Ameri- 
cans sued for personal injuries. Randolph Bergstrom found that in 
New York City in i870, just o.6% of cases filed in state court were ac- 
cident or tort cases.356 Only 40.7% of these were for personal injuries, 
constituting a total of thirteen personal injury suits for the entire year, 
some thirteen years after the abolition of the party disqualification rule 
in New York.357 By i890, however, the number of accident suits being 
litigated in New York courts had grown almost eight-fold, and by i9i0 
that number had grown again by more than a factor of four.358 
Among contested cases, the rise in the number of personal injury suits 
was almost as dramatic. Whereas in i870 tort cases of all kinds repre- 
sented only 4.2% of the New York City trial court contested caseload, 
by i910 they made up 40.9% of that caseload, just under a ten-fold in- 
crease.359 Similarly, as Robert Silverman has found, in Boston as late 
as i88o there were no more than "a dozen or so suits . . . filed in supe- 
rior court alleging damage caused by negligent operation of a horse- 
car."360 A mere twenty years later, however, there were over 8oo per- 
sonal injury cases involving streetcars in superior court, and 6oo more 
in the municipal court.36' 
These developments in the law of personal injury hardly went un- 
noticed. E. Parmalee Prentice, writing in the North American Review, 
found a 8oo% increase in the number of personal injury suits pending 
in the Cook County, Illinois courts between i875 and i896.362 Eli 
Shelby Hammond complained in the Yale Law Journal that "slight 
wrongs or injuries that ordinarily were never noticed hitherto," were 
increasingly being "made the foundation for building up by perjury 
... claims for enormous damages."363 By I907, Elon R. Brown of the 
New York State Bar Association explained that negligencene cases are 
356 Bergstrom analyzed the case records from the state supreme court, which was (as it is today) 
the trial court of general jurisdiction. See BERGSTROM, supra note 58, at 20 tbl.4. 
357 Id. 
358 Id. 
359 Id. at I7 tbl.2. 
360 ROBERT A. SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH: CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE BOSTON 
TRIAL COURTS, i880-i900, at I05 (i98i). 
361 Id.; see also George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Triumph, io9 YALE L.J. 857, 995-1001 (2000) 
(discussing the rise in civil litigation in the nineteenth century). 
362 E. Parmalee Prentice, The Speculation in Damage Claims for Personal Injuries, i64 N. AM. 
REV. i99, i99 (i897). 
363 Eli Shelby Hammond, Personal Injury Litigation, 6 YALE L.J. 328, 332 (i897). 
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blocking our calendars with a mass of litigation so great as to impede 
administration in all other branches of law."364 
At the same time that the number of accident cases was growing 
sharply, the number of lawyers was also increasing. United States cen- 
sus records provide a wide-angle view of the profession in the period 
from i870 to 190.365 In the United States as a whole, the number of 
lawyers jumped by almost I50% between i870 and i900, and the 
number of individuals in the paid workforce per lawyer decreased 
from 307 to 256. At the state level, the number of lawyers in New 
York State increased by an average of 37% each decade between i870 
and i900. The number of persons in paid occupations for every law- 
yer in the state decreased by approximately one fifth over the course of 
the three decades, from 252 to 203. Breakdowns of these numbers by 
national origin are slightly more difficult as a result of changing census 
categories, but it appears that the main growth area in the legal pro- 
fession in these years was among the children of immigrants: in the ten 
years between i890 and i900, the number of white native-born law- 
yers with parents of foreign or mixed birth in New York State grew by 
75%, two and a half times the rate of growth among lawyers overall. 
Nationally, the number of white native-born lawyers with parents of 
foreign or mixed birth grew by 8o% in the same decade, almost three 
times the rate of growth among lawyers generally. 
364 Elon R. Brown, Some Faults of Legal Administration, in N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING HELD AT NEW YORK, JANUARY 2 I, 24- 
25, i908, at I36, I42 (i908). 
365 A change in igio in the way the category of "lawyer" was defined makes comparisons be- 
tween pre- and post-igio census information problematic. For statistical treatment of the legal 
profession, see RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 249-3i8 (i989); Terence C. Halliday, Six 
Score Years and Ten: Demographic Transitions in the American Legal Profession, 1850-1980, 20 
LAW & SOc'Y REV. 53 (i986). The data presented here is compiled from the published reports of 
the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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TABLE i. THE GROWTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
LAWYERS IN NEW YORK STATE, I870-I930* 
Year Lawyers Persons in Pct. Growth Persons in White Na- Pct. Growth in 
Paid Occu- in Lawyers All Paid tive-Born White Native- 
pations Occupa- Lawyers with Born Lawyers 
tions Per Foreign or with Foreign or 
Lawyer Mixed-Birth Mixed-Birth 
Parents Parents 
i870 5,9I3 I,49i,oi8 - 252 2 _ 
i88o 9X459 I,884,645 6o% I99 - 
i90 II,94 2,435,725 i8% 2I8 2,299 - 
I900 I4,759 2,996,474 32% 203 4,09I 75% 
I9I0366 I7,27I 4,003,844 - - 5,3IO 32% 
I920 i8,29 3,367,909 5 % i86 5'999 I3 % 
I230 23 52521337 5_2% 200 - _ 
I DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES ... COMPILED FROM THE ORIGINAL RETURNS OF THE NINTH 
CENSUS (I870) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office I872); I DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 
CENSUS OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE 
TENTH CENSUS (i88o) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office i88o); I DEP'T OF THE 
INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS (I890) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office I890); I 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL REPORTS: 
OCCUPATIONS OF THE TWELFTH CENSUS (I904); DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, POPULATION I9IO: THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN IN 
THE YEAR I9IO, VOLUME IV: OCCUPATION STATISTICS (I9I4); DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION I920: FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED 
STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR I920, VOLUME IV: OCCUPATIONS (I923); U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
I930 POPULATION, VOLUME IV: OCCUPATIONS, BY STATES (I933); U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
I930 POPULATION, VOLUME V: GENERAL REPORT ON OCCUPATIONS (I933). 
366 The definition of "lawyer" was amended in i9io to remove semiprofessionals, namely, nota- 
ries, abstracters, and justices of the peace. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 
POPULATION i9io: THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR i9io, 
VOLUME IV: OCCUPATION STATISTICS (Gov 't Printing Office I 9 I 4). 
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TABLE 2. THE GROWTH OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES* 
Year All Paid Lawyers Pct. Number of White Pct. Number of 
Occupations Growth People in Native- Growth in White Na- 
in the the Paid Born the Num- tive-Born 
Num- Workforce Lawyers ber of Children of 
ber of Per Law- with For- White Foreign or 
Law- yer eign or Native- Mixed-Birth 
yers Mixed- Born Parents in the 
Birth Lawyers Paid 
Parents with For- Workforce 
eign or per Similarly 
Mixed- Situated 
Birth Par- Lawyer 
ents 
i870 I2,505,923 40,736 307 
i88o I7,392,099 64,I37 57% 27 I 
i890 23,3i8,i83 89,630 40% 260 II,034 3,542,408 32I 
I900 29,287,070 II4,460 28% 256 I9,900 - 266 
I9I0 38,i67,336 II4,704 2i,8I4 -- 
I920 4I,6I4,248 I22,5I9 3I% 340 27,288 306 
I930 48,829920 i6o,605 - 304 - - 
I DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES .. . COMPILED FROM THE ORIGINAL RETURNS OF THE NINTH 
CENSUS (I870) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office I872); I DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, 
CENSUS OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE 
TENTH CENSUS (i88o) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office I880); I DEP'T OF THE 
INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS (I890) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office I890); I 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL REPORTS: 
OCCUPATIONS OF THE TWELFTH CENSUS (I904); DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, POPULATION I910: THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN IN 
THE YEAR I910, VOLUME IV: OCCUPATION STATISTICS (I9I4); DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION I920: FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED 
STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR I920, VOLUME IV: OCCUPATIONS (I923); U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
I930 POPULATION, VOLUME V: GENERAL REPORT ON OCCUPATIONS (I933). 
Similar patterns characterized the legal profession in New York 
State's major cities. In Manhattan, the growth rate in lawyers as 
compared to the paid workforce considerably exceeded the state aver- 
age. Between I87o and I900, the number of persons in paid occupa- 
tions for every one lawyer decreased by 36%, from 273 to I74.367 Once 
367 DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES ... COMPILED FROM THE ORIGINAL RETURNS OF THE NINTH CENSUS 
(i870) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office i872); I DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS 
OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE TENTH CENSUS 
(i88o) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office i88o); I DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS 
OFFICE, THE STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE ELEVENTH 
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again, white children of immigrants represented the major growth 
category, with the number of lawyers in this class growing by 85% be- 
tween i890 and i900, compared to a 49% growth rate for lawyers gen- 
erally.368 Unlike Manhattan, Buffalo nearly matched the state average 
in the per capita growth in lawyers.369 In Buffalo, however, the 
growth in the number of lawyers who were the white children of im- 
migrants was an astounding I70% from i890 to 1900.370 Some cities 
lagged behind the state's average growth in the number of lawyers per 
capita. Albany, Syracuse, and Teroy experienced smaller than average 
growth in the number of lawyers per person in paid occupations;371 
Brooklyn and Rochester experienced small decreases in the number of 
lawyers per person.372 Even in these cities, however, the number of 
native-born white lawyers with parents of foreign or mixed birth grew 
disproportionately as compared to lawyers generally.373 
Increased competition for business among lawyers appears to have 
pushed the newcomers at the bar - and particularly the children of 
immigrants, who lacked connections to steadier or more lucrative work 
to generate new kinds of business.374 Young lawyers training to 
take on personal injury cases were instructed in no uncertain terms 
that although there were clear limits on soliciting business from acci- 
dent victims, actively soliciting cases was an indispensable part of the 
practitioner's livelihood. At Northwestern University Law School's 
Course in Legal Tactics, for example, Andrew Hirschl of the Chicago 
Bar advised students going into plaintiff-side personal injury law to 
distinguish between the "improper[]" solicitation of business and solici- 
tation of business more generally. "Let me tell you frankly, gentle- 
men," he warned: 
[I]f you don't solicit them you won't get them. You might as well make 
up your minds to it. I have watched this thing for over thirty-three years, 
at the bar here and elsewhere. If you don't solicit those cases you won't 
get them.... [T]hey are being looked for by others, and if the others get 
them you won't get them. That is plain.... Now, those men are after 
CENSUS (i890) (Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office i890); I DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND 
LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL REPORTS: OCCUPATIONS OF THE TWELFTH CENSUS 
(I904). The extremely high growth rate of lawyers in Manhattan suggests a qualification of 
Bergstrom's claim that "after i88o the population grew at an even faster pace than the number of 
lawyers." BERGSTROM, supra note 58, at 88. 






374 Immigrant lawyers may also have sympathized more strongly with working-class accident 
victims; at the very least, they were more likely than elite lawyers to have contacts in the communi- 
ties in which many accident plaintiffs lived. 
764 HARVARD LAWREVIEW [Vol. I I4:690 
these cases. And they will get them. If you are willing to sit in your of- 
fice, then they will get the cases.375 
Following Hirschl's advice, and indeed going considerably further, 
the plaintiffs' personal injury bar created intricate networks of "run- 
ners," including members of the police and railroad workforces, who 
received a percentage of the lawyer's take from each case.376 Others 
among the plaintiffs' bar - though probably fewer than their oppo- 
nents in the defense bar imagined - moved into the shady world of 
claims fraud, fabricating personal injury claims to bring suits against 
streetcar companies and other corporate defendants.377 Moreover, at 
least some plaintiffs' lawyers engaged in questionable settlement prac- 
tices. Upstate New York lawyer Arthur Clark, for example, sold out 
more than 300 clients in a brazen deal with the Central New York 
Telephone & Telegraph Company.378 
The defense bar developed similarly dubious strategies to obstruct 
personal injury litigation. On one level, this meant little more than in- 
genious exploitation of the complex procedural rules and overlapping 
jurisdictional rules of the federal and state court systems to stall cases 
on ancillary issues.379 At another level, however, it meant stooping to 
depths reached only by the most unscrupulous members of the plain- 
tiffs' bar. Railroads paid off employees to make themselves unavail- 
able to testify on an injured co-worker's behalf.380 Insurance agents 
and claims adjusters approached still-dazed victims seeking to execute 
releases for paltry sums.381 Corporate defense lawyers struck corrupt 
bargains with plaintiffs' counsel in return for a steady flow of defense 
work.382 
It is difficult to tell from any of this evidence, of course, whether 
the rise of injury claims resulted from the increase in the number of 
lawyers or vice versa. It may not matter, however, whether lawyers or 
375 Andrew J. Hirschl, The Plaintiffs Standpoint, I ILL. L. REV. i6, I7, i9 (i906). 
376 See, e.g., In re Clark, 77 N.E. I, 5-6 (N.Y. i906) (disbarring an attorney who, among other 
things, sold the claims of his own clients for $25 each); In re Newell, I74 A.D. 94, 98-99 (N.Y. App. 
Div. i9i6) (per curiam) (disbarring an attorney for paying an employee of the New York Central 
Railroad Company to monitor the company's telegraphic communications and notify him of acci- 
dents - and thus potential clients). 
377 See the interesting but sensationalist and decidedly one-sided KEN DORNSTEIN, 
ACCIDENTALLY, ON PURPOSE: THE MAKING OF A PERSONAL INJURY UNDERWORLD IN AMERICA 
53-I9I (I997). 
378 Clark, 77 N.E. at 5. 
379 See BERGSTROM, supra note 58, at IOI-I2; see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY (I992). 
380 BERGSTROM, supra note 58, at 99-ioo. 
381 See the accounts of personal injury practice in Edward A. Purcell, The Action Was Outside 
the Courts: Consumer Injuries and the Uses of Contract in the U.S., 1875-1945, in PRIVATE LAW 
AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 505, 5 I3-2 I (Willibald Steinmetz ed., 2000). 
382 See, e.g., SILVERMAN, supra note 360, at 99-ioo. 
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claims came first in time. The two trends no doubt at once responded 
to, interacted with, and accelerated one another. What evidence exists 
makes it fairly clear that many suits were brought that would not oth- 
erwise have been filed but for the encouragement of lawyers seeking 
contingent fees.383 Even when lawyers did not actively seek out cases, 
their increased presence in a particular city may well have heightened 
the probability that accident victims would approach them. And such 
increased demand for legal services, in turn, may have encouraged un- 
decided fence-sitters to train for the profession. 
In any event, from the perspective of the elite of the bar the boom 
in personal injury suits threatened the reputation of the profession 
and even, some suggested, the rule of law itself.384 It was the plain- 
tiffs' bar that came in for the most criticism. "Barratrous specula- 
tions," the "communistic tendencies of the present time," and the lure 
of "enormous verdicts," it was said, had led to such practices as adver- 
tising and solicitation "at the expense of all manly and professional 
dignity."385 Personal injury litigation was said to be "marked by a 
lower tone of professional ethics at the Bar and by a greater absence of 
abstract justice on the Bench than any other class of litigation."386 Ac- 
cording to Irving Vann of the New York Court of Appeals in his fa- 
mous commencement address at the Albany Law School, personal in- 
jury lawyers on the plaintiffs' side were practicing massive fraud by 
encouraging perjurious testimony from so-called expert witnesses in 
order to reap substantial contingent fees, thereby "rob[bing] corpora- 
tions of thousands of dollars every year."387 According to Cooley, the 
contingent fee disrupted the lawyer's professional obligations to court 
and client alike. It tempted lawyers to "deal deceitfully" with potential 
clients by exaggerating the difficulty of cases in order to extract higher 
fee percentages, and it placed the lawyer's selfish interest in the out- 
come of the case over his obligations to the "just administration of the 
383 See, e.g., In re O'Neill, I7i N.Y.S. 5I4, 5I5 (App. Div. i9i8) (discussing allegations that an 
attorney used runners to generate accident claims that otherwise appeared unlikely to have been 
brought). 
384 See, e.g., Hammond, supra note 363, at 332 ("The sharp practices of two professionals, legal 
and medical, are called in to aid the money-raid upon the unfortunate tortfeasor."); Prentice, supra 
note 362, at 204-08 (blaming the increase in injury suits on the development of professional specu- 
lation in personal injury litigation); see also To Establish Rules of Professional Ethics: A Proper 
Function of the Association, 3 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N REP. 74, 78-79 (i88o) (observing that many law- 
yers in the Association viewed contingent fees as "disreputable, unworthy, demoralizing and tend- 
ing to degrade the profession and impair the administration of justice"). 
385 To Establish Rules of Professional Ethics, supra note 384, at 78-79. 
386 Brown, supra note 364, at I42. 
387 IRVING G. VANN, CONTINGENT FEES: ADDRESS IN HUBBARD COURSE ON LEGAL ETHICS 
DELIVERED AT COMMENCEMENT OF ALBANY LAW SCHOOL I0-I2 (I905) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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law."388 Moreover, the contingent fee arrangement led plaintiffs' law- 
yers to file frivolous suits against corporate defendants in the hopes of 
exploiting the "effect of appeals to passion or prejudice" in the jury.389 
Cooley, then, saw in the contingent fee and the rising tide of acci- 
dent litigation threats to the abstract reason and cohesiveness of classi- 
cal legal thought. He was right, of course. Little in the messy, murky 
underworld of personal injury litigation corresponded to the airy 
propositions of Cooley's torts treatise. Tort liability in the real world, 
it seemed, turned not on classical liberal principles, but on the ques- 
tionable tactics of runners and insurance adjusters, the common law 
evidentiary system, and the persistence of employer power over in- 
jured employees.390 
5. The Rise of Faultless Injuries and the Compensation Crisis.- 
Another quickly developing trend was even more threatening to the 
doctrinal edifice of classical tort law. It was becoming apparent to 
many that an increasing number of the victims of personal injuries, 
especially victims of injuries suffered in the workplace, were them- 
selves faultless. Injuries, it seemed, were the inevitable result of mod- 
ern methods of industrial production. Such unavoidable accidents 
raised precisely the problem that lay at the core of classical tort law: 
the faultless (or "accidental," as Holmes would have it) victim of non- 
negligent injury. 
As late as the early i88os, students of American industrial acci- 
dents believed that accidents were almost always the result of some- 
one's fault. "Every death upon a railroad," explained Carroll Wright 
in i883, "like every death by violence, is the result of somebody's neg- 
ligence or wilfulness."'39' By the turn of the century, however, it 
seemed increasingly unlikely in many instances that accidents could be 
traced to any human fault. The New York Bureau of Labor Statistics 
claimed that "in modern industry," with its "extremely complicated 
machinery," it was "impossible to locate the responsibility" in work ac- 
cident cases.392 In Maryland in I 902, the legislature announced that in 
"perilous occupations . . . unavoidable or trade risk is responsible for at 
least ninety-five per cent" of fatal accidents.393 In Minnesota, the Bu- 
reau of Labor reported that most work accidents were due not to em- 
ployer or employee negligence but to the unavoidable "hazards of the 
388 The Contingent Fee Business, 24 ALB. L.J. 24, 25-26 (i88i). 
389 Id. at 26. 
390 Fishback and Kantor's statistical studies of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century tort 
law support Cooley's suspicions: common law doctrines appear to have had some influence on the 
"probability and level of accident payments, but they were clearly not the only influence and some- 
times not even the dominant influence." FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 6, at 45. 
391 I4 ANN. REP. MASS. BUREAU OF STAT. OF LAB. pt. i, at 68 (Boston, Wright & Potter i883). 
392 i7 ANN. REP. N.Y. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. 559(I900). 
393 I902 Md. Laws, ch. 4I2. 
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industry."394 Reports on the accident problem in Iowa observed that 
the toll of work accidents was "in great part[] unavoidable" and that 
even "when all possible precautions have been taken, modern industry 
will continue to exact a fearful toll of life and limb."395 Crystal East- 
man's widely influential study of work accidents in Pittsburgh made 
much the same point: in a substantial number of work accident fatali- 
ties, Eastman contended, "no one is to be blamed."396 
State bar associations, too, came to see industrial accidents as re- 
sulting not from the fault of particular parties but from inevitable 
risks. "[I]n many, if not all, lines of employment," observed one Ohio 
Bar Association report, "there is an element of inherent danger which, 
in measuring employees' injuries, is quite as important as the element 
of negligence."397 No matter how careful the employee and employer 
were, explained another report to the Ohio Bar Association a year 
later, more than half of work accidents were "due to the natural haz- 
ards or dangers of the business."398 
Indeed, the rise of faultless injuries precipitated a compensation 
crisis in the law of accidents. In recent years, legal historians have 
disagreed strongly over the relative stinginess or generosity of common 
394 Don D. Lescohier, Industrial Accidents and Employers' Liability in Minnesota, in PART II 
OF THE TWELFTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR, INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA i909-i9io, at I56 (i9io). 
395 E.H. DOWNEY, HISTORY OF WORK ACCIDENT INDEMNITY IN IOWA 2 (I9I2) ("Doubtless 
the number of work accidents may be considerably reduced in the United States, as it has been re- 
duced in Europe, by preventative measures.... Scientific accident prevention in Germany has 
produced a lower accident rate and a much lower rate of fatal accidents than obtains in the United 
States, but it has left the total casualty list of industry deplorably large. Indeed, the number of 
work injuries in Germany, as elsewhere, is increasing, both absolutely and relatively to the num- 
bers employed, as industrial development goes forward." (internal footnotes omitted)). 
396 EASTMAN, supra note i64, at 86. It is worth noting that the argument here reverses the 
standard account of the shift in attribution of blame in the late nineteenth century. Lawrence 
Friedman argues - drawing on Samuel Clemens's wonderful story of a steamboat accident in the 
novel The Gilded Age - that the mid-nineteenth century was a period in which the law held 
"NOBODY TO BLAME" for accidents causing injury and death. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 470 
(quoting SAMUEL CLEMENS & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE GILDED AGE 5 2 (Hartford, Am. 
Publ'g Co. i883)). A more persuasive interpretation of the passage comes in Nan Goodman's oth- 
erwise uneven account of tort law and literature. See NAN GOODMAN, SHIFTING THE BLAME: 
LITERATURE, LAW, AND THE THEORY OF ACCIDENTS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 65- 
97 (i998). In Goodman's view, the passage reflects the crisis of causal attribution confronting the 
mechanized United States at the end of the century. As I have tried to suggest here, the law at mid- 
century generally had little difficulty attributing negligence to either the defendant or the plaintiff, 
though it attributed blame to the injured far more often than we do today. Toward the end of the 
century, however, the increase in apparently blameless accidents created real difficulties for the law 
of torts. The steamboat accident in The Gilded Age, it is worth noting, was modeled on the steam- 
boat explosion that killed Clemens's brother. 
397 OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL SESSION 63 (I9O) 
(comments of Judge Robertson). 
398 OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL SESSION 94 
(I9II). 
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law judges in nineteenth-century tort cases. Lawrence Friedman and 
Morton Horwitz, on the one hand, have argued that the common law 
of tort systematically left victims of industry-related accidents uncom- 
pensated.399 Gary Schwartz and Peter Karsten, on the other hand, 
have contended that judges were actually quite sympathetic to the 
plight of injured plaintiffs.400 
For the most part, this argument has consisted of debating the mo- 
tives and decisionmaking behavior of appellate judges in reported 
cases. It is readily apparent in reading reported torts cases that in ap- 
pellate courts, many plaintiffs outside of work-accident litigation - 
especially railroad passengers - acquitted themselves quite well, even 
in states such as New York where courts were considered less friendly 
to plaintiffs.401 But the appellate case reports provide a view of only 
the top layer in a complicated multi-tiered process.402 Looking below 
the appellate level, it is clear that tort law served as a poor compensa- 
tion mechanism for accident victims. For one thing, work accident 
cases were sharply underrepresented among appellate personal injury 
cases, despite having been the leading category of accidents in the sec- 
ond half of the nineteenth century.403 Apparently, most work injuries, 
for some of the reasons reviewed already, were simply not brought into 
the tort system at all.404 Moreover, studies of one trial court's filings 
399 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 475-76, 485. 
400 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 64I, 
664-70 (i987); Schwartz, supra note 49, at I759-65; see also KARSTEN, supra note 49, at 99, 255- 
9I. 
401 This conclusion is based on my reading of every reported personal injury decision in the New 
York Court of Appeals between i86i and i88o. 
402 Law-and-society scholars refer to this multi-tiered structure as the 'dispute pyramid.' See 
Marc Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation, and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES I5I, i83-86 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., i986); Marc Galanter, Real World 
Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. I093, I099-I I02 (i996). 
403 In New York, for example, work accident cases brought by employees against their employ- 
ers represented, by my count, only io% (i8 out of i8o) of all personal injury cases among reported 
Court of Appeals decisions between i86o and i88o, even though the best estimate suggests that 
work accidents represented one third of accidental deaths and one half of all accidental injuries 
during the period. See Hoffman, supra note i i, at 5-6, I 7. 
404 Work accidents were underrepresented in trial court filings as well. Randolph Bergstrom, 
for example, has found that no work-accident cases were filed in New York City in i870. Although 
the amount of work-accident litigation as a percentage of total personal-injury litigation in New 
York increased over the next few decades, Bergstrom's statistics do not distinguish work-accident 
cases filed against employers (which faced significant legal obstacles) from work-accident cases 
filed against third parties (which were considerably easier to bring). See BERGSTROM, supra note 
58, at 2I; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late igth 
Century, i987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351, 36i (finding that work-accident suits against employers 
made up I 2% of the personal-injury caseload of state courts in Alameda County, California, from 
i88o to i900 and observing that work accidents "were less common on the dockets than one might 
have expected"); Lawrence M. Friedman & Thomas D. Russell, More Civil Wrongs: Personal In- 
jury Litigation, I90I-I9IO, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295, 299 (I990) (finding that personal-injury 
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indicate that less than io% of all claims filed resulted in final judg- 
ments entered on behalf of the plaintiff.405 To be sure, jury verdicts 
may have been predominantly in favor of plaintiffs,406 but most cases 
never got that far.407 And when we turn from the trial court filings to 
the records of accident-causing enterprises themselves, the inadequacy 
of tort law as a compensation mechanism becomes clear. Thomas 
Russell's study of the claims department of the Oakland Traction 
Company, a California street railway company, shows that between 
I903 and I905, only 58i of the 3843 passengers injured while riding 
the railway received any compensation from the company.408 The 
most common amount paid on a claim was between $io and $25.409 
Moreover, in the thirty-five deaths involving Oakland Traction be- 
tween i896 and i906, the company paid an average of $i69 in each 
case - less than $6ooo total - to settle claims by victims' families 
and to cover medical costs and funeral arrangements.410 In twenty of 
the deaths, Russell finds no payment at all to the victim's family, and 
in no case did a family receive more than $300.411 
The problems of faultless accidents and uncompensated injuries 
brought turn-of-the-century lawyers face to face with the central di- 
lemmas of classical tort law. Nonnegligent accidents happened, it 
seemed, on an increasingly regular basis, inflicting uncompensated in- 
jury on faultless victims. Yet the rationales advanced by the classical 
suits between employees and employers accounted for I7.6% of trial court personal injury filings in 
Alameda County Superior Court between i9oi and i9io). 
405 See Friedman & Russell, supra note 404, at 3IO; see also Friedman, supra note 404, at 355 
(describing late nineteenth-century tort law as a "system of non compensation"). 
406 See, e.g., Friedman & Russell, supra note 404, at 309 (finding that of thirty-eight cases tried 
before and decided by a jury in Alameda County between i9oi and i9io, twenty-five resulted in 
jury verdicts for the plaintiff); KARSTEN, supra note 49, at 99 (calculating on the basis of a number 
of trial court studies that plaintiffs won in 7 I % of cases resolved by jury verdicts). 
407 See, e.g., Friedman & Russell, supra note 404, at 307 (reporting that 8o% of cases filed in 
Alameda County between i9oi and i9io never went to trial). The percentage of cases never 
reaching trial is even higher today. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial 
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. I339, I339-40 (I994). 
408 Thomas D. Russell, Blood on the Tracks: Turn-of-the-Century Streetcar Injuries, Claims, and 
Litigation in Alameda County, California, at http://ccwf.cc.utexas.edu/-russell/pubs/bott.html. 
409 Id. 
410 Id. 
411 Id. Fishback and Kantor's study of fatal-accident compensation in work-accident cases 
similarly concludes that in fatal-accident cases compensation was "relatively meager"; a substantial 
proportion of workers' families in their samples (ranging from 24.4% in Minnesota to 67.9% 
among Illinois coal miners) received no compensation at all, and more than half of those families 
receiving any compensation from the decedent's employer received less than half of one year's 
earnings. FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 6, at 34-39. Fishback and Kantor's analysis of nonfa- 
tal work-accident cases is somewhat more difficult to interpret, but again substantial percentages 
of workplace accident victims (ranging from 9.i% in Minnesota to 72.9% in Kansas City, Missouri) 
received no compensation at all, and in most of the samples used, workers who did recover some 
compensation received too little to compensate them fully for their economic losses. Id. at 39-42. 
770 HARVARD LAWREVIEW [Vol. I I4:690 
lawyers for this category of damnum absque injuria were less and less 
persuasive in view of the mounting toll of accidents. "[A] system of 
laws which permit[s] no recovery in so large a percentage of deaths 
and injuries occurring is unjust," explained one bar association.412 In- 
deed, the negligence standard - which courts had crafted as a guaran- 
tor of the boundaries of individual autonomy - had come to license 
the massive infliction of remediless injury on thousands of Americans 
each year. 
D. The Dilemmas of Classical Legal Torts 
I. The Recessive Strains of Strict Liability. - Critiques of the 
negligence standard brought out recessive strains of strict or quasi- 
strict liability in the case law.413 In railroad crossing cases in New 
York, for example, the Court of Appeals solved the problem of dam- 
num absque injuria by sharply limiting the category of faultless acci- 
dents. Railroads had "the right to run their trains carefully and pru- 
dently on the track which they are by law authorized to construct and 
use."414 By the same token, it was "the duty of those who have an 
equal right to use the highway at the crossing to avoid [the trains]."'415 
Whenever there was an accident without the victim's contributory 
negligence, however, there was sure to be railroad negligence;416 and 
whenever there was an accident without railroad negligence, there was 
sure to be contributory negligence.417 Negligence and contributory 
412 OHIO STATE BAR ASS'N PROCEEDINGS, THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAI, SESSION 49(I9I3). 
413 As Robert Rabin has shown, there were also important areas of no-liability in late nine- 
teenth-century tort law. For example, there was no liability for damages caused by fright. Simi- 
larly, landowner liability for damages to trespassers was limited at best. Rabin, supra note 23, at 
933-36. My discussion here, however, focuses on the run of the personal injury cases, of which 
only a relatively small percentage implicated pure no-liability doctrines. Thus for my purposes the 
interesting tension in late nineteenth-century torts doctrine was between zones of negligence liabil- 
ity and zones of strict cause-based liability. 
414 Ernst v. Hudson River R.R., 39 N.Y. 6i, 66 (i868). 
415 Id. at 66-67. 
416 See, e.g., Weber v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 67 N.Y. 587, 587-88 (i876) (finding 
that the mere fact that the railroad had rung its warning bell and carried a light on the train was 
not enough to absolve it of negligence and liability when the plaintiff had not been contributorily 
negligent); Roach v. Flushing & N. Side R.R., 58 N.Y. 626, 626 (i874) (affirming the denial of a 
railroad's motion for a nonsuit when evidence suggested that the wind had been blowing "so as to 
carry sound in a direction contrary to that in which the train was going"); Eaton v. Erie Ry., 5 I 
N.Y. 544, 55I-52 (i873) (upholding a negligence verdict against a railroad for backing up over the 
plaintiff's wagon at a railroad crossing). 
417 See, e.g., McGrath v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 59 N.Y. 468, 473 (i875) (reversing 
a verdict for the plaintiff and rejecting the proposition that the railroad's failure to post a flagman 
excused the plaintiff's carelessness in crossing the tracks); Culhane v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River 
R.R. Co., 6o N.Y. I33, I37-38 (i875) (observing that absent negligence on the defendant's part, "[a] 
collision taking place at noonday ... must have been in part if not wholly the result of carelessness 
on the part of the servant in charge of the plaintiff's team [of horses]"); Calligan v. N.Y. Cent. & 
Hudson River R.R. Co., 59 N.Y. 65i, 65I (i874) ("A traveller has no right to omit the exercise of 
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negligence swallowed the class of faultless injuries, and crossing cases 
were thus virtually always said to be due either to railroad negligence 
or to the contributory negligence of the victim.418 Indeed, reading the 
railroad crossing cases one cannot help but sense that the courts were 
interested not in negligence and contributory negligence, but rather in 
who caused the accident. As a result, the law of railroad crossings be- 
came effectively a strict liability standard in all cases in which victims 
had not been contributorily negligent.419 
Rebuttable presumptions of negligence formed another quasi-strict 
liability mechanism for redressing the problem of the faultless victim. 
Hilliard identified in i859 a limited category of cases, including inju- 
ries to railroad passengers, in which "a loss, affirmatively proved, will 
be presumed to have resulted from the negligence of the defendant, 
throwing upon him the burden of disproving such negligence."420 
Soon thereafter, a series of English decisions held that when people 
were struck by objects falling from buildings and bridges, the circum- 
stances of the injuries afforded "a presumption that [the building or 
bridge owner] had not used reasonable care and diligence" in securing 
the building or bridge.421 Absent rebuttal of the presumption, English 
proper care in crossing a railroad track, upon the assumption that a train is being run precisely in 
obedience to a city ordinance [limiting the speed of the train]."); Reynolds v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson 
River R.R. Co., 58 N.Y. 248, 252 (i874) (reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that 
a reasonable jury would have had to find contributory negligence in a case in which the victim 
"would have saved his life, so far as can be seen from the evidence," by looking before he went out 
on the railroad tracks); McCall v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 54 N.Y. 642 (i873) (finding contributory 
negligence where the victim did not know of a railroad crossing at a particular point on the high- 
way but had passed by it earlier that same day and thus should have known of it); Wilds v. Hudson 
River R.R., 29 N.Y. 3I5 (i864) (affirming a nonsuit for the defendant railroad where the plaintiff 
crossed the tracks in the path of an oncoming train, despite the presence of a factual issue as to the 
excessive speed of the train). 
418 As the New York Court of Appeals explained in i869, in railroad crossing cases "the guide of 
duty on either hand assumes that, if each party is duly careful, neither will be injured." Grippen v. 
N.Y. Cent. R.R., 40 N.Y. 34, 44 (i869). 
419 For example, in cases involving obstructions near the tracks that hindered victims' views of 
an oncoming train, the New York Court of Appeals consistently held that in the absence of con- 
tributory negligence on the victim's part, the railroad company's conduct was unreasonably dan- 
gerous. See, e.g., Kissenger v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R., 56 N.Y. 538, 542-43 (i874) (upholding a jury 
verdict when boxcars obstructed the plaintiff's view of the tracks); Beisiegel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 34 
N.Y. 622, 632-33 (i866) (reversing a nonsuit for the defendant when idle freight cars blocked the 
plaintiff's view of a backing-up train). Cf Cordell v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 70 N.Y. 
II9, I24 (i877) (ruling that obstructions placed by the railroad on tracks go to a determination of 
the victim's contributory negligence and not the railroad's negligence); Salter v. Utica & Black 
River R.R., 59 N.Y. 63i, 633 (i874) (holding that the question whether a railroad owned an ob- 
struction that blocked a victim's view of the tracks was not relevant to the issue of the railroad's 
negligence). 
420 I HILLIARD, supra note 44, at I28; see also SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 46, ? I2, at 
I0-I I. 
421 See Kearney v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., 5 L.R.-Q.B. 4II (i870), aff'd, 6 L.R.- 
Ex. 759 (i87 ) (involving an injury by a brick falling from a railroad bridge soon after the passing 
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courts reasoned, the "thing spoke for itself" - res ipsa loquitur.422 In 
the United States, the English res ipsa decisions led to a wave of bur- 
den-shifting cases. Landslides occurring in a railroad cut derailing a 
train;423 cinders424 and bolts425 falling from elevated railways; over- 
head telegraph wires falling upon the road below;426 falling bricks,427 
buildings,428 scaffolds,429 or elevators;430 collapsing gangway planks;43' 
exploding boilers;432 and suddenly starting machinery433- all came at 
one time or another under the rule shifting the burden of proof to the 
defendant to disprove that it had been negligent.434 
Other areas of tort law verged on strict liability as well. Courts 
held common carriers of passengers to "the utmost care and skill 
which prudent men are accustomed to use under similar circum- 
stances."435 Dam owners were strictly liable for the flooding of areas 
upstream of their dams.436 Nuisances interfering with another's en- 
joyment of his property were "violations of absolute legal rights" and 
of a train); Byrne v. Boadle, I59 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Ex. Ch. i863) (finding, in a case involving a 
barrel of flour that fell from a window of the defendant's building and injured the plaintiff on the 
sidewalk below, that "[t]here are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur, and this 
seems one of them"). The Byrne case appears to have been the first res ipsa case; from Baron Pol- 
lock's "casual utterance, dignified and magnified by the cloak of the learned tongue, there has 
grown by a most extraordinary process the 'doctrine' of res ipsa loquitur." William L. Prosser, Res 
Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. i83, i83 (I949). 
422 Kearney, 6 L.R.-Ex. at 76i-62; see also Byrne, I59 Eng. Rep. at 300. 
423 Gleeson v. Va. Midland Ry. Co., I40 U.S. 435, 44I-42 (i89i). 
424 Lowery v. Manhattan Ry. Co., i N.E. 6o8, 6I I (N.Y. i885). 
425 Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 3i N.E. 870, 87I (N.Y. i892). 
426 Thomas v. W. Union Tel. Co., ioo Mass. I56, I57 (i868). 
427 Sheridan v. Foley, 33 A. 484, 485 (N.J. I895). 
428 Mullen v. St. John, 57 N.Y. 567, 569-70 (I874); Vincett v. Cook, 4 Hun 3I8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
I875). 
429 Flynn v. Gallagher, 52 N.Y. Super. 524, 525 (N.Y. Super. Ct. I885). 
430 Griffin v. Manice, 59 N.E. 925, 927-28 (N.Y. I9OI). 
431 Eagle Packet Co. v. Defries, 94 Ill. 598, 602 (i88o). 
432 Grimsley v. Hankins, 46 F. 400, 40I (S.D. Ala. I89I); see also Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Phil- 
lips, 55 11. I94, 20I (I870). 
433 Blanton v. Dold, i8 S.W. II49, II5I (MO. I892); see also Ross v. Double Shoals Cotton Mills, 
52 S.E. I2I, I22-23 (N.C. I905) (applying res ipsa loquitur to suddenly starting machinery but 
holding that under North Carolina law, res ipsa gets a case to the jury as a matter of law but does 
not shift the burden of proof to the defendant). 
434 The application of the res ipsa loquitur rule was extraordinarily haphazard. For every case 
applying the doctrine, another refused to apply it despite similar circumstances. See, e.g., Robin- 
son v. Charles Wright & Co., 53 N.W. 938, 940 (Mich. I892) (refusing to apply res ipsa in the case 
of the sudden malfunction of properly constructed machinery); Kirby v. President of Del. & Hud- 
son Canal Co., 62 N.Y.S. I I IO, I I I I (App. Div. I900) (finding that an explosion of hot water appa- 
ratus did not fall under the res ipsa rule); Piehl v. Albany Ry., 5i N.Y.S. 755, 756-57 (App. Div. 
I898), aff'd, 57 N.E. I I22 (N.Y. I900) (reaching the same conclusion as the Robinson court); May v. 
Berlin Iron-Bridge Co., 6o N.Y.S. 550, 553 (App. Div. I899) (refusing to apply res ipsa in a case 
involving falling iron trusses). 
435 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 46, ? 266, at 296-97. 
436 I HILLIARD, supra note 44, at 87. 
200I] TOWARD A NEWHISTORY OF AMERICAN ACCIDENTLAW 773 
thus "strict legal injuries."437 Hilliard wrote that the mere use of rea- 
sonable precautions did not vindicate a defendant in a blasting case.438 
According to Cooley, hunters trespassing on private lands were strictly 
liable for any damages caused to the landowner.439 Possessors of do- 
mestic animals were strictly liable for any ordinary damages to crops 
resulting from their escape, and possessors of wild animals were 
strictly liable for any damages caused by their escape.440 By the same 
token, extrahazardous activities such as the storage of nitroglycerin441 
or petroleum,442 excavations,443 and the production of noxious sub- 
stances444 could, in certain circumstances, lead to strict liability for 
harm caused.445 
Yet the move to strict liability standards could not rescue the pre- 
carious intellectual project of classical tort doctrine. A cause-based 
approach to liability might, to be sure, have gone a long way toward 
compensating nonnegligent victims. But even under a strict liability 
system, intractable problems of causation would have made it impos- 
sible to make bright-line distinctions among the boundaries of the 
various parties' spheres of interest.446 Both parties to a bilateral acci- 
dent, after all, were necessarily but-for causes of the accident. And in 
cases involving extrahazardous activities or nuisances, for example, the 
determination of which party - injurer or injured - had caused the 
accident would have required a prior (and circular) inquiry into who 
had been entitled to do what.447 A cause-based approach was there- 
fore indeterminate in important classes of cases, and even if classical 
tort law had adopted strict liability standards more widely, it still 
could not have clarified the boundary lines between persons. 
Still more problematic for the conceptual architecture of the classi- 
cal law of torts, the development of strict liability rules sharply un- 
dermined the intellectual clarity of tort doctrine. Even as recessive 
strains of strict liability emerged, they stood side by side with the still- 
dominant negligence standard. Treatises thus announced negligence as 
the general rule in accident cases while at the same time listing a 
437 Id. at I26. 
438 Id. at I27 (citing Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 43I (i853)). 
439 COOLEY, supra note 46, at 328-29. 
440 Id. at 329, 337-50. 
441 Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 54 N.E. 528, 530-3I (Ohio i899). 
442 Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 62 N.W. 336, 337-38 (Minn. i895). 
443 Mears v. Dole, I35 Mass. 508 (i883). 
444 Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 2o S.E. 280, 283-84 (S.C. i894). 
445 COOLEY, supra note 46, at 5 70-7 I . 
446 See Fletcher, supra note 236, at 66-67; Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Cau- 
sation Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579 (i987); Stephen R. Perry, 
The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, I CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE I47, I54-59 
(I988). 
447 Kelman, supra note 446, at 586. 
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growing number of categories of strict or quasi-strict liability as ad hoc 
exceptions to the negligence rule. In short, the carefully constructed 
architecture of the classical law of torts was losing its coherence and 
form. The law of torts retreated from conceptual order into doctrinal 
stalemate, caught between competing strands in the increasingly messy 
case law. 
2. The Limits of Consent. - The rule of assumption of risk had of- 
fered a contract-based approach to bringing tort doctrine into line with 
classical liberal principles. But it was increasingly apparent that to 
allow parties to contract into their own liability rules would not settle 
the dilemmas of tort law. As early as the i86os, courts began to con- 
front a wave of attempts by railroad companies to adjust by contract 
their tort liability exposure for injuries to passengers and workers. 
Tickets issued to passengers or to stockmen accompanying cattle in 
shipment increasingly included printed waivers of liability for personal 
injury.448 Employment contracts released employers from liability for 
the personal injuries of their workers,449 sought to replace state stat- 
utes of limitations with restrictive thirty-day notice requirements450 or 
to waive state safety regulations,451 and attempted to condition the 
filing of personal injury suits on medical examinations by company 
physicians.452 
With few exceptions, courts sharply curtailed the capacity of rail- 
roads and other firms to contract out of their common law liability for 
injuries to passengers and employees. Such contracts, in the truncated 
phrase of the late nineteenth-century courts, were void as "against 
public policy." Yet despite the unelaborated references to public policy, 
one can tease out of the cases at least three discrete rationales for 
holding contractual waivers of liability unenforceable. Each rationale, 
448 See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357 (i873) (discussing a contractual 
waiver of liability for injury to a drover accompanying livestock); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. 
v. Hamler, 74 N.E. 705, 705-o6 (Ill. I905) (reviewing a waiver of liability for porters employed by 
the Pullman Company); Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 47I, 474-75 (i874) (reviewing a 
waiver of liability for carrying a stockman); Doyle v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 44 N.E. 6ii, 6ii (Mass. 
i896) (reviewing a waiver of liability for paying employees); Bates v. Old Colony R.R. Co., I7 N.E. 
633, 638 (Mass. i888) (reviewing a waiver of liability for carrying an express messenger); Ill. Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Crudup, 63 Miss. 29I (i885) (reviewing a waiver of liability for carrying a mail agent); 
Bissell v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 25 N.Y. 442, 446-47 (i862) (reviewing a waiver of liability for inju- 
ries to paying passengers); Cleveland, Painesville & Ashtabula R.R. Co. v. Curran, ij Ohio St. I, 2- 
3 (i869) (stockman); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Henderson, 5I Pa. 3I5, 3i6 (i865) (paying passengers). 
449 See, e.g., Hissong v. Richmond & Danville R.R. Co., 8 SO. 776, 776 (Ala. i89i); Kan. Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. Peavey, 29 Kan. i69, I74-75 (i883); Purdy v. Rome, Watertown, & Ogdensburgh R.R. Co., 
26 N.E. 255, 255 (N.Y. I89I). 
450 Mumford v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., I04 N.W. II35, II37 (Iowa I905). 
451 See, e.g., Chi. & Erie R.R. Co. v. Lawrence, 82 N.E. 768 (Ind. I907); D.H. Davis Coal Co. v. 
Polland, 62 N.E. 492 (Ind. I902); Lassiter v. Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co., 49 S.E. 93 (N.C. I904). 
452 Galveston, Houston & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 9I S.W. 643 (Tex. Civ. App. I905). 
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in its own way, pointed toward the impracticability of the elegant con- 
ceptual structure of classical tort law. 
Tort doctrine aimed to set the bounds of each individual's duties 
and rights in order to clarify the scope of freedom in civil society. But 
cases voiding consensual waivers of liability indicated, first, that the 
law placed substantive limits on what an individual could do even 
with respect to purely self-regarding activity. Just as the criminal pro- 
hibition on suicide restricted individual liberty in order to protect life, 
the right to sue for damages arising out of negligence was unwaivable 
because private tort actions served as the best "safeguard" against the 
destruction of life. "The state has an interest of the highest degree in 
the preservation of its citizens' lives," explained Shearman and Red- 
field, and the protection that the negligence regime afforded to each 
individual was thus "of such value to the state that it should not allow 
it to be waived."453 
Second, many believed that such waivers of liability revealed the 
extent to which inequality undermined the classical framework. To 
uphold contractual waivers of liability between railroads and their 
passengers or employees, Seymour Thompson observed, was to "ignore 
the unequal situation of the laborer and his employer."454 The appeal 
of the inequality argument diminished during the first decades of the 
twentieth century, largely because it was exceedingly difficult to dis- 
tinguish authentic expressions of consumer or worker preferences from 
the effects of employer power.455 Nonetheless, this critique of contrac- 
tual waivers remained strong into the early twentieth century.456 
Third, and ultimately most devastating for the classical tort system, 
the cases suggested that the notion of individuals as self-contained 
rights bearers, whose boundaries could be definitively set out if only 
the law of torts were sufficiently clarified, was simply impossible.457 
Agreements between parties as to their rights, duties, and remedies, it 
turned out, inevitably affected third parties. When a railroad con- 
tracted out of its liability to one passenger or employee, its incentives 
to take care of other passengers and employees would necessarily di- 
minish. The U.S. Supreme Court noted precisely this consequence in 
i873, when it observed that such private "individual contracts" sup- 
453 SHEARMAN & RE DFIELD, supra note 46, ? 2 74, at 308. 
454 2 THOMPSON, supra note 23i, at I025. 
455 See Charles W. McCurdy, The "Liberty of Contract" Regime in American Law, in THE STATE 
AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT i6i, i6I-97 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., i998). 
456 See id. at i8i. 
457 Modern critiques of the attempt to work out a libertarian theory of torts based on boundary- 
crossing are critiques of strict liability, largely because Richard Epstein, the leading contemporary 
libertarian torts theorist, advocates a strict liability approach. The critiques are equally applicable, 
however, to a negligence regime theorized around similar attempts to carve out bright-line spheres 
of autonomy. See sources cited supra note 446. 
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planting the law of common carriers affected the "public interest."458 
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled the waiver of liability in a 
stockman's rail pass unenforceable because of the ripple effects such 
waivers might have on third parties. "It cannot be denied," the court 
explained, "that pecuniary liability for negligence promotes care; and if 
public carriers in conducting their business can graduate their charges 
so as to discharge themselves from such liability, the direct effect will 
be to [diminish] the motives for diligence."459 By the turn of the cen- 
tury, the problem of increased risk to third parties arising out of waiv- 
ers of liability had become increasingly central to courts' refusals to 
enforce such waivers.460 
As one New York court observed, whether one person could by 
contract exonerate another from liability for an injury inflicted by the 
latter's own negligence was "quaestio vexata in the jurisprudence of 
England and this country."'461 Indeed, the problem was all the greater 
given that the doctrine of assumption of risk - a mainstay of tort 
law's doctrinal structure - was itself all about waiving the tort liabil- 
ity rules imposed by law and setting new rules between employer and 
employee. When an employer notified an employee of a particular de- 
fect in machinery, or when an employee knew of and consented to a 
particular failure in the employer's obligations of care, the employee 
was said to waive his right to sue for the employer's negligence.462 
The courts required consent but often deemed the mere failure to quit 
sufficient to constitute consent.463 So, too, the fellow servant doctrine 
represented a contractual means by which employers transferred li- 
ability for work accidents to their workers. Thus, although the ques- 
tion was fairly well settled that contractual waivers were unenforce- 
able, a series of exceptional or dissenting cases emerged as courts 
sought to reconcile the apparent "public policy" problems of such 
458 N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 378-79 (i873). 
459 Cleveland, Painesville & Ashtabula R.R. Co. v. Curran, i9 Ohio St. I, I4 (i869); see also Ill. 
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Beebe, 50 N.E. IOI9, I022 (Ill. i898) (refusing to enforce a waiver on the ground 
that a stockman cannot waive liability rules rooted in "public policy"); Doyle v. Fitchburg R.R. 
Co., 44 N.E. 6I I, 6I2 (Mass. I896) (voiding a waiver of liability between a railroad and a paying 
passenger on the ground that the passenger could not waive the railroad's "public" duties to take 
care); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Spangler, 8 N.E. 467, 470 (i886) (holding a waiver of employer 
liability unenforceable on grounds that "[s]uch liability is not created for the protection of the em- 
ployees simply"); McCurdy, supra note 455, at I77-79. 
460 See McCurdy, supra note 455, at I78. 
461 Runt v. Herring, 2I N.Y.S. 244, 246 (Ct. Comm. P1. i892) (voiding an employee-plaintiff's 
agreement to hold an employer harmless even for injuries suffered because of the employer's negli- 
gence). 
462 2 THOMPSON, supra note 23i, at ioo8. 
463 See, e.g., Greenleaf v. Dubuque & Sioux City R.R. Co., 33 Iowa 52, 58 (i87i); Kroy v. Chi., 
Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 32 Iowa 357, 36i (i87I); Crutchfield v. Richmond & Danville R.R. 
Co., 78 N.C. 300, 302 (I878); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 23I, at ioo8. Courts split on this point, 
however. See KARSTEN, supra note 49, at II 2-27. 
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waivers with the principles of the doctrinal framework. In New York, 
for example, one court held that the assumption of risk principle al- 
lowed a worker to waive the protections of safety regulations.464 
Elsewhere, courts enforced employment agreements waiving the right 
to sue for damages incurred while on employers' trains going to and 
from work.465 Similarly, some courts enforced railroad company li- 
ability waivers by construing them to have been executed by the rail- 
roads in their capacity as so-called "private carriers" rather than in 
their capacity as common carriers.466 
Ultimately, as in the law's oscillation between negligence and strict 
liability, conflict between the waiver cases and the assumption of risk 
rule produced doctrinal stalemate. Classical tort law simply proved 
unable to draw bright lines separating individuals from one another or 
separating individuals from the state. Private rights, it appeared, in- 
evitably collided with one another as well as with public interests. 
If the dream of constructing a jurisprudence roughly consistent 
with classical liberalism ultimately proved unable to separate out the 
bounds of each individual's duties and rights, it was likely that the en- 
tire doctrinal edifice would collapse - as, of course, it did. By the 
third decade of the twentieth century, almost every American jurisdic- 
tion had replaced tort law with an administrative compensation sys- 
tem for work accidents, the most important category of personal inju- 
ries. But to move to workmen's compensation is to jump to the end of 
the story, to tell it working back from its conclusion. In a more imme- 
diate sense, the shortcomings of classical tort law precipitated a 
scramble for alternatives to the law of torts among working-class 
families seeking protections against the mounting risk of injury and 
death. 
IV. THE FIRST FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE SYSTEM 
Legend has it that on October 27, i868, John Jordan Upchurch of 
Meadville, Pennsylvania, established the first American cooperative 
464 De Young v. Irving, 38 N.Y.S. i089, I092 (App. Div. i896). De Young was a truly astounding 
decision. A New York factory law provided, inter alia, that no woman under twenty-one years of 
age "shall be allowed to clean machinery while in motion." Ch. 673, ? 8, i892 N.Y. Laws I376. 
The defendant angrily ordered his employee (the plaintiff, a woman under twenty-one years of age) 
to clean the machinery in a crinoline machine even though it was in motion. The plaintiff com- 
plied and caught her hand in the machinery, inflicting a severe burn. The plaintiff based her sub- 
sequent tort action against her employer on the latter's violation of the factory law. The Appellate 
Division, however, affirmed the dismissal of her case on the ground that the "plaintiff knowingly 
entered upon the forbidden task, and thereby waived the benefit of the statute." De Young, 38 
N.Y.S. at I092. 
465 Peterson v. Seattle Traction Co., 63 P. 539, 547-48 (Wash. i900). 
466 See, e.g., Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Henry, 83 N.E. 7I0, 7I2 (Ind. 
I 908). 
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fraternal insurance association, the Ancient Order of United Workmen. 
As retold at countless cooperative insurance conventions and lodge 
gatherings during the late nineteenth century, Upchurch founded the 
United Workmen primarily as a labor organization. A Civil War vet- 
eran and master railroad mechanic, Upchurch hoped that the United 
Workmen would foster "ideas of right and justice between man and 
man," provide "one united body for the protection of [workers'] inter- 
est against all encroachments," and elevate "labor to that standard it is 
justly entitled to."467 The United Workmen thus appeared to adopt a 
broad platform for the advancement of workers' interests, similar in 
many ways to the programs for workingmen's protection that labor 
groups such as the Knights of Labor, founded in i869, adopted during 
the same years.468 Within a year of its establishment, however, the 
United Workmen moved in a different, though not unrelated, direc- 
tion. The industrial accident problem on the railroads generated a 
strong need among railway workers such as Upchurch for some sort of 
insurance against death and disability. Thus, the United Workmen be- 
came primarily an association for the mutual insurance of its working- 
class membership. Indeed, the United Workmen very quickly became 
the leading early participants in the now little-known but remarkably 
important workingmen's cooperative self-insurance system of late 
nineteenth-century America. 
The story of Upchurch's founding of the first cooperative work- 
ingmen's insurance association is likely little more than a useful, if 
apocryphal, myth of origins for the vast cooperative disability and life 
insurance movement that sprang up practically overnight in post-Civil 
War America. If the myth of Upchurch's founding act was improb- 
able, however, the workingmen's organizations of the i89os were cor- 
rect in seeing the development of cooperative insurance in the post- 
Civil War years as an extraordinary phenomenon that required expla- 
nation. 
Late nineteenth-century cooperative self-insurance associations 
played a critical but now almost entirely ignored role in compensating 
accident victims, especially work accident victims. Indeed, by the 
i88os and i8gos, cooperative first-party insurance societies were the 
leading source of systematic compensation for accidental disability and 
death. In i86o cooperative life and disability insurance was a bit 
player in a tiny industry. By the i89os, however, it was the leading 
form of insurance in a life insurance market that had increased in size 
467 WALTER BASYE, HISTORY AND OPERATION OF FRATERNAL INSURANCE 9-IO (I919); see 
M.W. SACKETT, EARLY HISTORY OF FRATERNAL BENEFICIARY SOCIETIES IN AMERICA: ORI- 
GINAL GROWTH i 868-i 88o, at 2 7 (I 9 I 4). 
468 See generally FINK, supra note 54. 
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thirty times over.469 The cooperatives had become more important, in 
terms of number of policies and total insurance in force, than the 
commercial life insurance industry - stock and mutual companies 
combined.470 And in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, it 
appears that an astonishing one in three American workingmen be- 
longed to a cooperative insurance association of one sort or another.471 
In urban areas in the East and Midwest, the numbers were often even 
higher. In short, cooperative insurance had developed in the span of 
two decades into an institution of the first rank in American life. 
A. Cooperative First-Party Insurance and Insurance Markets 
Students of accident law have paid little attention to workingmen's 
cooperative insurance associations. Indeed, the standard accounts of 
the development of American accident law appear wholly unaware of 
the experiment with first-party insurance at the turn of the twentieth 
century. This lack of interest is striking. First-party insurance has 
been one of the most widely debated alternatives to our contemporary 
tort law regime. Beginning in the mid-ig6os with Robert Keeton and 
Jeffrey O'Connell's proposal for a first-party automobile accident in- 
surance program, many have argued that first-party insurance offers 
cheaper, surer, and fairer compensation for accident victims than the 
tort system does.472 George Priest, for one, argues that first-party in- 
surance effectively limits extravagant post-accident claims by victims. 
In his view the third-party tort system functions as a forced insurance 
system that systematically overinsures because it compensates nonpe- 
cuniary losses as well as pecuniary losses, and because it creates poor 
incentives for accident victims to mitigate their damages.473 Similarly, 
Patrick Atiyah has recently proposed shifting the English accident 
compensation regime to a first-party insurance basis by abolishing the 
action for personal injury.474 According to Atiyah, the move to first- 
party insurance would minimize the sum of accident costs by reducing 
administrative costs and eliminating the award of damages for pain 
and suffering, for which individuals rarely purchase protection in pri- 
469 See J. OWEN STALSON, MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE: ITS HISTORY IN AMERICA 8i6 
(1942). 
470 See infra pp. 797-98. 
471 Infra pp. 798-99; see DAVID T. BEITO, FROM MUTUAL AID TO WELFARE STATE: 
FRATERNAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SERVICES, i890-i967, at I4 (2000); B.H. Meyer, Fraternal 
Beneficiary Societies in the United States, 6 AM. J. SOC. 646-47 (i9oi) (estimating that one in fif- 
teen Americans belonged to a cooperative insurance society at the turn of the century). 
472 See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 2, at 268-72; JEFFREY O'CONNELL & C. BRIAN 
KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE II3-22 (i987) (discussing the 
efficacy of first-party insurance and the degree of its acceptance). 
473 Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, supra note i, at I553-60. 
474 Atiyah, supra note I, at 35-43. 
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vate insurance markets.475 Moreover, in Atiyah's view, a first-party 
system would ensure that recovery for disability does not turn on arbi- 
trary distinctions among the causes of an accident, such as whether 
someone 's negligence caused the accident, or whether the accident 
took place at work or in a car.476 
As contemporary proponents of first-party insurance concede, self- 
insurance mechanisms face significant obstacles. Disability insurance 
today is generally the least common form of private loss insurance in 
Western economies.477 In the i990S only one half of all paid workers 
had private short-term disability insurance, and fewer than one quar- 
ter had long-term disability coverage.478 Moreover, total disability in- 
surance payments in the i980s amounted to roughly $6 billion annu- 
ally, less than five percent of the total compensation paid to victims of 
disability resulting from accidents.479 
The chief problem for disability insurance is that it is especially 
susceptible to two difficulties endemic to insurance markets: adverse 
selection and moral hazard.480 Adverse selection describes the tenden- 
cies of high-risk insureds to seek out insurance and to stay in insurance 
pools, and of low-risk insureds to opt out of insufficiently subcatego- 
rized insurance pools that require them to subsidize the insurance of 
higher-risk insureds. Absent information sufficient to subcategorize 
insurance pools on the basis of the particular risk profiles of the in- 
sureds, adverse selection can lead to the eventual unraveling of insur- 
ance pools, as low-risk insureds abandon high-risk insureds.481 Moral 
hazard describes the effects of insurance coverage on insureds' incen- 
tives to avoid incurring covered costs in the first place and to mitigate 
losses once covered costs have been incurred.482 These two insurance 
market problems each affect disability insurance acutely. On one 
475 See id. Steven Croley and Jon Hanson have recently argued that individuals do in fact de- 
sire to purchase pain and suffering insurance, but that impediments in the insurance market pre- 
vent them from doing so. Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Acci- 
dents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, io8 HARV. L. REV. I787, I79I-92 (I995). 
476 See Atiyah, supra note I, at 35-43. 
477 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN 
SOCIAL INSURANCE 2I0-26 (i999) (analyzing problems with the provision of disability insurance 
and providing examples from Western countries); Abraham & Liebman, supra note 5, at 8i-82. 
478 Abraham & Liebman, supra note 5, at 8i-82. 
479 Id. at 82; see also COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES, supra note ii6, at i08; 
Abraham & Liebman, supra note 5, at I02-03. 
480 See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 477 at 70. 
481 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY I4-I5 (i986); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An 
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. I29, I38-4i (i990); see also 
Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, supra note i, at I54i-48, I553-63 (explaining the dynamics in- 
volved in the selection and unraveling of insurance pools). 
482 See ABRAHAM, supra note 48i, at I4-I5; Hanson & Logue, supra note 481, at I38-39; Priest, 
Current Insurance Crisis, supra note i, at I547-48. 
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hand, insureds often know much more about their likelihood of dis- 
ability than do insurers. As a result insurers are often unable to cate- 
gorize risk pools effectively, and lower-risk insureds will thus be re- 
quired to subsidize high-risk insureds or to leave the insurance market 
altogether. On the other hand, it is exceedingly difficult to determine 
precisely what is or is not a disability and to measure the extent and 
the nature of disabilities. Thus it is extremely expensive for insurers to 
police the moral hazards (and sometimes the outright fraud) associated 
with overclaiming in the event of a potentially disabling accident. 
The genius of cooperative insurance in post-Civil War America was 
its creative response to the endemic problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard in disability insurance markets.483 Cooperative insur- 
ance associations adopted a set of premodern fraternal social rituals 
and symbols such as secret passwords, secret handshakes, and elabo- 
rate initiation rites. Though overwrought and perhaps even silly to 
our eyes, these rituals served the critical insurance functions of com- 
bating adverse selection and moral hazard. Cooperative association 
insurance aimed to forge norms of solidarity among members that 
would discourage the self-interested departure of low-risk insureds 
from the insurance pool, as well as reduce the incidence of self-seeking 
claims on the pool. Thus, although the late nineteenth century wit- 
nessed a number of experiments in first-party insurance schemes for 
life and disability insurance, none of them caught on in the same way 
that cooperative insurance did, especially among working-class fami- 
lies. The cooperatives' peculiar design around social ritual and broth- 
erly spirit made them ideal vehicles for minimizing adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems in disability insurance. 
B. Insurance Associations and the Cooperative Strand 
of Free Labor Ideology 
The ability to combat the special problems of disability insurance 
markets was necessary to the success of the cooperative insurance 
movement, but this ability is not sufficient to explain the movement. 
In particular, the need to address problems of moral hazard and ad- 
483 Over the past several decades the concept of moral hazard has played a leading role in schol- 
arly accounts of insurance and tort law. As Tom Baker has shown in his account of the changing 
meanings of moral hazard since the early nineteenth century, however, the crudest uses of moral 
hazard in today's literature are little more than opportunistic claims of scientific objectivity on be- 
half of arguments against helping the poor, the sick, and the injured. See Tom Baker, On the Ge- 
nealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (i996). Baker's story of the historical evo- 
lution of the moral hazard concept does not, as I read it, seek to argue against the descriptive or 
normative value of moral hazard altogether. See id. at 290 (observing that the concept of moral 
hazard may be useful in understanding certain issues in tort law). Rather, it offers a note of cau- 
tion for those who see in the idea of moral hazard proof that "less is more" in government assis- 
tance programs. See id. at 238-39, 288-89. 
782 HARVARD LAWREVIEW [Vol. II4:690 
verse selection cannot explain the particular approach to mutual in- 
surance that American workingmen adopted in the i88os and i89os. 
For in addition to being a particularly economical insurance mecha- 
nism, the cooperative insurance societies represented one among a 
number of attempts by late nineteenth-century American workingmen 
to adapt the Civil War ideal of masculine free labor citizenship to a 
newly industrializing republic. 
Just as they have generally been ignored in the accident law litera- 
ture, cooperative insurance associations have traditionally received 
scant interest from historians. Some historians in a Tocquevillean vein 
have touched on them as examples of American civil society's associa- 
tionalist patterns.484 Others have viewed American fraternal societies, 
whose trappings many cooperative insurance societies adopted, as case 
studies in the construction of manliness.485 Most recently, a group of 
historians (inspired by cuts in social insurance programs) have ad- 
vanced the nineteenth-century model of cooperative societies as a pri- 
vate sector alternative to state entitlement programs.486 As we shall 
see, this recent optimism about private alternatives to social insurance 
is misplaced; the poorest and sickest Americans in the late nineteenth 
century were rarely able to purchase meaningful amounts of insurance 
for anything other than funeral expenses.487 
But with the exception of this post-welfare state scholarship, the 
cooperative insurance associations rarely fit into the analytic structures 
employed by historians writing about the Gilded Age and the Progres- 
sive Era. Unlike labor organizations ranging from the relatively con- 
servative American Federation of Labor to the radical Industrial 
Workers of the World, the cooperatives did not organize workingmen 
for purposes of collective bargaining in the capitalist workplace. And 
484 See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Biography of a Nation of Joiners, 50 AM. HIST. REV. i, i6-i9 
(I944). A recent update of the Toquevillean strand of studies of American fraternal associations, 
including cooperative fraternal insurance associations, can be found in the political science litera- 
ture on social capital and civic associationalism. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: 
THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 383-93 (2000); Theda Skocpol, Advo- 
cates Without Members: The Recent Transformation of American Civic Life, in CIVIC ENGAGE- 
MENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 46I, 499-504 (Theda Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds., i999). 
485 See MARK C. CARNES, SECRET RITUAL AND MANHOOD IN VICTORIAN AMERICA I04-07 
(i989); MARY ANN CLAWSON, CONSTRUCTING BROTHERHOOD: CLASS, GENDER, AND FRATERN- 
ALISM 45-52 (i989); LYNN DUMENIL, FREEMASONRY AND AMERICAN CULTURE, i88o-i930, at 
72-III (i984). 
486 See, e.g., DAVID G. GREEN, REINVENTING CIVIL SOCIETY: THE REDISCOVERY OF 
WELFARE WITHOUT POLITICS I47-53 (I993); William A. Schambra, All Community is Local: The 
Key to America's Civic Renewal, in COMMUNITY WORKS: THE REVIVAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
AMERICA 44 (E.J. Dionne ed., i998); MICHAEL TANNER, THE END OF WELFARE: FIGHTING 
POVERTY IN THE CIVIL SOCIETY I34-39 (i996); Stephen Davies, Two Conceptions of Welfare: Vol- 
untarism and Incorporationism, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Summer I997, at 39, 55-58; David Schmidtz, 
Guarantees, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Summer I997, at i. Cf. BEITO, supra note 47i, at 3-4. 
487 See infra pp.82I-22,83I-32. 
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unlike the Farmers' Alliances of the i88os, which formed the People's 
Party (or "Populists") of the i89os, the cooperatives did not organize a 
political party. Thus cooperative fraternal insurance associations are 
by and large treated as curiosities, representing little more than the 
joiner mentality of a nation of Babbitts.488 Such lack of interest in the 
cooperative insurance movement, however, has blinded historians to 
the importance of cooperative societies in the lives of everyday Ameri- 
cans in the i88os and i89os. 
The cooperative insurance system embodied not just a convenient 
mechanism for self-insurance, but also an alternative normative con- 
ception of the organization of American social life. Like the post-Civil 
War workingmen's associations out of which the Ancient Order of 
United Workmen developed, and like the Populists and farmers' asso- 
ciations with which the cooperatives shared many commitments, in- 
surance associations advanced a vision for the cooperative reconstruc- 
tion not just of accident law, but of social conditions and the American 
economy more generally. 
Injuries to workingmen highlighted the inability of late nineteenth- 
century wage-earners to achieve the financial independence of the 
antebellum master craftsman; moreover, they drove home the fragility 
of the domestic sphere in a wage-earning economy. Cooperative self- 
insurance offered a means of adapting the free labor ideal of manly 
protection of the family to a wage-earning and industrializing world. 
In so doing it also advanced a critique of the competitive system that 
generated the accident problem in the first place. For many coopera- 
tionists, the socioeconomic changes that prompted collective efforts to 
secure compensation for disability also called for - and perhaps even 
required - more than mere remedial measures to address the exter- 
nalities generated by economic life. For these advocates of coopera- 
tion, industrialization's accident toll was a fundamental flaw in the 
late nineteenth-century social order - a flaw that demanded an 
equally fundamental reorganization of economic and political life. 
The cooperative vision of the insurance associations, however, was 
deeply ambiguous in its implications. Like late nineteenth-century co- 
operatives more generally, the cooperative insurance associations were 
inextricably caught between competing meanings of cooperation. If 
some cooperative insurance advocates saw cooperation as an alterna- 
tive to competitive capitalism, others believed that the cooperatives 
stood for the capacity of private market mechanisms to address and 
solve the social problems attendant to an industrializing economy. For 
488 The reference here is to Sinclair Lewis's caustic send-up of striving middle-class values in 
Babbitt, whose main character is a member of an especially unattractive fraternal club. See 
SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT (I 92 2). 
784 HARVARD LAWREVIEW [Vol. II4:690 
this latter group of cooperationists, the great promise of cooperation 
lay in its capacity to inculcate the virtues of thrift and self-reliance on 
which competitive capitalist markets depended. 
The cooperative associations' attempt to reconstruct American so- 
cial life came to a head in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
when the leading cooperative insurance societies sought to stave off 
competing forms of social insurance by organizing into national trade 
associations and enacting legislation that would allow them to form a 
quasi-public insurance system. The cooperatives' attempt to establish 
themselves as the administrators of such an insurance system was hin- 
dered in part by the persistence of the voluntarist strand within the 
cooperative movement. Moreover, by the turn of the century the law 
of insurance made it increasingly difficult for the associations to over- 
come the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Perhaps the 
most important factors in the ultimate decline of cooperative insur- 
ance, however, were two developments - unique to the United States 
- around the turn of the twentieth century. First, an influx of new 
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe into the lowest tiers of 
the American labor market created a large number of American 
workingmen who were unable to afford even the relatively inexpensive 
insurance offered by the late nineteenth-century cooperative insurance 
associations.489 Second, in precisely the same years, the United States 
witnessed a critical reevaluation of the ideological meaning of work 
and an accompanying reorganization of the American workplace. 
Work accidents, after all, were the core of the accident crisis in the 
years after the Civil War. And as we shall see, changes in the way that 
Americans thought about and organized the workplace generated new 
skepticism about the capacity of workers themselves to engage in ef- 
fective accident prevention and self-insurance. 
For all of these reasons, the cooperative vision of an alternate legal 
order never came to fruition. Yet the cooperative alternative of the 
late nineteenth century represents an important path not taken in 
American political economy and a lost alternative in American acci- 
dent law. 
C. The Varieties of First-Party Insurance 
Notwithstanding the cooperatives' myth of origins in John Up- 
church in i868, post-Civil War workingmen's insurance societies de- 
veloped out of a long tradition of groups dedicated to mutual insur- 
ance. English friendly societies that claimed to have their origins in 
489 See infra pp. 83 I-33. 
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antiquity became important institutions in the eighteenth century.490 
In the United States, associations for mutual protection existed in a 
number of different forms throughout the first half of the nineteenth 
century.491 Indeed, mutual insurance pools sprang up across the 
United States and Western Europe during the first half of the nine- 
teenth century among a wide array of groups to protect against a vari- 
ety of hazards such as fire and maritime losses.492 
Nonetheless, it was only after the Civil War that the number and 
significance of first-party insurance systems increased sharply. The 
expansion of markets and the spread of new industrial technologies, 
especially the railroad, occasioned new experimentation with a variety 
of first-party insurance mechanisms. Cooperative insurance associa- 
tions were the most prominent of the experiments in first-party insur- 
ance for American workingmen. By the i89os they were the dominant 
mechanism for self-insurance among Americans generally, exceeding 
commercial life insurance in both number of policies and amount of 
insurance in force. But a number of other mechanisms for self- 
insurance became increasingly significant in the postwar years. The 
most important of these mechanisms were commercial life insurance, 
commercial accident insurance, so-called "industrial" insurance, and 
trade union mutual insurance and relief funds. 
i. Commercial Life Insurance. - Life insurance in the United 
States existed only on a minor scale before I840.493 Occasionally 
eighteenth-century marine insurance firms wrote short-term life poli- 
cies known as "ransom" policies for traveling merchants or ship cap- 
tains.494 And at the close of the eighteenth century, the Insurance 
Company of North America, which mostly wrote fire and marine poli- 
cies, experimented with a line of life policies.495 But there appears to 
have been little demand for life insurance in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. The Insurance Company of North America 
490 See ERIC HOPKINS, WORKING-CLASS SELF-HELP IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND: 
RESPONSES TO INDUSTRIALIZATION 9-io (I995). 
491 See STALSON, supra note 469, at 447; WILENTZ, supra note I44, at 220-27; James M. Lynch, 
Trade Union Sickness Insurance, 4 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 82, 82-83 (I9I4). For a discussion of the 
status of the Ancient Order of United Workmen as the "first" fraternal organization, see RICHARD 
DE RAISMES KiP, FRATERNAL LIFE INSURANCE IN AMERICA 32-35 (I953). 
492 See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 265-86 (I996). 
493 See MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, i885-I91o: A STUDY IN THE 
LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER 6 (i963). 
494 See STALSON, supra note 469, at 44. "Ransom" policies were so named because they were 
said to have evolved out of the practice among ship captains of putting funds on deposit for use as 
ransom money in case of capture by Mediterranean pirates. W.A. Hutcheson, The Evolution of 
Life Insurance, in i READINGS IN LIFE INSURANCE: A COMPENDIUM I, 7 (I934). 
495 VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (I979). 
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wrote no more than a half-dozen policies in the first four years of the 
experiment and ended the experiment entirely in i8I 7.496 
In the i840s, however, a boom in life insurance firms produced 
such future industry giants as New York Life and the Mutual of New 
York.497 The years immediately following the Civil War witnessed still 
sharper growth in new life insurance enterprises. Between i865 and 
i870, no fewer than I07 life insurance firms were established. The 
number of companies operating in New York alone increased from I4 
in i86o to 69 in i870.498 Over the same decade, the number of life in- 
surance policies in force in the United States grew from 50,000 to 
650,ooo, and the value of those policies in force rose from $I40 million 
to $i.8 billion.499 
The extraordinary growth of the life insurance market slowed 
during the i87os. A sharp recession in the middle of the decade, ques- 
tionable actuarial practices, and puffery by unscrupulous sales agents 
left a number of companies in precarious financial positions and gave 
many policyholders unrealistic premium expectations. At least eighty 
insurance companies failed during the decade.500 The remaining firms 
raised premium rates to stay afloat, resulting in the exit of many 
healthy, low-risk policyholders from the market.50' From i875 to 
i88o, the number of outstanding life insurance policies had dropped 
twenty percent, representing a twenty-three percent drop in the total 
dollar value of all life insurance policies in force. By i885, however, 
the losses of the i87os had been erased. The decades following i885 
witnessed a pattern of uninterrupted growth, especially for policy- 
holder-owned mutual companies, which outperformed shareholder- 
owned insurance companies into the twentieth century.502 
Despite strong growth in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, com- 
mercial life insurance firms did not develop an insurance product 
marketable to the class of Americans most subject to the vicissitudes of 
the new industrial economy. In the early years of commercial life in- 
surance, firms sold policies almost exclusively to the upper and upper- 
middle classes.503 The marketing of commercial life insurance to 
families and individuals of lesser means was not theoretically impossi- 
ble, but accurate actuarial tables were more difficult to draw up for 
496 Id. 
497 See KELLER, supra note 493, at 6-7. 
498 Id. at 8. 
499 Id. 
500 See Walter C. Wright, Life Insurance in the United States, I PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. 
ASS'N I 2 7, I30 (i888). 
501 Id. 
502 See STALSON, supra note 469, at 40I-543. For a discussion of the distinction between the 
mutuals and the shareholder-owned firms, see HANSMANN, supra note 492, at 265-86. 
503 See Kip, supra note 49i, at 26-27; STALSON, supra note 469, at 445. 
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workingmen, especially those employed in industries in which accident 
rates were in flux. Moreover, per-policy profit margins were greater on 
larger policies, for which administrative costs were relatively low.504 
As a result, even though it does not appear that commercial companies 
affirmatively rejected applications because they were for small 
amounts,505 commercial firms did little to attract such applications. 
Instead, life insurance firms sought out the high-end of the market, 
particularly after the debacles of the I87os. As Richard McCurdy of 
the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York announced in i898, 
life insurance companies were not "the custodians of the savings of 
those of slender resources but thrifty habits."506 Instead, they were 
"the bulwark and defense of large fortunes and large ventures."507 
2. Commercial Accident Insurance. - Commercial insurance mar- 
kets also offered limited forms of disability and accident insurance. In 
i849 the British Railway Passengers' Assurance Company of London 
began writing insurance for passengers against losses from railway ac- 
cidents, so-called "accident ticket" policies.508 And in the i85as, a 
number of small accident insurance firms sprang up in Massachusetts 
to offer similar policies.509 Only in i864, however, with the establish- 
ment of the Travelers' Insurance Company of Hartford, did American 
companies begin to write accident policies in significant numbers.510 
Even as late as i875, only three companies were engaged in the acci- 
dent insurance business in New York State.511 
Although the accident insurance market experienced strong growth 
in the thirty years or so after i875, this growth did not increase work- 
ers' access to accident insurance. By i910 there was $i8 million in ac- 
cident insurance in force in the United States.512 The largest share of 
personal accident insurance, however, was sold not to the industrial 
workers who faced the greatest risk of accidents, but rather to the 
business and professional classes to protect against accidents in 
travel.513 Indeed, most firms refused to sell policies to individuals 
working in hazardous occupations such as mining, railroads, iron and 
504 In the words of the leading historian of life insurance marketing, the commercial companies 
"neglected" and "badly treated" the market for less expensive policies. STALSON, supra note 469, at 
463. 
505 See id. 
506 KELLER, supra note 493, at 5 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
507 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
508 See WA. DINSDALE, HISTORY OF ACCIDENT INSURANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN 52-58 (I954). 
509 MCNEILL, supra note 286, at I2-I5. 
510 See CROBAUGH & REDDING, supra note 32 I, at 28; James R. Pitcher, Accidents and Accident 
Insurance, FORUM, Sept. i89i-Feb. i892, at 133. 
511 CROBAUGH & REDDING, supra note 32I, at 28. 
512 Id. 
513 Id. at3II 
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steel works, lumber, and bridge building, as well as a host of less 
prominent but still dangerous trades.514 
FIGURE I. OCCUPATIONS EXCLUDED FROM 
COMMERCIAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE* 
Acid works employee Gang sawyer 
Acrobatic performer Glass work employee 
Aeronaut Glucose works employee 
Army officer in field service Gravity railroad employee 
Artesian well borer Hide and skin worker 
Band sawyer Horse railroad employee 
Barb wire worker Indian agent 
Barge man Iron and steel worker 
Bark peeler Lumberman 
Baseball player, professional Miner, coal, gold, silver, 
Brass founder quartz, or copper 
Bridge builder, putting up Moulding machine worker 
Buzz planer or sawyer Nail maker 
Canal boatman Oil man 
Captain or mate of coasting Percussion-cap maker 
or seagoing vessel Pulp mill employee 
Cartridge maker Quartz mill employee 
Celluloid worker Railroad employee 
Chain maker Roofer 
Charcoal burner Sailor 
Cider-man or snapper Scythe maker 
Circular sawyer Shingle maker 
Circus rider Slater 
Coal heaver Slate quarrier 
Coke drawer or charger Soap boiler 
Cutlery forger, hot drop Spindle maker 
Cutlery grinder or polisher Spindle grinder 
Electric light employee Stove maker or worker 
Engineer or fireman of river, Submarine driver 
lake, sound, or tugboat Tack maker 
Engineer or fireman, seagoing vessel Telegraph builder or repairer 
Fibre manufacturer Thresher, with machine 
File maker Varnish maker 
Fireman Vitriol maker 
Firework maker Well digger 
Furniture factory employee Wire maker 
* Katharine Pearson Woods, Accidents in Factories and Elsewhere, 4 PUBLICATIONS AM. 
STAT. Ass'N I, 308-o0 (I895). 
514 See the accompanying chart in the text. See also McNEILL, supra note 286, at I02. 
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Those accident insurance firms that did write accident policies on rail- 
road employees, such as the notorious Provident Life Insurance & In- 
vestment Company, soon found themselves swamped with claims.515 
The Provident quickly went out of business, but only after it tried to 
fend off railway workers' claims through what one observer called 
"litigation of the most pettifogging description."'516 
The exclusion of railway and other dangerous occupations from ac- 
cident policies was one manifestation of commercial accident insurance 
companies' preoccupation with the problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard.517 Accident insurance policies typically disclaimed cov- 
erage for accidents caused by "voluntary exposure to unnecessary dan- 
ger,"518 "the influence of intoxicating drinks,"519 the violation of any 
laws,520 voluntary overexertion,521 the failure to use "due diligence for 
... personal safety,"522 and countless other specific hazards.523 Com- 
panies required applicants to warrant that they were in good health 
and in possession of full use of their faculties and that their "habits of 
life [were] correct and temperate."524 
In short, accident insurance policies reproduced much of the doc- 
trine of contributory negligence from the still-developing common law 
of torts. Moreover, to solve the difficult problems of proof in disability 
insurance markets, almost all accident policies covered only accidents 
causing "external and visible" marks.525 
As a result of these exclusions, commercial accident policies cov- 
ered only a small portion of the accidents that caused individuals to 
seek disability insurance in the first place. Moreover, despite the ex- 
515 See Accident Insurance, 7 AM. L. REV. 585, 597-98 (i873). For accounts of the early difficul- 
ties of accident insurance companies, see CROBAUGH & REDDING, supra note 32 I, at 2 9 (describing 
the inexperience of the early companies and their difficulties in mastering the "many varying fac- 
tors, the control of which rested with the assured, such as moral qualities, cooperation in the 
treatment, and so forth, which greatly influenced the business"); and MCNEILL, supra note 286, at 
9 (describing the susceptibility of early accident insurance companies to fraudulent claims). 
516 Accident Insurance, supra note 5I5, at 598. For railway worker cases involving the ill-fated 
Provident, see Providence Life Ins. & Inv. Co. v. Martin, 32 Md. 3I0 (i869); and Perry v. Provi- 
dent Life Ins. & Inv. Co., 99 Mass. i62 (i868). 
517 For comment on the nineteenth-century practice of refusing to insure moral hazards rather 
than simply increasing their premiums, see Baker, supra note 483, at 252-55. 
518 Accident Insurance, 48 CENT. L.J. 280, 280 (i896); see also Accident Insurance, 3 U.L. REV. 
264, 264 (i897). 
519 Accident Insurance, 3 CENT. L.J. 65i, 65I-52 (i876). 
520 See, e.g., HUBERT BRUCE FULLER, THE LAW OF ACCIDENT AND EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY 
INSURANCE I28-4i (I9I3); MCNEILL, supra note 286, at 98. 
521 MCNEILL, supra note 286, at 98. 
522 FULLER, supra note 520, at 260; see MCNEILL, supra note 286, at ioo. 
523 See generally FULLER, supra note 520, at 87-288 (including, inter alia, injuries sustained on a 
railroad bed or bridge and those sustained from inhaling gas; entering, leaving, or standing on 
moving cars; bodily infirmities; and disease); MCNEILL, supra note 286, at 98-i00. 
524 MCNEILL, supra note 286, at ioo. 
525 FULLER, supra note 520, at II9-28. 
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tensive use of disclaimers and exclusions, accident insurance compa- 
nies faced enormous problems of policing for moral hazard after cov- 
ered injuries occurred, as well as for outright fraud. The Massachu- 
setts Mutual Accident Insurance Association, for example, reported 
"great costs" arising from "fraudulent and fictitious claims."526 Massa- 
chusetts Mutual's treasurer noted that claimants sought to deceive in- 
surers as to the date of the injury, the duration of the disability, and 
the existence of preexisting conditions.527 According to another insur- 
ance industry observer, there were simply too many "varying factors," 
such as the "moral qualities" of the insured and his "cooperation in the 
treatment," that "greatly influenced the business" and yet were often 
beyond the control of the insurer.528 Indeed, the problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection led to a kind of macabre humor among 
insurance company executives. Samuel Clemens (better known as 
Mark Twain), who served as a director of the Hartford Accident In- 
surance Company in the i870s, suggested darkly in one insurance con- 
vention after-dinner speech that an insurance company such as the 
Hartford was "an institution which is peculiarly to be depended 
on.... No man can take out a policy in it and not get crippled before 
the year is out."529 Sure enough, the Hartford failed later that year.530 
3. Industrial Insurance. - Because of the commercial accident in- 
surance companies' inability to address effectively the problems facing 
disability insurance markets, commercial accident insurance in the late 
nineteenth century never expanded beyond the narrow market of trav- 
eling businessmen and professionals. In contrast, marketing efforts in 
what became known as "industrial" insurance were aimed squarely at 
working-class families.531 Industrial insurance consisted of small life 
insurance policies paid for by weekly premiums of as little as five 
cents, collected by insurance agents who went door to door on payday. 
Though the Prudential Assurance Company had offered industrial 
policies in England since i854, the first company to offer industrial in- 
surance in the United States, the Prudential Insurance Company of 
America (then the Prudential Friendly Society), began writing policies 
only in i875.532 The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and the 
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company soon joined the field, 
and in the last decades of the nineteenth century, industrial insurance 
526 MCNEILL, supra note 286, at I05. 
527 Id. at I05-09. 
528 CROBAUGH & REDDING, supra note 32 I, at 29. 
529 Mark Twain, Speech at the Hartford Accident Insurance Company, Hartford, Conn. (Oct. 
I 2, i874), in MARK TWAIN SPEAKING 89, 9i (Paul Fatout ed., I976). 
530 GOODMAN, supra note 396, at 91 (I998). 
531 MALVIN E. DAVIS, INDUSTRIAL LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (I944). 
532 Id. at 3-24. 
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grew at a rapid pace. In i88o there was approximately $20 million of 
industrial insurance in force in the United States, representing 228,357 
policies, or one policy for every 2I7 Americans.533 By i900 there was 
almost $I.5 billion in force, representing approximately eleven million 
policies, or one policy for every seven Americans.534 
Industrial insurance policies, however, were purchased by working 
families not so much to replace earnings or to sustain a family after the 
death of a wage-earner as to pay for the costs of burial. The average 
industrial insurance policy provided families with no more than 
enough to pay for funeral costs - typically "about $ioo for adults and 
$50 for children"535 - an amount hardly sufficient to sustain the 
families of disabled wage-earners. As one early twentieth-century stu- 
dent of urban working-class families observed, industrial insurance 
was "more properly described as burial-insurance than as life- 
insurance."536 Families thus purchased policies not just for wage- 
earners, but also for wives who worked in the home, as well as for 
children.537 Indeed, by the early twentieth century, women outnum- 
bered men among industrial policyholders. Children under five, 
moreover, represented the single largest age cohort.538 Industrial in- 
surance, then, functioned only as an insurance policy against a narrow 
subset of the costs of deaths from accident, sickness, or old age. 
4. Trade Union Insurance Plans. - Some Americans in the late 
nineteenth century were able to acquire insurance against death and 
disability through trade unions. When German economist August Sar- 
torius von Waltershausen toured the United States in the mid-i88os, 
he found that the recession of the i87os had decimated union member- 
ship levels.539 In response, he observed, many American labor leaders 
in the i88os had begun to use union benefit funds to bolster members' 
loyalty to the trade union system.540 As Waltershausen noted, how- 
ever, such benefit funds had not had great success.541 
In one sense, this lack of success is somewhat surprising. Trade 
union funds were well positioned to overcome the moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems that plagued commercial accident insur- 
533 See STALSON, supra note 469, at 809. 
534 Id. 
535 ROBERT COIT CHAPIN, THE STANDARD OF LIVING AMONG WORKINGMEN'S FAMILIES IN 
NEW YORK CITY I9I (I909); see also CHARLES RICHMOND HENDERSON, INDUSTRIAL INSUR- 
ANCE IN THE UNITED STATES I50 (i909) (estimating the average policy value in i899 at slightly 
more than $ioo). 
536 CHAPIN, supra note 535, at i9i. 
537 See MAURICE TAYLOR, THE SOCIAL COST OF INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 54-55 (I933). 
538 Id. at 55-56. 
539 WALTERSHAUSEN, supra note 86, at I97. 
540 Id. 
541 See id. at i98. 
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ance companies. Union locals fostered commitment and loyalty among 
their members, and the intimacy of members' face-to-face relation- 
ships allowed them to monitor one another's claims. The few trade 
union disability and death benefit plans that were successful worked 
hard to prevent the exit of low-risk members from insurance pools, as 
well as to combat malingering and fraudulent claims. Membership in 
such union funds was compulsory for all union members.542 Moreo- 
ver, the few union benefit plans that became widespread in the latter 
part of the century included benefit disclaimers for injuries arising out 
of immoral or unnecessarily dangerous activities.543 Union benefit 
plans also implemented formal visiting committees whose roles were 
partially social and partially monitoring. Typically, a union appointed 
a committee of at least two members to visit a disabled fellow mem- 
ber; no two members of the committee were to visit at the same time, 
and each member was to report independently to the union on the dis- 
abled member's condition.544 
Moreover, the trade unions seemed like the natural home for coop- 
erative associations for the mutual protection of workingmen against 
the new industrial accident problem. If work accidents threatened the 
ideals of free labor citizenship, it would appear logical for the same 
trade unions that sought to sustain the dignity and independence of 
wage-earners in the workplace to have adopted cooperative mecha- 
nisms designed to protect against the effects of industrial accidents. 
Trade unions, however, faced a difficult dilemma. Unions' interest 
in broadening their organizational base inhibited the widespread de- 
velopment of accident relief funds in the late nineteenth century. Re- 
lief funds could encourage loyalty to the union in tough times,545 but 
they also raised the cost of trade union membership. Furthermore, ef- 
fective administration of the trade union insurance funds required the 
expulsion of members who failed to pay their insurance dues. Thus, 
by i86o, it became a "well accepted doctrine that a trade union should 
not attempt to develop benevolent functions" because of the possibility 
of creating a drag on union membership.546 Prior to the i88os, only a 
few national trade unions created funds insuring against disability and 
death. Indeed, in the i86os and i870s, only the railway brotherhoods, 
542 See JAMES B. KENNEDY, BENEFICIARY FEATURES OF AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS 9-i0 
(Johns Hopkins Univ. Stud. in Historical & Political Sci., Series 2 6, Nos. I I-12, I908). 
543 23 ANN. REP. COMM'R OF LABOR: WORKMEN'S INS. & BENEFIT FUNDS IN THE U.S. 29-30 
( I909) [hereinafter ANN. REP. COMM'R OF LABOR]. 
5 44 Id. at 2 9 
545 Id. at 23. 
546 KENNEDY, supra note 542, at 9-io. 
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for which the industrial accident problem was especially acute, estab- 
lished widespread union-based mutual insurance funds.547 
A few nonrailway unions established insurance funds in the years 
immediately following the Civil War. The Cigar Makers' Union cre- 
ated a death benefit program in i867, as did the Iron Molders' Union 
in i870 and the Granite Cutters' Union in i877. After i88o a number 
of trade unions established similar death benefit programs; by I904, 53 
of II7 national unions affiliated with the American Federation of La- 
bor provided death benefits for their membership.548 Nonetheless, in 
all of these nonrailway union programs, the death benefit seldom ex- 
ceeded the cost of burial. "The ordinary death benefit in American 
trade unions," wrote one early twentieth-century student of union 
benefit programs, was only "a sum assumed to be sufficient to inter 
decently the deceased."549 Thus trade union death benefits at the turn 
of the century closely resembled industrial insurance policy benefits, 
ranging from $5o to $200 depending on the union and the duration of 
the deceased's membership.550 
Disability benefits - labeled "sick benefits," but payable for any 
disability preventing the member from working - were considerably 
less common than death benefits among nonrailway trades unions.551 
From the late i86os onward, a number of local union lodges sought to 
create formal disability insurance funds.552 Only in the i88os, how- 
ever, did national trade unions begin to offer formal disability benefits 
on a widespread basis; by I 904 less than a quarter of AFL trades un- 
ions offered such benefits.553 Most trade unions resisted the introduc- 
tion of disability benefits, usually because of the great difficulty of ad- 
ministering disability, as opposed to death, benefits. It was 
significantly more difficult to verify disability claims than death 
claims. Moreover, disability benefits forced unions into the messy 
business of policing claims to determine whether a member qualified 
as disabled. 
By contrast, railway brotherhoods offered their members substan- 
tially larger life insurance benefits, as well as sizeable permanent dis- 
547 Id. 
548 24 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
LABOR 46 (I 904). 
549 KENNEDY, supra note 542, at 53 n.I2. 
550 Id. at 54-56. Like industrial insurance, trade union insurance often featured similar death 
benefits for members' wives and children. Id. 
551 Fifty of eighty-four union benefit plans surveyed by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor in i908 
offered death benefits but not temporary or permanent disability benefits. See 23 ANN. REP. 
COMM'R OF LABOR, supra note 543, at 36-39. 
552 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE BRICKLAYERS' AND PLASTERERS' 
BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE UNION (New Haven, Pettle, Morehouse & Taylor i868) [hereinaf- 
ter BRICKLAYERS' & PLASTERERS' CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS]. 
553 KENNEDY, supra note 542, at 72. 
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ability benefits. Railway brotherhoods borrowed heavily from the co- 
operative insurance movement, adopting its ritualistic fraternal fea- 
tures and its lodge-based model of organization.554 Also like many of 
the cooperatives, the railway brotherhoods conceived their role as pri- 
marily addressing the industrial accident problem. Indeed, students of 
the railway brotherhood benefit funds understood them to respond di- 
rectly to the liability regime for railroad work accidents. One leading 
student of the railway benefit funds observed that risk in railroad em- 
ployment resulted from at least three sources: "the nature of the trade, 
the negligence of a fellow workman, or the negligence of the employ- 
ers."555 Under the common law of employers' liability, however, com- 
pensation was available at law only in the third class of accidents. 
The railway employee was therefore required to make provisions on 
his own against the other two kinds of accidents, and railway brother- 
hoods became the leading mechanism for self-insurance against these 
kinds of accidents.556 
The railroad troubles of the i89os and the recession that began in 
i893 took serious tolls on railway union membership. Nonetheless, in 
the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, railway broth- 
erhood insurance remained the leading form of railroad worker insur- 
ance against death and disability from accidents.557 Indeed, the lead- 
ing railway brotherhoods had a combined membership of more than 
one quarter million, representing as many as one in four railroad 
workers.558 In the first decade of the twentieth century, the seven 
great railway brotherhoods - the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire- 
men, the Grand Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Order of 
Railway Conductors of America, the Switchmen's Union of North 
America, the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, the Order of Railway 
Telegraphers, and the International Brotherhood of Maintenance-of- 
Way Employees559 - distributed more than $4 million in death bene- 
fits each year to their memberships, as well as over one half million in 
permanent disability benefits.560 Typical railway brotherhood death 
554 EDWIN CLYDE ROBBINS, RAILWAY CONDUCTORS: A STUDY IN ORGANIZED LABOR 20 
(Colum. U. Stud. in Hist., Econ. & L., No. I48, I9I4); JOEL ISAAC SEIDMAN, THE BROTHERHOOD 
OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN: THE INTERNAL POLITICAL LIFE OF A NATIONAL UNION 2-5 (i962). 
555 KENNEDY, supra note 542, at 49. 
556 Id. at 49. 
557 See Emory R. Johnson, Railway Relief Departments, in 8 BULL. DEP'T OF LABOR 39, 39 
(Washington, D.C., Gov't Printing Office I897). 
558 For a discussion of the membership numbers, see KENNEDY, supra note 542, at 20-29 
(author's notes). For the total numbers of railroad workers in the late nineteenth and early twenti- 
eth century, see I HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note I75, at I39 (I975). 
559 For a discussion of the seven great railway brotherhoods, see KENNEDY, supra note 542, at 
i9 (author's notes). 
560 23 ANN. REP. COMM'R OF LABOR, supra note 543, at 48, 50. 
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benefits ranged from $I000 to $3000561 and often reached as high as 
$4500.562 The brotherhoods paid permanent disability benefits in 
similar amounts, usually in place of death benefits.563 In i893 the 
railway brotherhoods even set up a Home for the Aged and Disabled 
Railroad Employees of America in Highland Park, Illinois, "to aid 
such who, by accident or from other causes, are permanently incapaci- 
tated for railroad work."564 
In at least some instances, a sophisticated theoretical foundation 
accompanied the successes of the trade union benefit funds. Losses in 
membership during the recessions of the i870s - and again in the 
i89os - caused a number of union leaders to advocate union benefit 
funds as a way to promote commitment to the union in hard times.565 
According to the editors of the German-language labor newspaper 
New-Yorker Gewerkschafts-Zeitung, for example, union funds "im- 
pose[d] a highly necessary discipline on the members" and "feelings of 
solidarity and fraternity."566 Most of all, however, union relief funds 
offered a means of forcing employers to pay the costs of accidents, 
notwithstanding the narrow employers' liability rules of the common 
law. As the editors of the Gewerkschafts-Zeitung observed, Marx con- 
tended that wages equaled the subsistence cost of reproducing the 
workforce. Such subsistence costs, however, were socially constructed, 
and thus wages "depend[ed] on the needs, habits, and expectations of a 
country's workers."567 Over time, the editors argued, payments into a 
union relief fund would "heighten expectations," which in turn (on 
Marx's theory) would result in higher wages. At the very least, the in- 
creased union solidarity fostered by the relief funds would increase the 
union's bargaining power and thus increase wages.568 "So it is already 
in our power," the editors concluded (too optimistically, no doubt), "to 
make the employers financially liable for the care of their victims."569 
561 Id. at 78. 
562 KENNEDY, supra note 542, at 4 I. 
563 23 ANN. REP. COMM'R OF LABOR, supra note 543, at 32. 
564 Id. at 79. 
565 See KENNEDY, supra note 542, at 5I; WALTERSHAUSEN, supra note 86, at I97. 
566 WALTERSHAUSEN, supra note 86, at I97. 
567 Id. at i98. The editors very likely referred to the passage in which Marx argued that wages 
were set according to the labor time necessary to sustain and reproduce the workforce but ob- 
served that the minimum necessities of any given workforce are themselves inevitably "products of 
history, and depend therefore ... on the habits and expectations with which, the class of free work- 
ers has been formed." I KARL MARX, CAPITAL 275 (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Books i990) 
(i867). 
568 WALTERSHAUSEN, supra note 86, at i98. 
569 Id. This Marxian theory of charging employers "for the care of their victims" via increases in 
wage levels resembles in certain respects the contemporary law and economics theory that parties 
to contracts will freely contract around liability rules so long as transaction costs are sufficiently 
low, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (i96o). The Marxian approach, 
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Notwithstanding this general theoretical basis for union relief 
funds, union insurance for more than funeral expenses ultimately re- 
mained uncommon outside the railway brotherhoods. The geographi- 
cal mobility of American workers and the frequency with which they 
changed trades presented significant problems for trade union accident 
insurance. Waltershausen, the German economist who toured the 
United States in the mid-i88os, observed that few workers wished to 
invest money in funds from which they were likely to depart before 
they received benefits.570 Moreover, trade union funds posed a special 
problem in hard times for specific industries; if the construction indus- 
try, for example, went into a particularly entrenched recession, mem- 
bers would face great difficulty making dues payments, and building 
trades unions would be hard pressed to pay benefits. Finally, unions 
experienced continuing tension between the competing goals of foster- 
ing loyalty among existing members and expanding union membership 
among unorganized workers. After long service as secretary-treasurer 
of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and editor of the Brother- 
hood's Locomotive Firemen's Magazine, Eugene V. Debs resigned from 
his leadership of the Brotherhood in i892 because he opposed its in- 
surance functions. "An order of this kind should be divorced from an 
insurance company," Debs announced to the Firemen's convention, "as 
thousands of men are expelled because they cannot maintain that 
branch of the order."'57' Because of similar qualms, the Knights of La- 
bor included a mutual insurance program in their constitution but 
never implemented it.572 
What American workingmen needed, then, was an insurance 
mechanism that took advantage of the trade union's singular capacity 
to police for moral hazard and adverse selection, but that was institu- 
tionally distinct from trade unions so as not to create tensions between 
organizing and insuring. Moreover, such an insurance mechanism ide- 
ally would not be tied to employment in any particular trade or estab- 
lishment and would allow for geographical mobility. Cooperative in- 
surance societies provided just such a system of insurance. 
however, goes one step beyond the law and economics theory to posit an account of the construc- 
tion of the parties' preferences. 
570 See WALTERSHAUSEN, supra note 86, at i98-99. As Waltershausen noted, this fact posed 
less of a problem for protection against sickness and injury, in which rates reflected ongoing risks, 
than it did for life insurance, in which premiums might include payment toward a higher risk of 
death in the future. See id. at i99. Even for accident or sickness insurance, however, many union 
funds determined a member's dues by reference to his age of entry. Departure from such funds 
after the passage of a period of time acted as a forfeiture of the benefit of a lower rate. 
5 71 SALVATORE, supra note I 83, at I I 2. 
572 See TERENCE V. POWDERLY, THIRTY YEARS OF LABOR: I859 TO i889, at 453 (Columbus, 
Ohio, Rankin & O'Neal i890). 
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V. COOPERATIVE SELF-INSURANCE AND THE COOPERATIVE 
CRITIQUE OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 
Cooperative insurance associations developed and flourished where 
other forms of insurance in the late nineteenth century struggled. This 
success was due, at least in part, to the remarkable methods that coop- 
eratives developed to address the perennial problems of disability in- 
surance markets. In this respect, cooperative life and disability insur- 
ance resembled the many varieties of mutual insurance against 
contingencies such as fire and maritime disaster that had developed 
among farmers and merchants in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu- 
ries.573 In addition, the success of the cooperatives reflected their at- 
tempt to preserve and reestablish mid-century free labor ideals in a 
rapidly changing economy. If industrial accidents stood as the starkest 
embodiment of the threat to free labor ideals posed by the new wage- 
earning industrial economy, then the insurance societies, in turn, 
formed the leading wedge of a late nineteenth-century cooperative 
movement that advocated the transformation of America's competitive 
capitalist economy into a cooperative commonwealth. 
A. Cooperative Associations as Accident Insurance Mechanism 
I. The Incidence of Cooperative Insurance. - Even though 
American cooperative insurance associations emerged only after the 
Civil War, in a short twenty years cooperative life and disability insur- 
ance rivaled commercial life insurance in size. By i885 the almost $2 
billion of insurance in force that cooperative associations reported to 
state insurance officials represented just under half of all life insurance 
in force in the United States.574 
573 See HANSMANN, supra note 492, at 265-86. 
574 STALSON, supra note 469, at 8I8-i9. 
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TABLE 3. INSURANCE IN FORCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES, I875-19IO 
Cooperatives Commercial Life Companies 
Year Certificates Amount (millions of Policies Amount (millions of 
dollars) (nonindexed) dollars) (nonindexed) 
i875 774,625 $I922 
i88o 6o8,68i I476 
| 885 $I969 8I4,69i 2024 
i890 3659 I1,272,895 3543 
I895 6589 I,877,808 48I8 
g900 4,I I I,848 7580 3,07 I,253 6947 
I 905 6,ii8,938 IO,4I2 5,306,ioi IO,554 
I9IO 8,558,093 I2,394 6,050,6I7 II,670 
J. OWEN STALSON, MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE: ITS HISTORY IN AMERICA 8o6- 
07, 8I7-I9 (I942); 72 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF 
N.Y., pt. II, at xxiii (I93).575 
By I890 the quickly growing cooperative insurance movement had 
become the leading source of life insurance in the United States. By 
I895 fraternal and other cooperative insurance associations reported 
$6.6 billion of life insurance in force, an amount substantially greater 
than the total life insurance in force through commercial companies 
mutual and stock companies combined.576 
Throughout this period, the number of persons insured through co- 
operative insurance associations appears to have exceeded the number 
of persons insured by commercial life companies. There are no accu- 
rate figures for the total number of fraternal and cooperative insurance 
association members prior to I900,577 but by that year fraternal and 
cooperative societies reported over four million certificate holders, 
compared to just over three million policy holders in commercial com- 
575 Stalson estimates that his figures underreport the total fraternal insurance in force by at least 
twenty percent. STALSON, supra note 469, at 8o6. The chart in the text above reflects Stalson's 
figures adjusted by his twenty percent estimate. It should be noted that Stalson divides coopera- 
tive insurance enterprises into "fraternal societies," which made up the overwhelming share of the 
cooperative insurance in force throughout the period, and "assessment societies," which repre- 
sented roughly one tenth of the cooperative life insurance market. For the assessment societies, 
Stalson's statistics begin only in i899. See id. at 806-07. 
576 Id. at 8i9. This $6.6 billion figure accounts for Stalson's estimate of twenty percent under- 
reporting by fraternal societies. 
577 See, e.g., KIP, supra note 49i, at I5 (beginning a count of the number of outstanding fraternal 
certificates in 1904); STALSON, supra note 469, at 807-o8 (beginning a count of the number of out- 
standing fraternal certificates in i899). State insurance reports provide only a partial state-by-state 
picture of fraternal insurance association membership before the turn of the century. 
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panies.578 Over the next ten years, the number of fraternal certificate 
holders doubled to well over eight million.579 
Yet the reported statistics surely underestimate the total number of 
Americans who participated in cooperative insurance associations. 
Reported statistics generally reflected the activities of the large, na- 
tional insurance cooperatives. But many cooperatives were organized 
informally on a purely local basis. By the mid-i8gos, it became a 
commonplace among insurance experts that the cooperative insurance 
system was as much as twice the size of its commercial competition.580 
Moreover, careful studies of the populations of eastern states revealed 
that although the cooperative insurance data reported to state insur- 
ance commissioners indicated that one in fifteen Americans belonged 
to a cooperative insurance society,581 actual membership levels (in- 
cluding the smaller, local associations) were larger still. In Connecti- 
cut, for example, a study published in i89i by the state Bureau of La- 
bor Statistics found that more than one in six residents of the state 
belonged to a cooperative insurance society.582 Given that the mem- 
bership in these societies was virtually all male,583 it seems fair to say 
that perhaps one half of the adult men in Connecticut belonged to an 
insurance association.584 Among the residents of towns and cities, the 
figures appear to have been even higher. In New Haven, one in four 
residents belonged to a cooperative insurance association; in Danbury, 
the famous hat-making town, and Meriden, a small industrial city on 
the Connecticut River, cooperative insurance association membership 
was closer to one in three.585 
2. Cooperative Life and Disability Benefits. - Cooperative asso- 
ciations provided a wide range of benefit levels. Many of the small, 
local mutual insurance societies appear to have offered only minimal 
life insurance benefits and little in the way of disability benefits. As 
578 See 72 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pt. II, at 
xxiii (I93I) [hereinafter ANN. REP. N.Y. SUPERINTENDENT]. 
579 Id.; see also KIP, supra note 49i, at I5 (estimating 6.5 million members in i910). Life insur- 
ance company policyholder numbers kept pace, doubling to over six million by i910. See ANN. 
REP. N.Y. SUPERINTENDENT, supra note 5 78, at xxiii. 
580 See Insurance Law as a Specialty, 2 YALE L.J. I45, I45 (i893) (attributed to "a Member of 
the New York Bar"). 
581 Meyer, supra note 47i, at 647. 
582 See 7 ANN. REP. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT. OF THE STATE OF CONN. FOR THE YEAR 
ENDING Nov. 30, i89i, at II3 (Hartford, Fowler & Miller Co. i892) [hereinafter CONNECTICUT 
REPORT]. 
583 The study found that ii8,6I3 of I26,6I3 members were men. Id. at 68. 
584 David Beito concludes that during the late nineteenth century one in three adult males par- 
ticipated in fraternal cooperative insurance societies nationwide. See David T. Beito, Thy 
Brother's Keeper: The Mutual Aid Tradition of American Fraternal Orders, 70 POL'Y REV. 55, 56 
(I994). 
585 See CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at I09, I I I, I I3. 
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we shall see, the inability of many of the associations to provide sub- 
stantial insurance to their members contributed to the decline of the 
cooperative insurance movement in the first decade of the twentieth 
century.586 
The more successful national cooperative associations, however, 
were able to offer their members disability and life insurance benefits 
that, although not exactly generous, provided meaningful income re- 
placement in the event of the death or disability of a wage earner. Na- 
tional associations typically offered their members life insurance bene- 
fits of $iooo or $2000, often along with lump-sum permanent disability 
benefits of one half the life insurance benefit.587 In addition, many as- 
sociations' local lodges offered temporary disability benefits that 
ranged from two to five dollars per week.588 In an era when typical 
workingmen earned roughly ten dollars per week, such temporary dis- 
ability benefits represented somewhere between one fifth and one half 
of weekly wages.589 
3. The Structure of Cooperative Disability and Life Insurance: 
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. - The rapidly increasing prob- 
lem of accidents appears to have formed the primary impetus for the 
development of the postwar cooperative societies. As the members of 
one New Haven association announced in i868, workingmen founded 
cooperative insurance societies to protect members who became "dis- 
abled by reason of accident, at [their] own employment, not caused by 
[their own] immoral or disorderly conduct."590 Working-class men in 
urban or industrial areas constituted the majority of the cooperative 
insurance societies' membership.591 Contemporary observers uni- 
586 See infra pp. 83I-33. 
587 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Supreme Tent of Maccabees of the World, 22 N.Y.S. 8oi, 8oI-04 
(Gen. Term i893) (describing the $2000 life insurance benefit and $iooo permanent disability bene- 
fit of the Maccabees of the World); CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at i69 (describing the 
$iooo life insurance benefit of the Knights of Columbus); R.C. Hill, The Evolution of an Idea, 
FRATERNAL MONITOR, Aug. i, i890, at 2 (author's notes on file with the Harvard Law School Li- 
brary) (describing the $2000 life insurance benefit of the Ancient Order of United Workmen). 
A note about The Fraternal Monitor: all issues dated before i9ii are available at the New 
York Public Library, which does not permit photocopying of these fragile volumes. The author's 
typewritten notes on the issues cited are on file with the Harvard Law School Library. 
588 See, e.g., CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at i68 (describing the five-dollar per week 
disability benefits offered through the local lodges of the Knights of Columbus); id. at 23I (de- 
scribing the two- to five-dollar disability benefits offered through the local lodges of the Ancient 
Order of United Workmen). 
589 See I HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note I75, at i68 (estimating 
average annual wages in manufacturing and railroad occupations in i890 at $439 and $560, respec- 
tively). 
590 BRICKLAYERS' & PLASTERERS' CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS, supra note 552, at I2. 
591 Most historians of nineteenth-century fraternal associations have emphasized the fraternal' 
middle-class membership. These studies, however, have been preoccupied with the elite associa- 
tions of the fraternal world, whose records were often more complete than those of the less well- 
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formly remarked on the working-class base of the cooperative benefit 
societies, whose memberships were composed of "the lower-paid 
workmen and the well-paid mechanics."592 Indeed, one Connecticut 
study found that over sixty percent of mutual insurance society mem- 
bers fit into these two groups.593 Cooperative insurance association 
members predominantly lived in industrial or urban areas. Agricul- 
tural associations, such as the Patrons Aid Society of Elmira, New 
York, occasionally sought to develop mutual insurance associations.594 
Such associations rarely flourished, however, apparently due to a lack 
of demand in agricultural settings for the kinds of mutual insurance 
programs that were sweeping across urban and industrial regions.595 
Because cooperative insurance associations served a primarily 
working-class, urban population, they generally provided members 
with both disability insurance and death benefits. To be sure, a few 
mutual insurance associations provided only death and funeral bene- 
fits, but most offered disability benefits as well.596 Indeed, the number 
of insurance associations offering disability benefits grew steadily 
through the i87os and i88os, significantly outpacing the growth in 
pure life insurance associations.597 
Cooperative insurance societies adopted precisely the kind of disci- 
plinary rules and regulations that one would expect to see in organiza- 
tions dealing with the moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
endemic to disability insurance. Cooperative insurance associations 
heeled cooperative fraternal insurance associations of the working class. See CARNES, supra note 
485, at 3-4 (describing fraternals as a middle-class phenomenon); CLAWSON, supra note 485, at 87- 
Iio (arguing that although the working class participated in fraternal, such organizations were 
not organs of working-class solidarity); DUMENIL, supra note 485, at 9 (finding the Masonic Order 
to be primarily composed of the middle class); Daniel Greenberg, Worker and Community: Frater- 
nal Orders in Albany, New York, i845-i885, 8 MD. HISTORIAN 38, 43 (I977) (finding that Odd 
Fellows membership consisted of the "great middle-industrial classes"); Roy Rosenzweig, Boston 
Masons, I9oo-i935: The Lower Middle Class in a Divided Society, 6 J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 
I I9, I24 (I977) (concluding that the membership of the Boston Masons was primarily native-born, 
white, and middle-class). 
592 CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at I2; see also 23 ANN. REP. COMM'R OF LABOR, 
supra note 543, at I5; HENDERSON, supra note 535, at II7; WALTERSHAUSEN, supra note 86, at 
I7I-230. 
593 CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at Ios. 
594 See BY-LAWS OF THE PATRONS AID SOCIETY II (Elmira, N.Y., Husbandman Print I876). 
595 The Patrons Aid Society complained in i88i that farmerser, as a class, have not yet learned 
to fully appreciate the importance of providing for their families that ready aid and protection 
which our Society offers them." SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PATRONS AID SOCIETY, 
ELMIRA, N.Y. 6 (Elmira, N.Y., Husbandman Print i88i); see also CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra 
note 582, at I05 (finding that farmers constituted less than one percent of the membership of Con- 
necticut mutual insurance societies). 
596 See 23 ANN. REP. COMM'R OF LABOR, supra note 543, at I7-i8; CONNECTICUT REPORT, 
supra note 582; WALTERSHAUSEN, supra note 86, at I92, 205-i8. 
597 See CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at 85. 
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universally required medical examinations of prospective members,598 
and virtually all the associations made thoroughuh investigations as to 
the character of applicants."599 Members faced expulsion from the as- 
sociations for making false statements of their age or lying during their 
medical examinations.600 Association bylaws typically provided for the 
forfeiture of members' rights to relief when "disability [was] superin- 
duced by drunkenness or fighting or other disgraceful practices."601 
Many associations also barred the recovery of death or disability bene- 
fits by members who had exposed themselves to "unusual danger."602 
Once a member filed a claim, his fellow members were usually under 
an obligation to visit and monitor his progress. In many instances, no 
doubt, members undertook such visits in the spirit of fraternal good 
will. But it is apparent that visitation requirements also served to 
identify "suspicious cases."603 Members claiming benefits faced expul- 
sion and denial of their claims for evadingn] supervision by the soci- 
ety,"604 and visiting committees were obligated to report any irregulari- 
ties promptly to their association's treasurer.605 Delinquency in the 
payment of assessments or fines for violations of an order's code of be- 
havior - including, in some societies, an injunction against working 
for less than specified rates in particular trades - could also result in 
forfeiture of benefits.606 
Cooperative insurance societies designed their insurance pools to 
foster group loyalty and mutuality. National cooperative insurance as- 
sociations such as the Ancient Order of United Workmen organized 
around local lodges that typically ranged between 50 and i50 mem- 
bers.607 The national scale of the pool ensured actuarial stability. The 
598 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIVERSAL WORKMEN'S SICK & DEATH BENEFIT FUND 
OF THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA 3-4 (New York, John Oehler, Steam Book & Job 
Printer i893) [hereinafter SICK & DEATH BENEFIT FUND]; GENERAL LAWS, RULES AND REGULA- 
TIONS OF THE BENEFICIARY DEGREE, JUNIOR ORDER OF UNITED AMERICAN MECHANICS IO 
(I905). 
599 The Order of the World, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Aug. i, i890, at I2 (author's notes). 
600 See, e.g., SICK & DEATH BENEFIT FUND, supra note 598, at 5. 
601 Legal Environments, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Oct. i, i890, at I4 (author's notes). 
602 SICK & DEATH BENEFIT FUND, supra note 598, at 5. 
603 Id. at 7. 
604 Id. at 5. 
605 Id. at 7. 
606 See People ex rel. Doyle v. N.Y. Benevolent Soc'y of Operative Masons, 6 Thompson & Cook 
85, 86-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. i875) (requiring a society to reinstate a member after his expulsion with- 
out notice and a hearing, but suggesting that such an expulsion would be allowable in the event of 
proper notice and a hearing); Cartan v. Father Matthew United Benevolent Soc'y, 3 Daly 20, 20-22 
(N.Y. Ct. Comm. P1. i869) (holding that a society's refusal to pay disability benefits on the ground 
that the member was delinquent in paying dues was unreasonable); St. Mary's Beneficial Soc'y v. 
Burford, 70 Pa. 32 I, 323-25 (i872) (upholding a denial of benefits because the member's intemper- 
ance caused his death); Legal Environments, supra note 6oi (author's notes). 
607 See CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at 232-35. 
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lodge units in turn helped to establish norms of social solidarity among 
the members. Each lodge adopted the traditional rituals of such ven- 
erable fraternal organizations as the Masons and the Odd Fellows. 
Secret handshakes and gestures, unwritten passwords, and mysterious 
and arcane initiation ceremonies all found their place in the coopera- 
tive insurance societies.608 
Three additional elements of the structure and operation of the co- 
operatives functioned to foster mutuality and commitment to the soci- 
ety. First, most cooperatives, especially before the mid-i8gos, operated 
on an assessment plan.609 Members were assessed a fixed amount 
often one dollar - each time the society needed to raise funds in order 
to pay claims, usually between fifteen and twenty times per year.610 
By operating on an assessment basis, the associations argued, they 
could avoid the expensive and potentially corrupting practice of cre- 
ating large reserve funds that characterized the old-line commercial 
companies.611 Moreover, the assessment basis served to emphasize the 
fraternal and reciprocal nature of the beneficiary societies; assessments 
became not a regular and fixed cost of maintaining one's own insur- 
ance account, but rather an irregular obligation linked to fellow mem- 
bers' needs. 
Second, members paid equal rates regardless of their age or risk 
profile.612 As one fraternalist recalled, "[t]here was no discrimination 
on account of age or physical condition or occupation. It was true 
equality and fraternity."'613 Indeed, like the assessment plan, the use of 
equal assessment rates rather than risk-adjusted rates emphasized the 
collective spirit of the cooperative insurance project. To be sure, equal 
assessment rates effectively required young, low-risk members to sub- 
sidize high-risk (often older) members and thus created an adverse se- 
lection risk that low-risk members would stay out of the associations 
altogether.614 As we shall see, this adverse selection problem became 
acute after the turn of the century. But the use of equal rates also cre- 
608 See, e.g., BRICKLAYERS' & PLASTERERS' CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS, supra note 552, at 7 
(reciting the duties of the door-keeper); CARNES, supra note 485, at I04-07; THEO. A. Ross, ODD 
FELLOWSHIP: ITS HISTORY AND MANUAL 575-87 (New York, M.W. Hazen Co. i888); ALBERT C. 
STEVENS, THE CYCLOPEDIA OF FRATERNITIES (i899) (describing rituals of cooperative and fra- 
ternal associations). 
609 See William Morse Cole, Co-Operative Insurance and Endowment Schemes, 5 Q.J. ECON. 
466, 469-70 (i89i). 
610 See Hill, supra note 587, at 2 (author's notes) (calculating the average annual number of as- 
sessments in the Ancient Order of United Workmen between i875 and i890 as seventeen). 
611 Cole, supra note 609, at 47I. 
612 See id. 
613 INSURANCE RESEARCH AND REVIEW SERVICE, FRATERNAL LIFE INSURANCE 30 (1938) 
[hereinafter FRATERNAL LIFE INSURANCE]. 
614 This problem eventually helped to undo the cooperative insurance movement. See infra pp. 
822-23. 
804 HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W [Vol. I I4:69o 
ated a powerful incentive for members to stay in a given society for 
long periods. The assessments paid by a young member overstated his 
personal cost of insurance; as an older member, however, that same in- 
dividual would receive the benefit of having newer members share 
some of the cost of insuring him against the greater risks that accom- 
panied age. 
Third, individuals whose membership lapsed because of failure to 
meet an assessment were unable to recover any of the investment they 
had made in the society.615 Like the equal rate structure across all age 
groups, the absence of surrender values created strong incentives for 
continued membership. By the i88os some states had enacted regula- 
tions requiring that the "old-line" commercial life insurance companies 
allow a policyholder to recoup some percentage of his investment if he 
canceled his policy before it became payable.616 For the cooperative 
associations, by contrast, the social compact of the insurance societies 
emphasized mutuality first and foremost. Assessments were not 
treated as investments to be recouped by an investor, but rather as 
contributions to brothers or their families to be reciprocated in case of 
one's own disability or death. 
4. Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Segregation in Cooperative Insur- 
ance. - Perhaps because of the importance of norms of mutuality and 
reciprocity in the cooperative insurance associations, the fraternal ethic 
generally did not extend across ethnic or religious lines. In virtually all 
cases it did not extend across racial boundaries.617 Over ninety-seven 
percent of the societies surveyed in the i89i Connecticut study re- 
quired that members be white.618 Upchurch's United Workmen pro- 
vided in its constitution that "only white male persons should be eligi- 
ble to membership" and that "this provision should never be altered, 
amended, or expunged."'619 Numerous cooperative associations fol- 
lowed the United Workmen's lead and established formal rules of ra- 
cial exclusion.620 The Supreme Secretary of the Empire Knights of 
Relief of Buffalo, announced one Empire Knight proudly, was "of the 
pure Anglo-Saxon race."'621 Cooperatives often stooped to the crudest 
racial characterizations of the day to illustrate a point: The Fraternal 
615 Cole, supra note 609, at 476. 
616 STALSON, supra note 469, at 3i8-i9. 
617 Chronicler of the fraternal movement Walter Basye insisted that "the societies have not been 
confined by racial, religious, or other bonds." BASYE, supra note 467, at I7. But Basye was none- 
theless forced to concede that such ostensible inclusiveness existed only because there were differ- 
ent "organizations for almost all races and creeds." Id. 
618 CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at I i9. 
619 STEVENS, supra notch 6o8, at I28. 
620 See, e.g., id. at I23, I37, I4I (discussing the American Legion of Honor, the Home Palladium, 
and the Independent Order of Mechanics). 
621 FRATERNAL MONITOR, Nov. i, i894, at I4 (author's notes). 
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Monitor, a monthly magazine dedicated to news and opinion relating 
to fraternal beneficiary associations, published cartoon advertisements 
for itself contrasting the foolish wastefulness and lack of foresight of 
three blackface characters with the prudent and upstanding character 
of the average white fraternalist.622 
Black Americans, excluded from the white cooperative insurance 
organizations, established their own cooperative insurance associa- 
tions, such as the Colored Brotherhood and Sisterhood of Honor in 
Kentucky and the Colored Consolidated Brotherhood of Atlanta.623 
Although many of the black cooperatives paralleled existing white in- 
stitutions in structure and even name,624 black associations were dis- 
tinct in a number of ways. Black women took a leading role in mutual 
insurance associations.625 Moreover, among black Americans, the line 
between cooperative insurance and commercial insurance enterprises 
was blurred.626 Black fraternal organizations such as the Grand 
United Order of True Reformers in Richmond, the Mutual Aid and 
Banking Company in New Bern, North Carolina, the Bank of 
Galilean Fishermen in Hampton, Virginia, and the Sons and Daugh- 
ters of Peace in Newport News operated insurance programs that were 
described, in the case of the True Reformers, as the "Gibraltar of Ne- 
gro Business."627 In Florida the Afro-American Industrial Benefit As- 
sociation evolved into the Afro-American Life Insurance Company.628 
The two largest black life insurance companies - the North Carolina 
Mutual Life Insurance Company and Atlanta Life Insurance - began 
as humble affairs, but by the first decade of the twentieth century, they 
622 FRATERNAL MONITOR, Dec. i, i894, at i (author's notes). 
623 STEVENS, supra note 6o8, at I3I; see also M.S. STUART, AN ECONOMIC DETOUR: A 
HISTORY OF INSURANCE IN THE LIVES OF AMERICAN NEGROES I I-34 (i969) (describing the de- 
velopment of black fraternal organizations). See generally Monroe N. Work, Secret Societies as 
Factors in the Social and Economical Life of the Negro, in DEMOCRACY IN EARNEST: SOUTHERN 
SOCIOLOGICAL CONGRESS, i9i6-i9i8, at 342 (James E. McCulloch ed., i969) (i9i8) (same). 
624 A black beneficiary organization called the Improved Benevolent and Protective Order of 
Elks existed until I 9I2, when the Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks, a white association, 
obtained an order restraining the black association from using the elk as its namesake. ARTHUR 
PREUSS, A DICTIONARY OF SECRET AND OTHER SOCIETIES 324-28 (I924). White associations 
strictly prohibited their members from fraternizing with members of the parallel black organiza- 
tions. "The Negro Odd Fellows," wrote one Catholic lawyer, "are not recognized by the white 
lodges of the same name and a member of one of these white lodges who might visit a colored 
lodge, if indeed he could, would be expelled." Id. at 327. 
625 See Elsa Barkley Brown, Womanist Consciousness: Maggie Lena Walker and the Independ- 
ent Order of Saint Luke, I4 SIGNS 6io, 6i6 (i989); Anne Firor Scott, Most Invisible of All: Black 
Women's Voluntary Associations, 56 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 3 (1990). 
626 See STUART, supra note 623, at I9-20. 
627 JULIET E.K. WALKER, THE HISTORY OF BLACK BUSINESS IN AMERICA: CAPITALISM, 
RACE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP i66, i87,4I I nn.26-30 (i998). 
628 Id. at i88. 
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had emerged as institutions of the first rank in southern black life.629 
Nor did black self-insurance societies appear exclusively in the South. 
Even before the great twentieth-century migration of blacks to north- 
ern cities, urban blacks in cities like Philadelphia established mutual 
beneficiary associations to provide for collective self-insurance.630 
Religious differences also operated as barriers in the formation of 
fraternal insurance organizations. For example, the Catholic Church 
barred members from joining non-Catholic secret or fraternal associa- 
tions. The rule appears to have broken down in later years,631 but in 
the late nineteenth century, the prohibition on non-Catholic associa- 
tions seems to have had a significant impact. Catholics founded sepa- 
rate insurance associations, including the the Knights of Columbus, es- 
tablished in i882 in New Haven, and the Catholic Order of Foresters, 
formed in Chicago in i883.632 The same period witnessed the forma- 
tion of separate Jewish beneficiary societies in New York and else- 
where.633 
B. Industrial Accidents, Cooperative Associations, and the Crisis of 
Free-Labor Citizenship 
Many features of the late nineteenth-century cooperative insurance 
associations made a good deal of sense in light of the moral hazard and 
adverse selection problems in disability insurance markets. In this 
sense, the economic problems endemic to disability insurance markets 
form a necessary - but not sufficient - part of the explanation of co- 
operative disability insurance's success. There were, after all, a num- 
ber of different forms that private insurance might have taken to solve 
the market problems of disability insurance.634 The American coop- 
erative insurance associations, however, adopted an approach to dis- 
629 See GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW I65-66 (I996); ALEXA 
BENSON HENDERSON, ATLANTA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY: GUARDIAN OF BLACK ECONOMIC 
DIGNITY 3-I9 (i990); WALKER, supra note 627, at i89-90. See generally WALTER B. WEARE, 
BLACK BUSINESS IN THE NEW SOUTH: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE NORTH CAROLINA MUTUAL 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (I973). 
630 See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO: A SOCIAL STUDY 22I-25 (Schocken 
Books I970) (i899); NICK SALVATORE, WE ALL GOT HISTORY: THE MEMORY BOOKS OF AMOS 
WEBBER 59-67 (i996). 
631 In I924 a publisher circulated a dictionary of non-Catholic fraternal societies as a "reference 
work" for the "reverend clergy ... on the subject of secret and other societies into which Catholics 
are liable to be drawn." PREUSS, supra note 624, at iii. 
632 CHARLES W. FERGUSON, FIFTY MILLION BROTHERS: A PANORAMA OF AMERICAN 
LODGES AND CLUBS 30I-303 (I937). 
633 See DANIEL SOYER, JEWISH IMMIGRANT ASSOCIATIONS AND AMERICAN IDENTITY IN NEW 
YORK, i88o-i939 (I997). 
634 The most likely alternative in nineteenth-century America might have involved expressly 
religious groupings. A host of other forms, such as intensely nationalistic organizations, might also 
have been adopted. 
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ability benefits that centered on the ideals of independence, fraternity, 
equality, and manliness. Cooperative societies argued that cooperative 
insurance would allow American workingmen to preserve their inde- 
pendence in an era of wage-earning dependence. Fraternity and 
equality, they contended, represented virtues under sharp attack in the 
increasingly hierarchical organization of American economic life. 
Moreover, cooperative insurance also offered a means for wage-earners 
to preserve their roles as manly breadwinners for their families, not- 
withstanding the increasingly acute problems of death and disability 
from work accidents in industrialized labor. 
In short, the cooperative insurance associations of the late nine- 
teenth century sought to preserve the ideals of mid-century free labor 
ideology in the changing landscape of the postwar decades. For the 
cooperative insurance societies, the insurance certificate replaced pro- 
prietorship as the embodiment of free labor independence. Where 
once the self-owning wage laborer had been able to rise to the level of 
master craftsman or independent proprietor with at least a small prop- 
erty holding, now the insurance policy against death and disability al- 
lowed the self-owning workingman to invest in the value of his self- 
ownership to protect against the consequences of injury. The worker's 
body itself would form the new property on which independence could 
be established by investing in the property value of that body over 
time through an insurance arrangement. In the equality and fraternity 
of the cooperative insurance association, the American workingman 
might thus find a new kind of independence despite the increasingly 
hierarchical structure of economic life. 
Moreover, the cooperative insurance impulse reconceived manliness 
as the capacity to protect one's family from unforeseen contingencies. 
"Had it not been for lodge people persuading my husband to join," 
stated a typical cooperative insurance circular of the day, "myself and 
the little ones would to-day be in want."635 Indeed, a typical motto for 
the cooperatives was "Lupus Repulsus": with the wolf at the door of 
the widow's modest home, the certificate of the cooperative insurance 
association promised (in loco patris) to chase the wolf away.636 
Yet the cooperative associations' attempt to maintain working- 
men's economic independence in the face of the accident crisis was, 
like the free labor ideal itself, a project of deeply ambiguous ideologi- 
cal import. Insurance associations simultaneously embodied a pointed 
critique of the iniquities of the competitive wage system and an ac- 
commodation to that competitive wage system. On one hand, coopera- 
635 Contemporary Views, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Sept. i, i890, at I4 (author's notes). 
636 See Advertisement, Order of the International Fraternal Alliance (Boston), FRATERNAL 
MONITOR, Feb. i, i89i, at i9 (author's notes). 
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tive associations stood as one strand of the late nineteenth-century 
movement that sought to reconstruct the competitive wage labor sys- 
tem into a "cooperative commonwealth." From this perspective, the 
industrial accident problem was the starkest exemplar of the crippling 
effects of wage labor on the nation's workingmen, effects that war- 
ranted a thorough reorganization of economic production in the indus- 
trial age. On the other hand, for many, cooperative insurance repre- 
sented a means by which workingmen might adapt to the new 
industrial order by extending the commodification of their bodies 
through a private and voluntarist insurance mechanism.637 Because 
the wage labor system rendered the workers' labor power a commod- 
ity, the life and disability insurance contract treated the worker's body 
itself as a marketable commodity. Moreover, from this perspective, life 
and disability insurance offered a means to manage the contingencies 
of the new industrial economy, short of a mass reorganization of 
American economic and social life. 
C. The Ambiguities of Cooperative Insurance 
If cooperative insurance was a response to the threat that industrial 
accidents posed to workingmen's free labor ideals, it also brought out 
the ambiguities of these ideals. Within the cooperative insurance 
movement itself, two competing accounts of cooperation vied for the 
meaning of the movement. The first account -called here the "thin" 
theory of cooperation - bore a number of close similarities to the clas- 
sical liberalism of the law of torts. On this view, cooperation was a 
process by which rational, self-interested individuals could assume new 
levels of self-control and responsibility. By contrast, according to a 
second account - the "thick" theory of cooperation - the cooperative 
insurance movement was not merely a process for the pursuit of indi- 
vidual interests, but rather an adaptation of the substantive ideal of 
independence for the free labor workingman to an increasingly indus- 
trialized world.638 
i. The Thin Theory of Cooperation: Cooperative Insurance and the 
Responsible Self. - No one better captured the thin strand of the post- 
637 For discussions of the commodification theme in nineteenth-century life insurance, see 
ZELIZER, supra note 495; and VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE 
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN II 3-3 7 (I 985). 
638 I borrow the terms "thin" and "thick" from the political theory literature - derived from 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice - on the difference between "thin" or minimalist theories of justice, on 
one hand, which require few substantive commitments to particular notions of the good and take 
persons as prior to the rich particularities that constitute their ends; and "thick" or full theories of 
justice, on the other hand, which entail more significant commitments to particular conceptions of 
the good and take persons as necessarily encumbered by a rich set of social attachments. See JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 396-99 (I97I); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM I78 
(I993); SANDEL, LIBERALISM, supra note I53, at 5o-65, I20-2 I. 
200I] TOWARD A NEWHISTORYOFAMERICANACCIDENTLAW 809 
Civil War insurance movement than Elizur Wright, Massachusetts's 
first insurance commissioner. Born in i804 into a Congregationalist 
family in Litchfield County, Connecticut, Wright grew up in the heady 
antebellum world of New England evangelical reform.639 Like many 
antebellum American reformers in the evangelical Protestant tradition, 
Wright believed deeply in the human capacity for "direct communion 
to God through conscience."640 As Wright's correspondent and friend 
Theodore Weld put it, God had "committed to every moral agent the 
privilege, the right and the responsibility of personal ownership."'641 In 
Wright's view, certain social beliefs followed directly from human be- 
ings' capacity for self-responsibility. Thus, for example, he advocated 
complete abstinence from alcohol and tobacco. Moreover, as a young 
man in the early i830s, Wright became a leading immediatist in the 
American abolitionist movement.642 Indeed, Wright was named the 
domestic secretary of William Lloyd Garrison's American Anti-Slavery 
Society at its inception in i833.643 
At the center of Wright's view of the world, and at the heart of his 
abolitionism, lay his belief in responsibility for one's own moral 
choices. "God has devolved upon every individual," he wrote, "a cer- 
tain responsibility towards making civil government what it should 
be."644 Thus, moral suasion and individual action held out the greatest 
promise for liberty, which could be gained only "by moral power."645 
In focusing on individual action and moral suasion, Wright tapped 
into the strong current of ideas about human perfectibility in nine- 
teenth-century antislavery thought; if human beings could cast off the 
burden of original sin, many of the most radical abolitionists argued, 
then communities might no longer need coercive mechanisms of hier- 
archy, authority, and governance.646 Yet more so than many of his 
fellow abolitionists, Wright was preoccupied with the persistence of 
639 See PHILIP GREEN WRIGHT & ELIZABETH Q. WRIGHT, ELIZUR WRIGHT: THE FATHER OF 
LIFE INSURANCE I (I937). For accounts of the New England antebellum reformers, see generally 
ROBERT H. ABZUG, COSMOS CRUMBLING: AMERICAN REFORM AND THE RELIGIOUS 
IMAGINATION (I994); LAWRENCE J. FRIEDMAN, GREGARIOUS SAINTS: SELF AND COMMUNITY IN 
AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM, i830-i870 (i982); WALKER, supra note 246; and RONALD G. 
WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY APPEAL: AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM AFTER i830 (I976). 
640 LAWRENCE B. GOODHEART, ABOLITIONIST, ACTUARY, ATHEIST: ELIZUR WRIGHT AND 
THE REFORM IMPULSE 44 (I990); cf. DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN 
WESTERN CULTURE 333-64 (i966) (describing Christian ideas about human perfectibility in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). 
641 GOODHEART, supra note 640, at 44. 
642 Id. at 4I; see also R. CARLYLE BULEY, THE AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION, i906-i952: A 
STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LIFE INSURANCE 57-58 (I953). 
643 GOODHEART, supra note 640, at 64. 
644 Id. at go. 
645 Id. 
646 See DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, I770- 
I823, at 554 (I975); DAVIS, supra note 640, at 298-300. 
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tragedy in human life. "Men," Wright wrote to Garrison, "are not 
completely freed from sin by the grace of God."647 Indeed, Wright was 
no stranger to tragedy. Five of Wright's children died in the i83os and 
i840s, and in i844 his house in Boston burned to the ground, almost 
taking his wife and remaining children with it.648 
Wright's hesitance to accept the strongest interpretations of human 
perfectibility led him in i839 to break with Garrison over the latter's 
increasingly radical platform, which advocated equality for women 
and the abolition of all forms of human government.649 After his 
break with Garrison, Wright became increasingly involved in the still- 
fledgling life insurance industry of the i84os and 5os.650 In i858, 
Wright was named State Insurance Commissioner for Massachusetts, a 
position he held until i867.651 In these years, as well as in his subse- 
quent career as an independent insurance expert, Wright came in- 
creasingly to believe that life insurance offered the best means by 
which men could continue to assume responsibility for themselves, 
even in the face of the contingencies of modern life. Life insurance, he 
argued, solved "the great problem - how to secure independence by 
means of general dependence."652 Indeed, cooperative *insurance ar- 
rangements of different kinds, according to Wright, would be "a long 
step taken towards the solution of the great labor questions" of the 
day.653 Thus Wright looked forward to a day when workingmen 
would adopt life insurance protections "as universally" as the various 
arrangements of "steam and lightning" that had called workingmen's 
insurance associations into being in the first place.654 
In his theory of life insurance, Wright clung to the moral reform 
ideals of his antebellum abolitionism. Many of his contemporaries in 
the i840s viewed life insurance as little more than a lottery; indeed, be- 
fore i 8cc, life insurance had been seen as little more than a way of 
betting on lives.655 But Wright saw that insurance on lives could serve 
as a bulwark for the morally responsible self in unsettling times. In- 
surance against death offered the opportunity to realize "fraternity 
647 GOODHEART, supra note 640, at I03. 
648 Id. at II7, I24. 
649 Id. at Io3-o6. 
650 See BULEY, supra note 642, at 58-59; STALSON, supra note 469, at 232-34; WRIGHT & 
WRIGHT, supra note 639, at 220-39. 
651 GOODHEART, supra note 640, at I48. 
652 Id. at I45. 
653 Id. at i64. 
654 Id. at i63. 
655 For discussion of the eighteenth-century background for the perceived relationship between 
life insurance and gambling, see generally BULEY, supra note 642, at I3-26; and GEOFFREY 
CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, i695-I775 (I999). 
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without the destruction of independence and individuality."656 Moreo- 
ver, life insurance offered a way to adapt the ideal of moral responsi- 
bility for one's own actions to modern conditions without coercively 
reorganizing the fabric of economic and social life. In essence, Wright 
viewed life insurance as a uniquely voluntary and individualistic solu- 
tion to a social problem. Life insurance and other mechanisms of pru- 
dence, thrift, and individual responsibility, Wright believed, could 
make trade unions entirely unnecessary.657 Indeed, until his death in 
i885, Wright argued that if American workingmen would follow the 
teachings of the antebellum temperance advocates, they would be able 
to rise above the poverty of urban and industrial life.658 
Wright was hardly alone in viewing life insurance arrangements as 
a mechanism for the achievement of personal moral responsibility. 
The Connecticut Board of Labor Statistics argued that cooperative in- 
surance societies taught citizens the virtues of self-reliance - in the 
Board's words, "the wisdom of thrift, the independence of self-help, 
and the pride of self-government."659 Moreover, many cooperative as- 
sociation voices evinced a deeply rooted commitment to insurance as a 
voluntarist mechanism for accommodating the individual to the di- 
lemmas of industrial life. From this perspective, insurance allowed in- 
dividuals to solve the social problems that otherwise threatened to re- 
sult in expansion of the state. The effective use of insurance could 
thus counter calls for new governmental functions. "We are not of the 
opinion that insurance forms any of the functions of government any 
more than the sale of groceries and dry goods," announced The Frater- 
nal Monitor in i89i. "Governmental insurance, whether voluntary or 
compulsory, can never be made a success even under monarchical 
forms of government."660 Such opposition to governmental action ex- 
tended beyond the role of the state in insurance. Many fraternal in- 
surance societies bitterly opposed what they sensed was the "tendency 
... towards saddling the government with functions which do not 
properly belong to it."'661 
656 GOODHEART, supra note 640, at I76. For Wright's response to the persistent gambling cri- 
tique of life insurance, see STALSON, supra note 469, at I5 I-52. 
657 See GOODHEART, supra note 640, at i65. 
658 See id. at 208. 
659 See CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582, at 66. 
660 Paternalism, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Feb. i, i89i, at I2 (author's notes). 
661 Id. State regulation and supervision of the economy and state assumption of roles such as a 
seller of insurance, groceries, and dry goods "differ only in degree," wrote the editors of The Fra- 
ternal Monitor, "they are both perversions of the true function of government." Id. (author's 
notes). This antistatist sentiment led many cooperative beneficiary organizations to stay out of 
politics. The Fraternal Monitor's editors argued as follows: 
On general principles it is unwise for the fraternities to enter the domain of politics.... 
When ... the fraternities essay to occupy this field, their affairs to a certain extent be- 
come interwoven with its fortunes, and the advantages to be gained thereby are of a du- 
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2. The Thick Theory of Cooperation: Cooperative Insurance and 
the Cooperative Commonwealth of the Workingman. - If one strand of 
the insurance movement of the post-Civil War years focused on life in- 
surance's capacity to accommodate the moral responsibility of the in- 
dividual to a new industrializing era of unforeseen contingencies, a 
competing approach to cooperative insurance offered very different 
lessons for the meaning of the accident crisis. On the "thick" account 
of the cooperative associations, cooperative insurance represented the 
opening of a new cooperative commonwealth of the independent 
workingman. 
(a) The Cooperative Critique of the Wage System. - Post-Civil 
War America witnessed a proliferation of cooperative movements 
seeking to counter the vicissitudes of economic and social change. The 
key ideal linking all of these movements was the aspiration for what 
Americans from all walks of life came to think of as a "cooperative 
commonwealth." In the South and the Midwest, farmers in fraternal 
orders such as the Rochester-based Patrons of Husbandry (also known 
as The Grange) and the Texas-based Knights of Reliance founded re- 
gional and national Farmers' Alliances dedicated to the cooperative 
advancement of small farmers' interests in the increasingly troubled 
agricultural markets of the i88os.662 Farmers' Alliances throughout 
the agricultural regions of the nation, but especially in the Dakotas 
and Texas, formed distributive cooperatives designed to cut out the 
middlemen who controlled farmers' access to markets.663 Many Alli- 
ances also established cooperative enterprises furnishing such diverse 
goods and services as coal, barbed wire, farm machinery, and life and 
fire insurance.664 Ultimately, the cooperative farmers' alliances in- 
spired a political movement that had considerable success in the late 
i88os and early i89os running on a "cooperative commonwealth" plat- 
form.665 The Farmers' Alliances and the People's Party, or Populists, 
which absorbed the Farmers' Alliances in i896, advocated the nation- 
alization of railroads,666 the creation of state-owned distribution and 
bious nature.... It follows therefore, that no good purposes can be served by political al- 
liances. 
Seasonable Paragraphs, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Oct. i, i89i, at 3 (author's notes). 
662 See ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., AMERICAN POPULISM: A SOCIAL HISTORY i877-i898, at 83- 
I07 (I993) [hereinafter MCMATH, AMERICAN POPULISM]; ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., POPULIST 
VANGUARD: A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN FARMERS' ALLIANCE I5I-52 (I975) [hereinafter 
MCMATH, POPULIST VANGUARD]; C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, i877- 
I9I3, at i88-90 (2d prtg. I971). 
663 LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOMENT IN AMERICA 39, 
59 (I976). 
664 MCMATH, AMERICAN POPULISM, supra note 662, at ioi. 
665 Id. at 83-I07. 
666 Id. at I04, I09. 
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storage institutions for agricultural goods,667 and the extension of be- 
low-market-rate loans to producers of agricultural and industrial 
goods.668 
The farmers were hardly alone in advocating cooperation as the 
"Key to the Solution of the Industrial Problem of the Age," as Texas 
Farmers' Alliance leader Charles Macune described it.669 In the i88os, 
middle- and upper-class reformers, as well as many important elements 
of the labor movement, turned to cooperation as the best alternative to 
the competitive capitalist organization of American economic and so- 
cial life. Though they reached very different conclusions regarding the 
particular reforms necessary to mend the rent fabric of the nation, 
popular social reformers such as Edward Bellamy, Henry George, and 
Henry Demarest Lloyd saw some form of cooperation as critical to 
their projects of social reform. Bellamy's i887 novel Looking Back- 
ward envisioned a federally supervised reorganization of the economy 
on the model of a cooperative family and inspired a movement of Na- 
tionalist Clubs advocating like-minded reforms.670 Unlike Bellamy, 
George advocated an approach to industrial difficulties that avoided a 
strong national state. Thus, George's i879 Progress and Poverty ar- 
gued in favor of heavily taxing ground rents and redistributing the 
revenue.671 But like Bellamy's nationalist utopia, George's tax plan 
was inspired by and sought to inculcate a new spirit of self-regulation 
by a "community of honest producers free from artificial restraints and 
special privileges" - a community in which cooperatively determined 
bounds would place sharp limits on the proper scope of the market- 
place.672 Similarly, Lloyd's i894 Wealth Against Commonwealth, an 
indictment of the Standard Oil Company, advanced cooperation 
among small independent producers as an alternative to monopoly 
production.673 Lloyd even became a director of the American Co- 
667 GOODWYN, supra note 663, at 90-93, I09-I3. 
668 Id. at i09-i0. 
669 MCMATH, POPULIST VANGUARD, supra note 662, at go. 
670 EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD, 2000-i887 (Belknap Press i967) (i888). For 
more on Bellamy, see ARTHUR LIPOW, AUTHORITARIAN SOCIALISM IN AMERICA: EDWARD 
BELLAMY & THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT (i982); and JOHN L. THOMAS, ALTERNATIVE 
AMERICA: HENRY GEORGE, EDWARD BELLAMY, HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD AND THE 
ADVERSARY TRADITION (1 983). 
671 See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 408-2 I (Robert Schalkenbach Found. I929) 
(i879); THOMAS, supra note 670, at ii8-22. 
672 THOMAS, supra note 670, at io8. George thought of his self-regulated community as pre- 
serving the competitive functions of the market, see GEORGE, supra note 67i, at 3i6-i9, but such 
competition only took place in George's schema within a general framework of cooperatively 
agreed-upon bounds. See generally CHARLES ALBRO BARKER, HENRY GEORGE 294 (I955); 
STEVEN B. CORD, HENRY GEORGE: DREAMER OR REALIST? 228-34 (i965); ANNA GEORGE DE 
MILLE, HENRY GEORGE: CITIZEN OF THE WORLD (Don C. Shoemaker ed., I950). 
673 See HENRY DEMAREST LLOYD, WEALTH AGAINST COMMONWEALTH I7i-84 (Thomas C. 
Cochran ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc. i963) (i894); see also CHESTER MCARTHUR DESTLER, HENRY 
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operative Union, a leading American cooperative organization, and 
published a book for an American audience on experiments in "labor 
copartnership" in England and Ireland.674 
Both the Farmers' Alliances and reform writers in the cooperative 
tradition forged connections in the late i88os to the labor movement, 
which had developed its own variation on the postwar cooperative 
ideal. The Farmers' Alliances in particular established farmer-worker 
coalitions with the Knights of Labor.675 Similarly, George and Lloyd 
established relationships with industrial workingmen in the Knights.676 
Much as the Farmers' Alliances grew out of local agricultural fra- 
ternities, the Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor developed 
in the i86os out of a mysterious and little-understood set of local 
tradesmen's secret societies in Philadelphia.677 With the addition of 
miners in the i87os, and then skilled tradesmen in the early i88os, the 
Knights became the United States's leading labor organization by the 
early to mid-i88os.678 Moreover, the Knights brought together under 
one tent a wide array of trades, and in a few instances they success- 
fully crossed the ethnic and racial boundaries that divided American 
labor.679 
Cooperation and the cooperative commonwealth ideal lay at the 
core of the Knights' mission. The preamble to their constitution an- 
nounced that the Knights endeavored "to establish co-operative institu- 
tions, such as will tend to supersede the wage system by the introduc- 
tion of a co-operative industrial system."680 According to Terence 
Powderly, the Grand Master Workman of the Knights, the nation's 
workingmen would only be free of the bonds of wage slavery when the 
"rotten" competitive system "g[a]ve way to the true co-operative sys- 
tem."'681 As he typically proclaimed at the Knights' conventions, coop- 
eration would make it possible to recapture the Lincolnian dream of 
"every man his own master - every man his own employer."682 
The Knights were only the most striking manifestation of a still 
broader movement among the "producing classes" of workingmen 
DEMAREST LLOYD AND THE EMPIRE OF REFORM 296-300 (i963); THOMAS, supra note 670, at 
30I-04. 
674 See DESTLER, supra note 673, at 380, 389. 
675 See MCMATH, AMERICAN POPULISM, .supra note 662, at 83-I07. 
676 See id. at I I3; THOMAS, supra note 670, at 280. 
677 See LEON FINK, WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY: THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS, at xii (i983); ROBERT E. WEIR, BEYOND LABOR'S VEIL: THE CULTURE OF THE 
KNIGHTS OF LABOR 2 (i996). 
678 See FINK, supra note 677, at xii. 
679 See POWDERLY, supra note 572, at 347-5 I; see also FINK, supra note 677, at I49-77, 224. 
680 POWDERLY, supra note 5 7 2, at 2 30. 
681 Id. at 233. 
682 TERENCE V. POWDERLY, THE PATH I TROD: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF TERENCE V 
POWDERLY 269 (Harry J. Carman, Henry David & Paul N. Guthrie eds., I940). 
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against market trends that were undermining prevailing modes of pro- 
duction and social organization. Among industrial workers, this pro- 
ducerist worldview's central tenet was the labor theory of value.683 
Drawing on both Locke and Marx, American workingmen in the i88os 
argued that wealth was the product of the noble labor of the working 
classes.684 Accordingly, the profits of production rightfully belonged to 
the producers. Yet the wage system of labor withheld from the worker 
his equitable share of the returns from production. In the process, the 
wage system stripped the workingman of his dignity in labor and re- 
duced him to a state of wage slavery. 
Cooperation, by contrast, offered a model of production that might 
preserve the dignity of the workingman and restore to him a fair re- 
turn on his productive capacities. Thus, in the decades between the 
Civil War and the turn of the century, the main theme of the American 
labor movement centered on the cooperative alternative to wage labor. 
An outpouring of radical labor pamphlets decried the "degrading" and 
"monarchial"685 social economy by which capitalist wage labor 
"rob[bed]"686 the producing classes of what was rightly theirs. In con- 
trast, the promise of what labor radicals variously called an "American 
co-operative labor social economy,"687 an "[e]conomy of [c]oopera- 
tion,"688 or "universal co-operation"689 was that it might ensure the 
workingman an equitable share of the wealth he created.690 
(b) Cooperative Insurance and the Critique of the Accident Crisis. 
-For the cooperationists, the law of employers' liability for industrial 
accidents was a leading example of the inequitable distribution of the 
profits of enterprise. If labor was the source of value in the production 
process, the competitive capitalist economy stripped the workingman 
of his rightful share of the returns on production yet left him to bear 
683 See DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA i850-I920, at 2 I3- 
I4 (I978). Rodgers emphasizes that common references to labor as the source of wealth were not 
necessarily doctrinaire Marxist claims about labor time and the production of surplus value. Id. at 
2 I7-i8. This proposition is surely correct, but the significance of the distinction may be relatively 
small. As David Montgomery has shown, for example, the American labor theory of value led la- 
bor radicals to a number of conclusions not altogether different from those that they might have 
drawn from Marx's Das Kapital. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 15I, at 251-57. 
684 RODGERS, supra note 683, at 2 I3-I4. 
685 WALTER S. WALDIE, AMERICAN CO-OPERATIVE LABOR SOCIAL ECONOMY VS. 
MONARCHIAL LABOR DEGRADING SOCIAL ECONOMY 24 (Philadelphia, Sherman & Co. i87 I). 
686 J.M. BLOOMER, THE COOPERATIVE EDUCATOR: A KEY TO THE MINES OF WEALTH 
ACCESSIBLE TO HONEST PRODUCERS WHO THINK AND ACT FOR THEMSELVES 2 (Toledo, News 
Publ'g Co. i888). 
687 WALDIE, supra note 685. 
688 BLOOMER, supra note 686, at 9. 
689 WILLIAM HALLER, THE NEW IDEA: UNIVERSAL CO-OPERATION AND THEORIES OF 
FUTURE GOVERNMENT 8 (Cincinnati, H. Watkin, Printer n.d.). 
690 FRANKLIN HENRY GIDDINGS, TWELVE PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION (New York, Socio- 
logic Society of America i887). 
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the increasingly grave risks of personal injury and death. These cir- 
cumstances stood squarely at odds with the moral economy of the co- 
operatives. Terence Powderly of the Knights of Labor became a labor 
radical as a child growing up near the anthracite mines of Pennsylva- 
nia, listening to miners' unions condemn the mine operators for their 
callous disregard of miner safety.69' Building trades union leader Ed- 
ward H. Rogers argued that "justice and equity" required employers' 
liability reform.692 Similarly, fellow labor leader George E. McNeill 
explained that it was a "scandal" that "a man is pensioned for wounds" 
received in warfare, "but must be pauperized when receiving injuries 
in the peaceful pursuits of life."693 In industrial workplaces, McNeill 
observed, "[t]he slaughter continues" without the fanfare given to lives 
destroyed on the battlefield.694 
Organized protest against the law of employers' liability appears to 
have been rare among American workingmen into the late i86os.695 
In i868, the National Labor Union added Rogers's call for liability re- 
form to its political platform.696 By the i88os, employers' liability law 
reform appeared regularly as a legislative goal of workers' organiza- 
tions, alongside maximum hours laws, land reform, and repeal of the 
law of labor conspiracies.697 Similar liability reforms became impor- 
tant in the legislative agenda of the railway brotherhoods.698 Even 
then, however, labor unions in the late nineteenth century rarely made 
workplace safety or employer compensation of injured workers central 
issues in collective bargaining with employers.699 
Protest against the political economy of the law of employers' li- 
ability emerged not so much in organized political lobbying for liability 
rule reform or in collective bargaining over safety conditions as in the 
overlap between the cooperative insurance societies and the coopera- 
691 See POWDERLY, supra note 682, at 23-24. 
692 THE LABOR MOVEMENT: THE PROBLEM OF TO-DAY 332 (George E. McNeill ed., Boston, 
A.M. Bridgman & Co. i887). 
693 Id. at 490. 
694 MCNEILL, supra note 286, at 65. 
695 John Fabian Witt, Note, The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 
i842-I9IO, I07 YALE L.J. I467, I48i-82, I482 n.79 (i998). In New York in the i850s, labor activ- 
ists advocated land reform, mechanics' lien laws, minimum wage legislation for public works, 
maximum hours legislation, and repeal of the law of labor conspiracy, but not employers' liability 
reform. See The Congress of Trades, N.Y. HERALD, July 26, i850, at i; The New-York City Indus- 
trial Congress, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Sept.2 5, i850, at 8. 
696 See 9 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 224 (John R. Com- 
mons & John B. Andrews eds., igio). 
697 See Robert Asher, Failure and Fulfillment: Agitation for Employers' Liability Legislation and 
the Origins of Workmen's Compensation in New York State, i876-I9IO, 24 LABOR HIST. i98, 202- 
03 (i983); Witt, supra note 695, at I482 n.79. 
698 See SALVATORE, supra note I83, at 42-43. 
699 See WILLIAM GRAEBNER, COAL-MINING SAFETY IN THE PROGRESSIVE PERIOD: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM I28 (1976). 
2001] TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ACCIDENT LA W 8I7 
tive commonwealth movement more generally. The Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen, later led by Eugene Debs, formed in the early 
i87os not as a labor union, but as a fraternal mutual insurance society 
first and foremost.700 By the same token, many of the early producers' 
cooperatives featured collective insurance programs,701 and some were 
primarily organized as such.702 
Indeed, for many supporters of a cooperative political economy, co- 
operative insurance associations were just one part of the broader co- 
operative movement.703 Some cooperationists believed that the coop- 
erative insurance societies, with their relatively simple assessment- 
based administration, would serve as an entry wedge for the coopera- 
tive movement more generally; in the fraternal insurance associations, 
cooperative members would learn the habits of cooperation and its 
benefits.704 For other cooperationists, cooperative insurance societies 
represented a way-station that would provide benefits to the "casual- 
ties" of industrial capitalism during the interval before the cooperative 
economy established itself.705 
The problem of upholding the independence of the workingman in 
the face of the onslaught of industrial injuries even led some free labor 
radicals and advocates of the cooperative commonwealth vision to 
turn to full-time work in mutual accident insurance. George E. 
McNeill led the American eight-hour movement from the i86os into 
the i88os, first as secretary of the Grand Eight-Hour League and then 
as president of the Workingmen's Institute and the Boston Eight-Hour 
League.706 In i883 he joined the Knights of Labor, and throughout 
the i89os he maintained close ties to the AFL.707 Into the first decade 
700 SALVATORE, supra note i83, at 20. 
701 See, e.g., ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF THE WINNEBAGO COUNTY INDUSTRIAL AND 
PROVIDENT SOCIETY 2 (Oshkosh, Wis., Levy & Ryckman, Printers i878); CONSTITUTION OF THE 
WORKINGMEN'S LEAGUE I (n.p., n.d.) [hereinafter WORKINGMEN'S LEAGUE CONSTITUTION]; 
CONSTITUTION OF THE WORKMEN'S SICK & DEATH BENEFIT FUND OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA I5 (New York, John Oehler, Printer I899) [hereinafter WORKMEN'S SICK & DEATH 
BENEFIT FUND CONSTITUTION]; THE INDUSTRIAL REPUBLIC, FOUNDED ON FRATERNAL CO- 
OPERATION (n.p., I89I). 
702 See WORKINGMEN'S LEAGUE CONSTITUTION, supra note 7OI; WORKMEN'S SICK & DEATH 
BENEFIT FUND CONSTITUTION, supra note 70I, at 8. 
703 See NELSON BOOTH, EXPERIENCES AS CO-OPERATORS 6 (n.p., n.d.). 
704 See PROSPECTUS OF THE AMERICAN WORKERS' ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
EDUCATIONAL, INDUSTRIAL, COOPERATIVE, AND SOCIAL REFORM 6 (i879). 
705 See WILLIAM NELSON BLACK, ULTIMATE FINANCE: A TRUE THEORY OF CO-OPERATION 
42 app. (New York, Humboldt Publ'g Co. 1888). 
706 See MONTGOMERY, supra note I5i, app. D at 467; I5 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 
I70, I70-7I (John A. Garraty & Mark C. Carnes eds., I999); I2 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIO- 
GRAPHY 150, I50-5 I (Dumas Malone ed., I933). 
707 Is See AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 706, at I7 I. 
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of the new century, McNeill remained an important participant at co- 
operative movement conventions.708 
In McNeill's view, the wage labor system usurped the independ- 
ence of the free laborer and transformed him into "a man without the 
rights of manhood."709 Moreover, McNeill believed that the accident 
problem among wage laborers was the most glaring instance of the ill 
effects of wage labor. Accidents reduced the workingman to a "physi- 
cally . . . deformed" creature, "ek[ing] out . . . [a] mere pittance" "at the 
risk of health and limb, and perhaps life."710 McNeill argued that ul- 
timately only the consolidation of a "Grand Army of Labor" could "lift 
the laborer to a higher level of manhood."'71 In the meantime the 
problem of work accidents required the creation of collective worker 
institutions that could help maintain the independence of workingmen 
and their families during times of disability. Thus, in i883 McNeill es- 
tablished the Massachusetts Mutual Accident Association. The Asso- 
ciation's primary function, as the high proportion of work accidents 
among the accidents listed in its records reveals, was to provide insur- 
ance for men injured at work.712 
The collectivist structure of the cooperative self-insurance societies 
often gave voice to the broad social philosophy and the labor theory of 
value of the cooperative commonwealth ideal. Cooperative insurance 
societies, the movement's leaders contended in i89i, involved nothing 
short of "the warp and woof of American citizenship."'713 Three years 
later Nathan S. Boynton, the president of the National Fraternal Con- 
ference, envisioned a cooperative reconstruction of the American econ- 
omy as a producers' commonwealth. "If the national fraternal benefi- 
ciary societies can successfully combine," Boynton asked, "why cannot 
the labor organizations of the country absorb, manage, and direct the 
wealth they produce and keep it out of the pockets of the non- 
producers, the Goulds and Vanderbilts?" Indeed, through "co- 
operation," Boynton contended, America's producing classes would 
soon be able 
to own, control, and manage the railroads, the mines, the printing offices, 
and all of our manufacturing enterprises, without any strike, contention or 
paralysis of business just as the great fraternal beneficiary system has se- 
708 See Handbill, NATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE CONFERENCE AT LEWISTON, MAINE, JUNE 20- 
24, I902 (listing George McNeill, "'the grand old man"' of the labor movement, as the lead 
speaker). 
709 THE LABOR MOVEMENT, supra note 75, at 455. McNeill argued, inter alia, that the wage 
laborer's "wife is forced from home, and his children from school." Id. 
710 Id. at 466. 
711 Id. at 468, 463. 
712 See McNEILL, supra note 286, at 47. More than four of every ten accidents reported to the 
association by its members were work-related, as compared to only I.5 of every ten for the next 
largest category, accidents "about house and grounds." See id. 
713 FRATERNAL MONIToR, Aug. i, i89i, at 5 (author's notes). 
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cured control of a vast business, representing four billions of dollars, and 
are successfully controlling and managing it without any conflict with 
capital, and without a single strike, boycott, or lockout. 
In no other way, in my opinion, will the contention between labor and 
capital ever be settled. . . . It is only a matter of time in my opinion when 
it will be successfully carried out.714 
Boynton, then, saw in workingmen's cooperative fraternal insurance 
the promise of cooperation writ large. 
Boynton was hardly alone in this view. Abb Landis, a cooperative 
insurance advocate from Nashville, argued that the success of the co- 
operative insurance movement was a harbinger of the cooperative 
economy to come. "No thoughtful observer can regard our present in- 
dustrial regime as final," wrote Landis just after the turn of the cen- 
tury.715 According to Landis, the "remittent warfare between capital 
and labor" showed that the existing economic system was "obviously a 
temporary condition."'716 Cooperative insurance societies, however, 
demonstrated that the "capitalist and labor may be combined in the 
same person, and that great industries may be competently managed 
by officers elected by the whole body of the workers."'717 "Why is it 
not possible," Landis asked, "to extend this principle of mutual coop- 
eration and entirely eliminate the capitalist and forever be rid of his 
exploitation of labor with its attendants of friction and ferment?"'718 In 
the place of trusts, bankers, and dividends to stockholders, Landis, like 
Boynton, envisioned an economic structure that rewarded labor in 
proportion to its equitable share of inputs in the productive process. 
3. The Ambivalences of Cooperative Insurance. - Boynton's and 
Landis's shared vision of cooperation as a model for social life, how- 
ever, was but one strand of the deeply ambiguous cooperative impulse 
in the late nineteenth century. Their view of the cooperative move- 
ment, and of cooperative workingmen's insurance in particular, prom- 
ised a thoroughgoing reconstruction of American political economy. 
But the "thin" variation of cooperative insurance easily accommodated 
itself to competitive capitalist markets. On Wright's account, after all, 
cooperative insurance did not have sweeping implications for the 
shape of the economy. It promised instead to reconstruct the individ- 
ual by fostering personal moral responsibility. 
The difficulty for advocates of the transformative conception of the 
insurance associations was that the concept of cooperation was inde- 
714 FRATERNAL MONITOR, Dec. i. i894, at 7 (author's notes). 
715 Abb Landis, Life Insurance by Fraternal Orders, 24 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sd. 
475, 487 (1904). 
716 Id. 
717 Id. 
718 Id. at 487-88. 
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terminate. The corporation is easily redescribed as a profit-seeking 
capital cooperative.719 And in the hands of liberal advocates of lais- 
sez-faire such as E.L. Godkin, editor of The Nation, cooperation repre- 
sented little more than a convenient mechanism by which workingmen 
could participate in the production of goods and services in an indus- 
trial economy.720 As geologist and Mormon theologian Dr. James Ed- 
ward Talmage observed, cooperation could be reconceived as nothing 
more than the means by which "laborers became their own capital- 
ists. I721 
Black and immigrant insurance associations shared the same 
deeply divided identity. W.E.B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington 
both advocated cooperative insurance among blacks as a form of col- 
lective self-help in the context of racially discriminatory insurance and 
financial institutions.722 But the implications of their cooperative vi- 
sions differed sharply. For Du Bois, cooperative insurance, like coop- 
erative economic action more generally, constituted a step toward the 
cooperative reorganization of economic life.723 For Washington, how- 
ever, black self-help institutions such as mutual insurance enterprises 
might be a way for black Americans to develop commercial acumen.724 
Similarly, ethnic insurance societies among the new immigrants of the 
early twentieth century found themselves torn between a desire to fos- 
ter tight bonds within their communities and an impulse to provide in- 
stitutional support for the Americanization of immigrants and their in- 
troduction into the American commercial economy.725 
In part, the conflicting ideologies in cooperative workingmen's in- 
surance resulted from the need to adapt the cooperatives' ideological 
commitments to the realities of running a going concern. As one coop- 
erative organ observed, cooperatives needed always to attend to the 
719 For a review of the "capital cooperatives" analogy in the i99os, minus the "scheming capital- 
ists" of the i890s version, see HANSMANN, supra note 492, at I2-I4. See also WM. H. 
TEMPLETON, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, UNIVERSAL CO-OPERATIVE ASSOCIATION 2 
(contending that the "scheeming [sic] capitalists" had "formed co-operative associations, not that 
justice might be done to the laboring man equally with themselves, but ... that they might by their 
great strength of co-operation crush the power of the organizations of the laboring people"). 
720 See E.L. Godkin, Cooperation and Character, 43 NATION 305 (i886); see also RODGERS, su- 
pra note 74, at 44-47. This is essentially the approach of Hansmann today, whose book studies a 
variety of enterprises and uses macroeconomic theory to make sense of the use and success of dif- 
ferent ownership structures in different sectors of the economy. See generally HANSMANN, supra 
note 492. 
721 What It Is Not. What It Is., INDUS. REPUBLIC, Sept. 24, i89i. 
722 See WALKER, supra note 627, at i87-93. 
723 Du BoIs, supra note 630, at 22I-25, 233-34 (discussing economic self-help in the black com- 
munities of Philadelphia); W.E.B. Du Bois, Resolutions of the Conference, in ECONOMIC CO- 
OPERATION AMONG NEGRO AMERICANS 4 (W.E.B. Du Bois ed., I907). 
724 See WALKER, supra note 627, at i87-93. 
725 See, e.g., LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 
I9I9-I939, at 53-97 (i990); SOYER, supra note 633, at 3-9. 
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"two sides" of cooperation, "the business side, and ... the social and 
educational side."726 Yet the ideological and business sides of the co- 
operatives were in some ways tightly interwoven because a coopera- 
tive society's survival depended upon the inculcation of loyalty to the 
society. Fostering group loyalty was prerequisite to a cooperative soci- 
ety's ability to combat the endemic difficulties of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Without such loyalty and group commitment, coop- 
eratives could unravel quickly, even when only a relatively small pro- 
portion of the membership lacked the requisite commitment to the en- 
terprise.727 Such a propensity to unravel did not bode well for a 
movement split by a deep ideological divide. 
D. The Unraveling of Cooperative Fraternal Insurance 
i. The Shortcomings of Cooperative Insurance Societies: High- 
Risk Exclusions. - There is much to be said for the effectiveness and 
wide impact of the fraternal and cooperative insurance associations. 
Indeed, a growing literature has picked up this strand of the story to 
advance a dubious argument for the viability of private alternatives to 
the welfare state.728 But cooperative self-insurance also had a number 
of shortcomings, not the least of which were the exclusion of high-risk 
applicants from the insurance pool and the inadequacy of benefit lev- 
els in many smaller cooperative associations. 
From the beginning, cooperatives instituted a rigorous process of 
medical screening for prospective members. R.N. Seaver, chair of the 
National Fraternal Congress's committee on Medical Examiners and 
726 The Co-Operative Association of America, CO-OPERATOR, Nov. i89i, at 4. 
727 As Thomas Schelling has described in other contexts, the macroeffects of micromotives can 
be devastating for social movements. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR (I978). 
728 See supra pp. 78i-82. David Beito's recent book is a wonderful example of the disconnect 
between the historical record and the policy prescriptions in recent literature favoring resurrection 
of private cooperation. In the last few paragraphs of his book, Beito bemoans the fact that frater- 
nal association membership "no longer includes the very poor" because state welfare programs 
have crowded out voluntary mutual assistance. Summoning an imaginary golden age of Victorian 
responsibility and self-help, he concludes that "[t]he old relationships of voluntary reciprocity and 
autonomy have slowly given way to paternalistic dependency." BEITO, supra note 47i, at 234. 
Now there is much to be said for the claim that state entitlements and cooperative mutual assis- 
tance embody and foster two very different conceptions of politics. As I hope should be clear to the 
reader, it is not at all clear that cooperative associations uncomplicatedly represented the principle 
of autonomy rather than, say, mutualistic solidarity and collectivism. More troubling, however, is 
the implication that once upon a time the "very poor" belonged to mutual aid associations that of- 
fered substantial assistance to their members. Beito spends the better part of a chapter explaining 
that cooperative mutual assistance associations survived precisely by excluding the least fortunate 
members of the community from membership. The sick, the injured, the very poorest - all of 
these groups were excluded from most cooperative insurance associations, which were quite rea- 
sonably concerned with the heavy burdens that such individuals would place on association re- 
sources. See BEITO, supra note 47 I, at 44-62. 
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Examinations, announced in grandiosely mixed metaphor that medical 
examinations were "the very foundation stones of the whole fabric of 
Fraternal Protection."729 When Seaver turned to the question of how 
to admit new members, he abandoned the rhetoric of fraternity for the 
language of the business of insurance: "[I]n so far as the Medical Ex- 
aminations are concerned ... it is a purely business enterprise in 
which we are each and every one mutually interested, and whatever 
affects the interests of one affects the interests of all others .... 730 As 
another committee member put it, it was necessary that each frater- 
nity's medical examiner be a physician "having the courage to fear- 
lessly do his duty" and "guard[] our gates."'73' 
In "guarding the gates," however, cooperative insurance societies 
excluded many of the most vulnerable segments of the community. 
Physicians conducting medical screenings asked prospective members 
about their families' medical histories, as well as their own; a parent's 
death from consumption might be enough to exclude a would-be 
member.732 The standard medical examination form of the Royal Ar- 
canum required prospective applicants to list all physicians with 
knowledge of their physical condition and required the applicants to 
waive any doctor-patient privilege that might attach to medical infor- 
mation about the applicant or render a physician incompetent to tes- 
tify against the applicant in court.733 Although such medical screen- 
ings made good actuarial and business sense, in practice they limited 
to the healthiest members of the community the scope of the associa- 
tions' benevolence and fraternity. 
2. Low-Risk Flight, Lapses, and Ponzi Schemes. - The exclusion 
of high-risk members from cooperative self-insurance societies high- 
lighted the cooperatives' need to maintain a steady influx of young, 
low-risk members. Most commercial life insurance mechanisms in the 
late nineteenth century employed a system of building reserves while 
policyholders were young, charging higher premiums as policyholders 
aged, or reducing benefit levels for aging policyholders.734 But in the 
name of fraternal ties among members, the American cooperative so- 
cieties adopted an assessment system of equal rates and equal benefits 
for members of all ages.735 As a result, young (typically, low-risk) 
729 Document F, NAT'L FRATERNAL CONG., JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 2 I, i888, at I5- 
i6 [hereinafter NFC JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS]. 
730 Id. at i6. 
731 Id. at 45. 
732 See, e.g., Davis v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 54 N.Y.S. I023, I024 (App. Div. I898) 
(upholding a claim for benefits where an association alleged that the decedent had misrepresented 
his family's history of consumption). 
733 See, e.g., Foley v. Royal Arcanum, 45 N.E. 456, 457 (N.Y. i896). 
734 See Cole, supra note 609, at 470. 
735 See supra p. 803. 
200I] TOWARD A NEW HISTOR Y OF AMERICAN ACCIDENT LA W 823 
members effectively subsidized the insurance of older (typically, high- 
risk) members. Such a system could work, as insurance experts at the 
turn of century observed, but it required that each society have a 
stream of new young members able to pay for the insurance of aging 
members.736 In the caustic words of one insurance expert, for the co- 
operative insurers to succeed without robbing the final generation of 
new members of their assessment payments, they would need to "con- 
tinu[e] business to the end of the world, always increasing in num- 
bers."737 
Cooperative insurance societies continually worried about adding 
young and healthy members to their memberships, as well as screening 
out poor insurance risks. But they also had to worry about the flight 
of low-risk members once they joined.738 A younger member could 
significantly reduce the cost of his insurance by leaving a society bur- 
dened with a relatively large number of older, high-risk members. In- 
deed, when the cooperative associations began to mature in the late 
i87os and early i88os, the number of new cooperative insurance asso- 
ciations grew sharply as low-risk members of existing societies splin- 
tered off into new, lower-cost associations.739 One student of insurance 
associations estimated that by i888 there were as many as I200 
American insurance societies.740 The creation of new cooperatives ac- 
celerated in the i89os. As one study found, of 568 societies whose 
founding dates could be ascertained, only 78 were founded before 
i88o; far and away the largest cohort -some 230 societies - were 
founded in the five years after I895.74' 
As new societies sprang up, older societies died off in high num- 
bers. Between i88i and i885, seventy-three cooperative insurance as- 
sociations failed in New York state alone.742 A year later, nineteen ad- 
ditional cooperative insurance societies had gone out of business.743 
With each succeeding year a new host of failures arrived: seventeen in 
736 See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 535, at I I 7. 
737 Cole, supra note 609, at 474. In this respect, the cooperative associations anticipated the 
structure of the federal old-age pension system under the Social Security Act. 
738 See FRATERNAL MONITOR, Nov. i, i894, at 9 (author's notes) (describing the problem of exit 
by younger or healthier members). 
739 See, e.g., CONNECTICUT REPORT, supra note 582. 
740 See WILLIAM C. NIBLACK, THE LAW OF VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES AND MUTUAL BENEFIT 
INSURANCE ? i62, at i9i (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. i888). 
741 Meyer, supra note 47i, at 655-56. 
742 26 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pt. II, at xi 
(Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. i885). 
743 2 7 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pt. II, at xviii- 
xix (Albany, Argus Co. i886). 
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I887;744 ten in i888;745 sixteen in i889.746 By 1905 several hundred as- 
sociations either had ceased reporting to the state superintendent of in- 
surance or had been officially placed in receivership.747 
Criticism of the fraternal' financial structure mounted in the i89os 
as low-risk members continued to flee and new associations arose to 
lure away such members from older societies.748 The cooperatives re- 
sponded to such criticism by pointing to lapse rates as the means by 
which societies could remain solvent while maintaining equal assess- 
ment rates and equal benefits for members without regard to age or 
risk profile. When members left a cooperative insurance association 
(or "lapsed"), they forfeited the value of their paid-in assessments. The 
resulting surplus, argued the fraternalists, allowed the cooperative in- 
surance associations to maintain their fiscal solvency over time.749 
The lapse argument, however, was startlingly unfraternal in its im- 
plications. Existing members essentially funded their own benefits by 
expropriating the paid-in assessments of lapsed and often less fortu- 
nate members. Moreover, the lapse imperative opened the floodgates 
in the i88os and i89os for a series of Ponzi-scheme operations in the 
guise of fraternal insurance associations.750 These newly-dubbed "en- 
dowment societies" observed that, because of high lapse rates and the 
consequent forfeiture of benefits by other members, death benefit in- 
surance associations paid out to certain members significantly more 
than those members had paid in. For members who stayed in and 
reaped the benefits of lapsed members' contributions, such associations 
offered an extraordinary investment opportunity. The difficulty with 
744 29 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pts. II, III, at 
xxviii (n.p., Troy Press i888). 
745 3i ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pts. II, III, at 
xxv (Albany, James B. Lyon i890). 
746 Id. 
747 46 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pts. III, IV, at 
xxii-xxvi (Albany, J.B. Lyon I 905). 
748 See, e.g., SHEPPARD HOMANS, LIMITATIONS OF ASSESSMENT INSURANCE (New York, The 
Spectator Co. i895); Francis B. Forbes, Notes on Fraternal Beneficiary Corporations Doing Busi- 
ness in Massachusetts, 8 PUBLICATIONS AM. STAT. ASS'N I, 2-3 (I902) (calling for greater state 
oversight of the cooperative insurance societies). Some of the criticism of fraternals came from 
commercial insurance companies, which rightly perceived fraternals as competitors in the life in- 
surance market. As Henry Hyde, founder and president of the Equitable Life Assurance Society 
(one of the "Big Three" commercial companies), wrote to a vice president in i887, "we must make a 
sharp attack upon co-operatives, as we are being troubled by them a good deal." KELLER, supra 
note 493, at 7I (internal quotation marks omitted). In league with other commercial life insurance 
companies, Hyde's firm implemented a propaganda campaign against the cooperatives. Id. 
749 See, e.g., Editorial, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Sept. i, i890, at 8 (author's notes) (arguing that 
lapse rates support the financial viability of cooperative insurance societies); see also Annual Re- 
port of the Committee on Statistics and Good of the Orders, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Aug. i, i9ii, 
at i6-i8 (author's notes) (reporting on lapse rates). 
750 See Frank P. Bennett, The "Endowment" Craze in Massachusetts, 1892 AM. J. POL. 514; 
Cole, supra note 609, at 487-93. 
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the standard death benefit of the life and disability insurance associa- 
tions, however, was that "you ha[d] to die to win."'751 What, reasoned 
the endowment associations, prevented an association from moving up 
the payment date? In fact, what prevented an association from accel- 
erating the assessment schedule and accomplishing for live members in 
five years a result that took the death benefit societies thirty years to 
accomplish for dead members?752 
In the late i88os and early i89os, endowment association lobbyists 
induced state legislatures to legalize endowment insurance contracts.753 
At the outset, endowment benefit organizations such as The Iron Hall 
promised $iooo certificates maturing in seven years, at a rate of $2.50 
per assessment.754 Not to be outdone, the Sexennial League promised 
$iooo after six years;755 the Anti-Poverty Association of the Age adver- 
tised its ability to reduce the period before maturity on the same $iooo 
to five years while guaranteeing sickness, accident, and funeral bene- 
fits in the meantime.756 
Many of these associations were wholly fraudulent Ponzi schemes; 
others appear to have been the product of misplaced optimism and ig- 
norant management. Usually it was difficult to tell which was which, 
and in any event the result was always the same. Those who got in 
early received stupendous returns, and those who came later seldom 
saw their money again. In i883 the New York Superintendent of In- 
surance warned: 
In every corner of the land great numbers of these scheming plans for 
money-making and personal aggrandizement are springing up and going 
among the people as life insurance associations under the plea of benevo- 
lent and charitable purposes. In many cases they are downright frauds, 
intended to rob the people. In many other cases they are wild and delu- 
sive schemes of crazy theorists, bubbles which are sure to burst.... 
[T]hey gather up vast sums of money from that class of our people who 
are least able to bear the drain, and carry it off to distant States, where the 
method of its expenditure is known to no one save those who receive and 
handle it.757 
751 A Good Illustration, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Sept. i, i890, at I4 (author's notes). 
752 See id. (author's notes). 
753 See 33 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pts. II-IV, 
at xxxv-xxxvi (Albany, James B. Lyon i892); 35 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T 
OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pts. II-IV, at xxxvi (Albany, James B. Lyon i894). 
754 See Advertisement, The Iron Hall, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Sept. i, i890, at i (author's 
notes). 
755 See A Good Illustration, supra note 75i, at I4 (author's notes). 
756 See Advertisement, The Anti-Poverty Association of the Age, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Oct. i, 
i890, at i9 (author's notes). 
757 23 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pt. I, at Ix-lxi 
(Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. i882). 
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"The pretenses and promises of some of the managers would be gro- 
tesque if they were not put forth in a serious way," wrote another in- 
surance superintendent.758 The fraternal press lambasted endowment 
societies for approaching members "with the barefaced proposition 
that if 'You will come in now, you will reap the advantage of being 
first. "'759 
Endowment orders appear to have had the most success recruiting 
members in Massachusetts, where they collected $I2.5 million from 
364,000 members. Of this money collected, however, only about $3 
million was ever paid out to the holders of matured certificates.760 As 
many as fifty-six endowment corporations established themselves in 
Massachusetts; by i893, all fifty-six had collapsed, and the organizer of 
one of the largest - The Iron Hall - was under indictment.761 
The flood of fraudulent and utopian schemes appears to have 
slowed by the mid-i8gos as the first wave of five- to seven-year poli- 
cies came due on which payments could not be made. The Iron Hall 
went into receivership in New York State in i892,762 and two years 
later Massachusetts banned endowment insurance contracts alto- 
gether.763 Many cooperative insurance associations resisted the lure of 
the endowment order schemes.764 But the episode had a permanent 
impact on the public perception of even the honest cooperative insur- 
ance associations. As late as i9ii, the New York State Department of 
Labor continued to monitor closely local fraternal organizations in 
immigrant communities to "weed[] out" fraud and to protect the "bona 
fide fraternal societies."765 
E. The Failure of English-Style Collectivization 
i. The Quest for 'One National Organization.' - American coop- 
erative insurance associations might have been able to reorganize 
themselves in the early twentieth century in such a way as to preserve 
their position as the nation's leading insurance mechanism. English 
friendly societies, after all, shared many of the traits of the American 
758 See 26 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pt. II, at 
xxx (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. i885). 
759 Is It Time?, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Nov. i, i890, at 5 (author's notes). 
760 See Cole, supra note 609, at 488; see also Bennett, supra note 750, at 5I5 (discussing the 
height of endowment order popularity in Massachusetts). 
761 35 ANN. REP. SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pt. II, at 
xxxviii (Albany, James B. Lyon i894). 
762 Glines v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, 2 I N.Y.S. 543, 544 (Gen. Term i892). 
763 i894 Mass. Acts 367. 
764 See A Fraternal Beneficiary Society, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Jan. i, i895, at 7 (author's 
notes). 
765 N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF LABOR, i9i I ANN. REP. BUREAU OF INDUS. & IMMIGR. Ioo. 
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fraternals.766 Like the American cooperative self-insurance system, the 
friendly societies offered working-class members benefits in the event 
of accident, sickness, or death. And in the English case, the friendly 
societies managed to reform their practices to put their insurance pools 
on a sounder actuarial footing. Moreover, English friendly societies ul- 
timately became a crucial building block in early British social insur- 
ance programs. In particular, friendly societies administered work- 
ingmen's health insurance under the National Insurance Act of i9iI, 
which required membership in a registered friendly society or another 
authorized insurer.767 Members and their employers paid mandatory 
premiums to the society; the society, in turn, paid the members' health 
care costs.768 Thus, as late as I908, some students of workingmen's 
insurance in the United States thought it possible that the cooperative 
insurance societies might be integrated "into a great and powerful sys- 
tem covering the land."769 
American cooperative insurance societies did indeed seek legislative 
change that would allow them to form a quasi-public, collectivized 
system of workingmen's insurance like the one established through the 
English friendly societies in 9i i. Beginning in i886, a number of the 
most important and well-established cooperative insurance associa- 
tions - including the Ancient Order of United Workmen, the Knights 
of Honor, the Order of United American Mechanics, and the Royal 
Templars of Temperance - joined together to establish the National 
Fraternal Congress (NFC).770 From the start, the NFC's missions 
were to limit the entry of new fraternal associations into the field and 
to limit competition among existing associations for one another's 
younger and healthier members.771 The creation and enforcement of a 
standardized premium structure for all fraternal associations was a 
766 See ABB LANDIS, FRIENDLY SOCIETIES AND FRATERNAL ORDERS 4-78 (i900). 
767 See Ogus, Great Britain, in THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE i88i-i98i: STUDIES 
OF GERMANY, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND I50, i85 (Peter A. Kohler 
& Hans F. Zacher eds., with Martin Partington, i982). The fact that by i910, many friendly socie- 
ties were employer-managed relief funds rather than workingmen's self-insurance cooperatives 
somewhat complicates the story of the implementation of friendly societies into the national insur- 
ance scheme. See J.R. Hay, Employers' Attitudes to Social Policy and the Concept of 'Social Con- 
trol', 1900-1920, in THE ORIGINS OF BRITISH SOCIAL POLICY I07, ii9 (Pat Thane ed., I978). 
Moreover, last-minute changes to the National Insurance Act allowed commercial insurance com- 
panies to compete with the friendly societies as administrators. See RODGERS, supra note 74, at 
233-34. The friendly societies, however, maintained their role as administrators of the National 
Health Insurance Act until the post-World War II reorganization of the English welfare state. See 
W.A. DINSDALE, HISTORY OF ACCIDENT INSURANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN I 9-2 I (I 954). 
768 See A.I. Ogus, supra note 767, at I50, i85. 
769 HENDERSON, supra note 535, at 83; see also I.M. Rubinow, Labor Insurance, I2 J. POL. 
ECON. 362, 362-63 (I904) (stating that "co-operative insurance" and the lodges of American frater- 
nal associations "laid a foundation for future state universal insurance"). 
770 NFC JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 728, at i-3. 
771 See id. at 38. 
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critical part of these projects. Throughout the i89os, the NFC en- 
couraged member societies to revise their premium structures by 
moving away from the equal assessment basis and toward a premium 
rate that varied with the age of the member.772 
As a private body, however, the NFC lacked the enforcement 
power necessary to prevent new societies from entering the market and 
offering lower rates to young members. As a result, the NFC was un- 
able to control the unraveling tendencies of the cooperative insurance 
societies. Therefore, beginning in 1905, the NFC sought uniform state 
legislation that would bar the entry of new societies offering premiums 
below the NFC's standard rates.773 By barring the entry of low-rate 
competitors, the NFC hoped to bring all new cooperative insurance as- 
sociation members into one of the existing societies. The influx of new 
members into the existing societies would keep rates low for older 
members. Moreover, the establishment of a fixed set of associations 
embracing all those seeking life and disability insurance through coop- 
erative associations would stem the unraveling of the associations 
through the continual sorting and resorting of the membership into 
separate risk pools. Indeed, the uniform legislation movement sought 
to create nothing less than "one national organization" for the "welfare 
of the body politic" and "the welfare of each individual" therein.774 
By i9i i the NFC was able to report that thirteen state legislatures 
had enacted its proposed uniform bill setting rate standards and lim- 
iting the entry of new societies.775 The cooperationists' dream of cre- 
ating "one national organization" for the collective self-insurance of its 
members, however, would never be realized. Beginning in i908 and 
1909, the momentum in workingmen's insurance against accident 
shifted decisively away from the cooperative insurance associations. 
2. The Failure of Collectivization. - (a) The Ideological Ambigui- 
ties of Cooperation. - Despite the leadership of the NFC, a persistent 
strand of voluntarism among many cooperationists divided the coop- 
erative insurance movement over the questions of uniform legislation 
and barriers to entry. Thus, even as the NFC sought new regulations 
to stabilize the industry, many associations actively opposed new state 
regulation of cooperative insurance associations.776 Such opposition, of 
772 See NAT'L FRATERNAL CONG., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON RATES, 2-8 
(i899) (discussing several different plans); Meyer, supra note 47i, at 652. 
773 See NAT'L FRATERNAL CONG., UNIFORM BILL RELATING TO FRATERNAL BENEFICIARY 
ASSOCIATIONS 8-9 (I 905). 
774 One National Organization, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Apr. I, I9I2, at i8 (author's notes). 
775 NAT'L FRATERNAL CONGRESS, REP. OF JOHN J. HYNES, PRESIDENT, 7-8 (ijii). 
776 See, e.g., Paternalism, FRATERNAL MONITOR, Feb. i, i89i, at I2 (author's notes) (arguing 
that the power of the state to effect social change is sharply limited and that "the government, ei- 
ther national or State, would be wise in diminishing rather than extending its functions in the di- 
rection of paternalism"). 
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course, partly reflected the self-interest of upstart societies' leaders, 
whose leadership positions were threatened by limitations on the 
growth of new societies.777 But opposition to regulation also reflected 
the persistence of the voluntarist tradition in the cooperative insurance 
movement. The NFC thus experienced repeated difficulties control- 
ling splinter coalitions opposed to its attempts to use uniform legisla- 
tion to form a quasi-public body of cooperative insurance associa- 
tions.778 
(b) The Law of the Cooperative Insurance Contract. - Moreover, 
by the early twentieth century, developments in the law of insurance 
contracts made it increasingly difficult for cooperative insurance socie- 
ties to police moral hazard and adverse selection problems. By the 
i88os and i89os, commercial life insurance companies had become ex- 
tremely sophisticated in drafting life insurance policies.779 Commercial 
companies hired "able counsel"780 to draft policies allowing them to 
deny claims on a variety of grounds, including voluntary assumption 
of increased risk, self-inflicted wounds, failure to maintain "sober and 
temperate habits," and death or disability from any number of causes 
that either posed risks of moral hazard or suggested the possibility of 
an undisclosed preexisting condition.781 Courts, however, reacted to 
insurance company drafting by interpreting insurance contracts contra 
proferentem - against the drafter - in all cases of ambiguity.782 In 
an ongoing dialectic between courts' interpretive decisions modifying 
apparently clear policy language in favor of sympathetic plaintiffs and 
insurance company lawyers' responses to those decisions, insurance 
contract litigation placed a premium on sophisticated policy- 
drafting.783 Moreover, juries consistently favored plaintiffs in insur- 
777 See, e.g., FRATERNAL MONITOR, Aug. I, I9I I, at I8 (author's notes) (recounting the Wiscon- 
sin Insurance Commissioner's efforts to assure the cooperatives that state insurance would not 
compete with cooperative insurance). 
778 See, e.g., FRATERNAL MONITOR, Nov. I, I9 I I, at 6 (author's notes) (discussing the split be- 
tween the NFC and a competing group, Federated Fraternities). 
779 See Contracts of Insurance, 3 U.L. REV. 297, 297 (i897). 
780 Id. 
781 BLISS, supra note 46, at I34-80; see DEXTER REYNOLDS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIFE 
ASSURANCE 85-I I3 (Albany, Gould, Banks & Co. i853); WILLIAM REYNOLDS VANCE, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 524-27 (I904); see also SPENCER L. KIMBALL, 
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A STUDY IN THE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY, BASED ON WISCONSIN RECORDS, i835-1959, at 2II (i960) (noting 
that company lawyers viewed contract drafting as a game to be played against the courts). 
782 COOKE, supra note 46, ? 3, at 3-4; VANCE, supra note 78I, at 429-30. 
783 For a discussion of insurance contract litigation in this period, see LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY (i965); and 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 545-49. 
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ance cases that pitted sympathetic claimants against deep-pocket in- 
surance companies.784 
Courts construed cooperative insurance contracts under the same 
interpretive principles applicable to commercial insurance policies.785 
As in cases involving commercial companies, courts applied the doc- 
trine of contra proferentem to cooperative policies.786 Yet cooperative 
insurance enterprises found themselves caught in the dialectic process 
of insurance contract writing and judicial interpretation without the 
legal acumen of the commercial insurers.787 Moreover, cooperative in- 
surance agreements relied on broad and often vague standards to gov- 
ern the conduct of associations and their members. Courts, however, 
insisted on a rule-bound construction of all insurance contracts, an ap- 
proach that interpreted away all ambiguity. The result was two in- 
commensurate approaches to insurance contract design and interpreta- 
tion - one committed to standards and the other to rules.788 Not 
surprisingly, late nineteenth-century insurance lawyers thus observed 
that a disproportionate share of insurance litigation involved coopera- 
tive associations; as one insurance lawyer wrote, "the great mass of life 
insurance litigation arises on assessment certificates or policies."789 
784 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. DAVIES, MYSTERIOUS DISAPPEARANCES AND PRESUMPTIONS OF 
DEATH IN INSURANCE CASES: Two PAPERS READ BEFORE THE NEW YORK MEDICo-LEGAL 
SOCIETY 9 (New York, L.W. Lawrence i883) (observing the "tendency of the average jury to find a 
verdict against a life insurance company in all cases, without the slightest attention to the law or 
the facts involved"); FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 545-46. 
785 FREDERICK H. BACON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BENEFIT SOCIETIES AND 
INCIDENTALLY OF LIFE INSURANCE ? 78, at 94 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. i888) (ex- 
plaining that "Benefit Societies doing a Life Insurance Business are like other Life Insurance Cor- 
porations" and that "[tihe contracts of all [cooperative or assessment companies] must be judged by 
the laws applicable to all similar contracts of other corporations"). 
786 See id. ? 468, at 704-05; COOKE, supra note 46, ? 3, at 3-4. 
787 See Insurance Law as a Specialty, supra note 580, at I47-48 (ascribing high rates of coopera- 
tive insurance litigation to the cooperatives' reliance on lay persons to draft policies). Consider the 
example of the Maccabees' persistently frustrated policy-drafting. In i887 the Maccabees 
amended the disability provision of their bylaws. Under the new provision, a member was entitled 
to disability benefits if he became "unable to direct or perform the kind of business or labor which 
he has always followed, and by which alone he can thereafter earn a livelihood." Notwithstanding 
this restrictive language, at least one court required payment of disability benefits to a member 
who lost the fingers of his right hand while coupling railroad cars. Hutchinson v. Supreme Tent of 
Knights of Maccabees of the World, 22 N.Y.S. 8oi, 80I-04 (Gen. Term i893). In response the 
Maccabees amended the disability provision again to provide disability benefits only to members 
unable "to perform or direct any kind of labor or business." Beach v. Supreme Tent of Knights of 
Maccabees of the World, 77 N.Y.S. 770, 77I (App. Div. I902) (quoting the defendant's bylaws) 
(emphasis added). Once again, however, courts defeated the Maccabees' own interpretation of 
their disability provision and held in favor of disabled members. Id. at 772, 775 (requiring pay- 
ment of disability benefits to a member who lost the use of his right arm in a workplace sawmill 
accident, even though he could still direct and supervise work in the sawmill). 
788 On rules versus standards, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adju- 
dication, 89 HARV. L. REV. i685 (I976). 
789 Insurance Law as a Specialty, supra note 580, at I47. 
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Moreover, cooperative insurers' special emphasis on policing moral 
hazard and adverse selection through medical examinations and strict 
codes of behavior made cooperatives less amenable to settlement than 
the commercial companies, and more likely to deny claims as well.790 
Yet courts placed restrictions and procedural limitations on the abili- 
ties of cooperative associations to amend their insurance provisions 
retroactively against existing members791 and to expel their mem- 
bers.792 
By the first decade of the twentieth century, courts had thus se- 
verely hampered the effectiveness of the cooperatives' capacity to po- 
lice for moral hazard and adverse selection. As a result, the coopera- 
tives' special genius, which had allowed them to take a leading role in 
the provision of disability as well as life insurance in the late nine- 
teenth century, came under increased pressure. Many associations in 
the late i89os and in the first decade of the twentieth century shifted 
their premium rates to a member-by-member basis in which rates 
sought to reflect the risk of a particular member, usually by the age of 
that member.793 And a number of societies exhibited new concerns 
about their inability to combat fraud and malingering by claimants. 
Cooperatives began to hire detective agencies to run background 
checks on prospective members and to investigate claims.794 Coopera- 
tive magazines ran regular columns alerting associations to particular 
kinds of fraud and particular repeat offenders in frauds on the coop- 
erative societies.795 
(c) The New Immigrants. - In addition, the massive influx of over 
one million new immigrants each year around the turn of the century 
radically changed the landscape of workingmen 's insurance in the 
United States.796 New immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe 
790 The threat that settling cases would create incentives to manufacture claims would have 
been particularly acute for the cooperatives. Waltershausen suggested in his discussion of the co- 
operative insurance societies that some societies would themselves concoct reasons to expel mem- 
bers making long-term claims for permanent disability. WALTERSHAUSEN, supra note 86, at I92- 
93- 
791 Amendment by a Mutual Benefit Society of Its Contract of Insurance, 37 CENT. L.J. 86, 87 
(i893); see BACON, supra note 785, ? 92, at i09-i0. Significantly, the leading cases on retroactive 
amendment of benefits provisions were disability insurance cases, in which moral hazard issues 
were likely to be more of a problem than in life insurance cases. See id. 
792 Expulsion of Members of Corporations and Societies, 24 AM. L. REV. 537, ? 4, at 539-4I 
(I890); see BACON, supra note 785, ?? 95-I I I, at I 3-40. 
793 See Meyer, supra note 47i, at 652. 
794 See Advertisement, Thiel Detective Service Co., FRATERNAL MONITOR, Aug. i, i9ii, at 2 
(author's notes). 
795 See, e.g., Bogus Check Operations, FRATERNAL MONITOR, June I, I9I2, at I5 (author's 
notes). 
796 See generally JOHN BODNAR, THE TRANSPLANTED: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRANTS IN URBAN 
AMERICA I20-30 (i985); OSCAR HANDLIN, THE UPROOTED: THE EPIC STORY OF THE GREAT 
MIGRATIONS THAT MADE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I70-20I (I952). 
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developed collective mutual protection societies of their own.797 Many 
such societies in immigrant communities, however, were never able to 
provide substantial benefits to workingmen or their families. 
Indeed, it appears that as the influx of Eastern and Southern 
European immigrants accelerated, increasing numbers of American 
workingmen participated in small, local fraternal organizations in 
which death benefits provided families with only enough to pay for 
funeral expenses. The elite of the cooperative insurance associations, 
such as those that reported annually to state insurance commissioners, 
traditionally paid a death benefit of $iooo or $2000.798 Many mutual 
benefit associations, however, offered far less. Fifty-four percent of the 
families in the Wainwright Commission's study of work accidents in 
New York received some form of insurance benefit after the accidental 
death of a male wage-earner, but sixty percent of those receiving in- 
surance benefits received less than $500.799 Similarly, in Chicago, a 
state commission found in i9i8 that although four of five working- 
class families had insured the life of at least one family member, most 
families' insurance policies were small: the average insurance policy in 
the Chicago study was for $4I9.800 Such policies ensured sufficient 
funds to pay for funeral costs, but they provided little more protection 
than that. As insurance expert E.H. Downey noted in the early I920S, 
the insurance purchased by even the "better paid workmen" was "ut- 
terly inadequate as a permanent provision for a family which has lost 
its chief breadwinner."80' In the grim words of one Polish mother in 
Chicago, the reasoning of those who worked to purchase insurance in 
the new immigrant communities was "[w]ork, work and earn for your 
grave."802 
By the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, it was 
evident that the lowest-paid members of the working classes could not 
afford to insure themselves adequately against disability and death. In 
Pittsburgh only one in four working-class families possessed more than 
$500 of insurance against death from industrial accident, and four of 
five of those families were from the upper half of the labor market.803 
797 See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 725, at 64-72; SOYER, supra note 633, at 8i-I2. 
798 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 587, at 2 (author's notes). In i890 the Ancient Order of United 
Workmen estimated that $2000 in fraternal insurance cost $2 I yearly. See id. (author's notes). One 
problem with the recent literature on fraternal associations as private alternatives to the welfare 
state is that it tends to analyze the well-funded elite fraternals and to draw conclusions from them 
about the entire movement. See, e.g., EMERY & EMERY, supra note 486. 
799 See FIRST REP. TO THE LEGIS. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. BY THE COMM'N APPOINTED 
UNDER CH. 5i8 OF THE LAWS OF i909 TO INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS' 
LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS 26 (i9io) [hereinafter WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT]. 
800 COHEN, supra note 725, at 65-66. 
801 E.H. DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION I2 (I924). 
802 COHEN, supra note 725, at 65. 
803 See EASTMAN, supra note i64, at I34. 
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In New York City Robert Coit Chapin of the Russell Sage Foundation 
found in i909 that while i9i of 3i8 working-class families purchased 
some kind of insurance, only 56 of them purchased life insurance in 
the amount of $500 or more.804 Similarly, the Wainwright Commis- 
sion, appointed in i909 to study work accidents in New York State, 
found that an appallingly low number of workingmen killed on the job 
had life insurance in any significant amount.805 Accordingly, the coop- 
erative self-insurance approach to accident compensation seemed in- 
creasingly insufficient in many of the most compelling cases. 
(d) The Transformation of Work, the Deterrence Problem, and the 
Decline of the First First-Party System. - The increased difficulties 
of combating moral hazard and adverse selection and the new influx of 
poor immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe into the Ameri- 
can workforce cannot entirely explain the decline of the cooperative 
insurance societies. After all, English-style collectivization could have 
swept the new immigrants and the working poor into state-mandated 
insurance societies and thus solved at least the adverse selection and 
unraveling problems by creating mandatory insurance pools. 
A final force in the demise of the cooperative first-party insurance 
system was the dramatic reconceptualization and reorganization of 
work in America in the decade after i900. Work accidents lay at the 
heart of the turn-of-the-century accident problem. As a mechanism for 
compensating accident victims in the workplace, the first-party insur- 
ance system appears to have had many virtues. As a mechanism for 
encouraging safety and deterring accidents in the first place, however, 
804 CHAPIN, supra note 535, at I9I-92. A similar study in Buffalo found similar results. See 
John R. Howard, Jr., Report on the Standard of Living Among Workingmen's Families in Buffalo, 
New York, in CHAPIN, supra note 535, app. 5, at 307, 3IO. 
805 WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 799, at 26. 
TABLE 4. INSURANCE PAYMENTS TO MEN KILLED IN INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENTS, ERIE COUNTY, NEW YORK, DURING I907 AND I908, 
AND IN MANHATTAN DURING I 908, BY WAGES 
Weekly Total Insurance Recovered 
Wage $o $I-499 $500-999 $i,ooo and over 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Less than I3 7 53.8 5 38.4 I 7.7 
I 9 
$9-II.99 37 I7 45.9 I3 35-I 6 I6.2 I 2.7 
$I2- 77 48 62.3 i6 20.7 3 3.8 I0 I2.9 
L$I6- 44 i6 36.3 I7 38.6 4 9.0 7 I5.9 
$2 I and 40 9 22.5 I7 42.5 5 I2.5 9 2 2.5 
over 
Totals 2II 97 45.9 68 32.2 I9 9.0 27 I 2.7 
Id. at 26. 
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first-party insurance relied on one of two assumptions. First, the suc- 
cess of cooperative self-insurance depended in part on the idea that 
workers themselves acted as effective agents in the administration of 
an accident law regime. Thus, for example, the mid-nineteenth- 
century law of employers' liability rested on the claim - often inaccu- 
rate - that workers themselves were largely in control of the opera- 
tions of the industrial workplace and therefore were the most effective 
preventers of work accidents.806 Lemuel Shaw and other judges 
elaborating and applying the rules of employers' liability argued that 
workers rather than employers were in the best position to prevent ac- 
cidents.807 Moreover, sophisticated working-class advocates of first- 
party insurance argued that self-insurance among workingmen held 
the promise of allowing workers to impose the costs of work accidents 
on employers. Workingmen who banded together to create mutual in- 
surance programs, the argument went, would come to expect higher 
wages and would acquire the collective power to exact those higher 
wages from employers.808 
Second, first-party approaches to accident law could also effectively 
address safety concerns and deter accidents if accompanied by a regu- 
latory system that effectively enforced safety measures in work- 
places.809 By the first decade of the twentieth century, however, state 
factory inspection regimes in the United States were seen as clear fail- 
ures.810 In New York, for example, the i886 factory inspector law, as 
amended in i887, sought to protect the "life or limbs" of factory em- 
ployees by requiring employers to cover hoisting shafts and elevator 
openings, to build fire escapes for factories higher than three stories, 
and to install handrails and rubber skid-proof mats on all flights of 
stairs. The statute also required safeguards for belts and gears and 
mandated that employers report all workplace injuries to the state fac- 
tory inspector.811 But persistent enforcement problems rendered the 
statute ineffective from the start. Fines of $50 to $ioo were simply too 
small to induce compliance by many employers.812 Moreover, in the 
806 See Witt, supra note 695, at I469-84. 
807 See id. at I469-70. 
808 See supra p. 795. 
809 Today's accident law literature commonly makes the point that first-party or social insurance 
approaches require supplementary command-and-control deterrence and safety regulations. See, 
e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 9, at 284-85. 
810 See, e.g., GRAEBNER, supra note 699, at 72-I I I. The highly successful i893 federal legisla- 
tion requiring automatic couplers was a rare exception to the general failure of regulatory control. 
See ALDRICH, supra note I3, at 37. Other federal railroad safety requirements such as the air 
brake had mixed effects on railroad accident rates, because air brakes allowed railroad companies 
to increase the length and speed of their trains. See id. at 38. 
811 Ch.409, ??9, ii, i886N.Y.Laws629,amendedbych.576,? 2,i887 N.Y.Laws575,576. 
812 See R. Rudy Higgens-Evenson, From Industrial Police to Workmen's Compensation: Public 
Policy and Industrial Accidents in New York, i88o-i9io, 39 LAB. HIST. 365, 369-70 (i998). Cf 
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i89os and early i900s, the severely understaffed New York Factory In- 
spector's office typically issued tens of thousands of compliance orders 
to noncomplying employers each year but exacted only $iooo to $2000 
in fines annually.813 By i909, when the Wainwright Commission sur- 
veyed the industrial accident problem in the State of New York, few 
believed that the factory inspectors could effectively regulate industrial 
safety.814 
If regulatory approaches to making the workplace safer were un- 
workable, the ability of workers themselves to act as effective agents 
of accident prevention became critical to the continued centrality of 
first-party cooperative insurance in American accident law. So long as 
workers in many of the most dangerous industries exercised relative 
autonomy in the workplace, the safety incentives argument could plau- 
sibly be said to point toward placing the costs of accidents - and thus 
the incentives to avoid accidents - on employees.815 But if prescrip- 
tive ideas about how best to organize work changed, and if the organi- 
zation of work itself changed in the American workplace, the deter- 
rence argument would point the other way. 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, the new prominence in 
the industrial safety debate of expanded employers' liability rules and 
workmen's compensation at once signaled and reproduced dramatic 
changes in the organization of the American workplace. Led by Fre- 
derick Winslow Taylor and his gospel of "scientific management," 
managerial experts in labor relations and in the organization of pro- 
duction processes assumed central roles in the American economy. In 
view of the reorganization of the workplace, contemporaries began to 
focus not merely on the incentive effects of liability rules on the work- 
ers themselves - as Shaw and other mid-nineteenth-century judges 
had - but rather on the poor incentives that the law of employers' li- 
ability created for employers to ensure workplace safety.816 The 
Wainwright Commission, for example, believed that the best way to 
have "a real effect" in making employers focus on work safety was not 
to increase the state's regulatory apparatus, but to place the economic 
cost of work accidents on the employer, thereby "making him put his 
Donald W. Rogers, From Common Law to Factory Laws: The Transformation of Workplace Safety 
Law in Wisconsin Before Progressivism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. I77, i96-208 (I995) (describing 
the enforcement problems of industrial regulation in Wisconsin). 
813 See WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 799, at 6; Higgens-Evenson, supra note 
8I2, at 37I; cf. Rogers, supra note 8I2, at 202 (describing Wisconsin's understaffed inspector of- 
fices). 
814 See WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 799, at 6. 
815 Even if workers insured against such costs, their interest in self-preservation provided con- 
siderable incentives for deterrence. 
816 See, e.g., Woods, supra note I33, at 3i6-I7. 
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mind constantly to the question of preventing accidents."1817 Mean- 
while, students of social insurance began increasingly to doubt the ca- 
pacity of workingmen themselves to gauge the risk of accidents and to 
insure themselves accordingly. "[E]very man," it was said, "depreciates 
the risk of his peculiar calling. The car-coupler, the laborer on a con- 
struction train, or the electric-light lineman, is perfectly sure that there 
is no occupation safer than the one in which he is engaged."'818 
VI. CONCLUSION: A PATH NOT TAKEN 
Given that the cooperative insurance associations faced mounting 
problems in the first decade of the twentieth century, how is it that 
they represent (as I have claimed) a viable path not taken in the devel- 
opment of American accident law? It is, after all, exceedingly difficult 
to imagine the lodges and fraternal rituals of the cooperatives surviv- 
ing on a widespread basis through the twentieth century. 
The key to understanding the long-term significance of the coop- 
eratives as an alternative in the development of American accident law 
is that in other Western nations, insurance associations of one kind or 
another helped build twentieth-century social insurance programs. 
Systems of social insurance play a more important role in compensat- 
ing accident victims in Western Europe than they do in the United 
States. And in Western Europe, nineteenth-century systems of work- 
ingmen's insurance became crucial intermediaries in the construction 
of twentieth-century social insurance programs. State-run social in- 
surance programs require an infrastructure, and the need to construct 
a bureaucratic apparatus can be a considerable obstacle to the devel- 
opment of new state systems of insurance. 
As the English example makes clear, cooperative workingmen's as- 
sociations in the United States could have adapted to serve new and 
important functions in the twentieth century. In Great Britain, after 
all, friendly societies administered state insurance programs under the 
i9 Ii National Insurance Act, accepting contributions from members 
and their employers and administering benefit claims. Indeed, the 
friendly societies continued to play an important role in the admini- 
stration of the national welfare state until World War II. Similarly, in 
Germany, the social insurance legislation of the i 88os arose out of a 
welter of local and regional insurance programs, some compulsory and 
others voluntary. 
817 WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 799, at 7. 
818 James R. Pitcher, Accidents and Accident Insurance, I2 FORUM I3I, I34 (i89i). This psy- 
chological tendency toward overly optimistic assessments of risk (the "cognitive bias" toward opti- 
mism, in the language of behavioral science) remains to this day one of the central justifications for 
workers' compensation programs. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 9, at 245. 
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Some students of workingmen's insurance believed that the Ameri- 
can cooperatives would, like their English counterparts, help to create 
a broad system of social insurance.819 In the United States, however, 
social insurance reformers did not begin to propose broad social insur- 
ance programs until around i910. And by that time, developments 
such as mass immigration and the reorganization of the workplace 
developments uniquely powerful in the United States - meant that 
cooperative insurance seemed increasingly out of step with twentieth- 
century conditions. Indeed, they seemed unable to fulfill their com- 
pensation function and inadequate as a means of deterring work acci- 
dents in the first place. As a result, the cooperative insurance associa- 
tions dropped out of American reform debates just as social insurance 
reform proposals arrived on the legislative agenda. 
Total cooperative life and disability insurance in force as a percent- 
age of commercial life insurance in force fell from I37% in i895 to 
i09% in i900 to roughly 99% in I905.820 In the wake of the enact- 
ment of workmen's compensation statutes in virtually every important 
industrial jurisdiction in the decade after i910, the importance of co- 
operative insurance associations declined still more rapidly. Coopera- 
tive life and disability insurance in force as a percentage of commercial 
life insurance in force fell sharply to 4I% by i9i6 and then to 23% by 
I920.821 As shown in the table below, cooperative life insurance in 
force per capita in the United States fell from an all-time high of $Io5 
in I9W0 to just $37 in I920 after adjusting for wartime inflation. 
819 See supra pp. 82 6-2 7. 
820 Figures derive from the table at the beginning of Part V. See supra p. 797. 
821 See STALSON, supra note 469, at 819 tbl.B. 
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TABLE 5. LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE PER CAPITA IN 
THE UNITED STATES, IN CONSTANT i890 DOLLARS822 
Year Cooperative Commercial 
(stock and mutual combined) 
I885 $39.32 42.4I 
i890 58.IO 54-09 
I 900 93.83 86.oo 
1gio I04-99 98.85 
I920 37.09 93-76 
I92 5 45-72 I 73.92 
More dramatically still, the relative financial importance of coop- 
erative insurance to the average family enrolled in an insurance society 
decreased sharply after i900, and especially after i910. Measured in 
constant i89os dollars, the average size of a cooperative life insurance 
policy fell from $I362 in i900 to $873 in i910 to a mere $368 in 
I92 o.823 
Moreover, actuarial reform drained the cooperatives of their dis- 
tinct practices and cooperative ethos. By the I920S even those who 
continued to play a leadership role in fraternal insurance associations 
saw them as little different from commercial life insurance compa- 
nies.824 No longer did the cooperatives play the special role among 
American insurers of insuring workingmen against the risk of disabil- 
822 I derived the figures in the table as follows: 
(i) I obtained the amount of each type of insurance from its respective source. For coopera- 
tive insurance figures, see id. For ordinary commercial insurance figures, see 72 ANN. REP. 
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE INS. DEP'T OF THE STATE OF N.Y., pt. II, at xxiii (I93I). 
(2) To correct for underreporting, I adjusted the cooperative insurance figures upward by 
twenty percent, as recommended in STALSON, supra note 469, at 8o6 app. i8. 
(3) I adjusted for inflation by reference to the "Douglas" price index. See I HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note I75, at 2 I3. The Douglas price index does not go 
as far back as I885, so I estimated the Douglas index for i885 by comparison to the "Burgess" in- 
dex. See id. I compared Burgess I9I3 (value = ioo) to Douglas I9I3 (value = I37) and extrapo- 
lated backward to conclude that if Burgess I885 = 64.6, then Douglas I885 = 88.5. The algebra is 
I00/I37 = 64.6/x. 
(4) I then divided by population figures taken from HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: Two CENTURIES OF THE CENSUS, I790-I990, at I04 (Donald B. Dodd ed., I993). To cal- 
culate population figures for the midpoints between decades, I assumed constant population 
change within each decade. 
823 I arrived at these amounts by dividing the total dollar amount of life insurance by the num- 
ber of certificates for each year, see STALSON, supra note 469, at 807 app. i9, and then adjusting for 
price inflation using the Douglas price index, see I HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note I 75, at 2 I3. 
824 See, e.g., FRATERNAL IFE INSURANCE, supra note 6I3, at 30 (explaining that in the old days 
thereee was no discrimination on account of age or physical condition or occupation. It was true 
equality and fraternity"). 
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ity as well as death. And to the extent that cooperative insurance as- 
sociations continued to insure families of modest means against the 
death of a wage-earner, they did so in ways not very different from 
those of commercial insurers. 
The failure of the first American first-party system to go the way of 
the English friendly societies helped shape the basic institutional fea- 
tures of American accident law in the twentieth century. In the United 
States social insurance systems for accident compensation remain rela- 
tively limited outside the field of work accidents. Not coincidentally, 
American accident law in our own time is characterized by a high de- 
pendence on tort litigation relative to other Western nations.825 Acci- 
dent victims in the United States are more likely than their English 
counterparts to file personal injury tort claims.826 Comparative studies 
indicate that injured Americans file roughly 327 tort suits per Ioo,ooo 
people, whereas injury victims in England and Wales file only I I 7 tort 
suits per Ioo,ooo people.827 Moreover, Americans are more likely than 
the English and Welsh to consider claiming damages in the event of 
nonwork accidents, and studies suggest (though inconclusively) that 
they are also more likely to consult a lawyer.828 
Of course, the failure of the first-party insurance system cannot in 
and of itself explain the peculiarities of the American law of accidents. 
The availability of juries in American personal injury actions, the 
English attorney's fee rule that places the burden of the winner's legal 
costs on the loser, and any number of other differences between 
American and European accident law regimes have played important 
roles. 
Nonetheless, if the cooperative insurance associations' relative 
unimportance in the twentieth century has blinded us to the important 
role they played in the late nineteenth century, it bears repeating that 
the cooperative insurance societies of the i88os and i89os presented a 
very real alternative to the kind of accident law regime that eventually 
825 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Compensation for Injury in the United States, in COMPENSATION 
FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN SWEDEN AND OTHER COUNTRIES I27, I38 (Carl Oldertz & Eva Tide- 
felt eds., i988). 
826 To be sure, in neither the United States nor England does the tort system provide compensa- 
tion to more than a small minority of accident victims. Just 6.5% of English accident victims re- 
ceiving compensation for their injuries did so through the tort system. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY 13 tbl.4 (I978). 
Meanwhile, IO.5% of American accidental injury victims receiving compensation did so through 
the tort system, including settlements. See COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES, supra 
note ii6, at ioi. 
827 See Richard A. Posner, Explaining the Variance in the Number of Tort Suits Across U.S. 
States and Between the United States and England, 2 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 7, 478-79 (I997). 
828 See COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES, supra note ii6, at I27-29. The data are 
different for work accidents because British workers injured on the job are able to bring tort ac- 
tions against their employers, whereas similarly situated Americans are not. 
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developed in the twentieth century. To be sure, the first-party system 
of the late nineteenth century had its difficulties. Twenty-first century 
supporters of first-party approaches to accident law would do well to 
note the extent to which problems of moral hazard and adverse selec- 
tion plagued their late nineteenth-century precursors.829 Yet the ulti- 
mate unraveling of the nineteenth-century cooperative insurance re- 
gime hardly indicates that the cooperative insurance associations had 
nothing to offer in the twentieth century. In a more hospitable legal 
climate that allowed the societies to combat adverse selection and 
moral hazard more actively and that preserved significant worker dis- 
cretion in the production process, the nineteenth-century first-party in- 
surance system might have changed the face of accident law into the 
early twentieth century. 
Regardless of the precise long-term implications of the cooperative 
accident insurance movement, the story of the cooperative insurance 
societies suggests that the history of American accident law is consid- 
erably richer and more variegated than most accounts of tort law sug- 
gest. At the turn of the twentieth century, accidents and accident law 
became perhaps the most visible manifestations of the wrenching diffi- 
culty of accommodating nineteenth-century free labor ideals to the 
world of mass industrial production. In response to rising industrial 
accident rates, a wide array of Americans - ranging from working- 
men and labor leaders to judges, lawyers, and scholars - experi- 
mented with an equally wide array of approaches to understanding 
and resolving the accident crisis. In particular, the contest between 
classical tort law and cooperative accident insurance embodied two 
contrasting conceptions of how best to reorganize the nation for a new 
age. 
Ultimately, of course, neither classical tort law's liberalism nor the 
insurance societies' cooperative commonwealth emerged completely 
victorious. The cooperatives declined and failed, and administrative 
state programs replaced much of the common law in the first decades 
of the twentieth century; beginning in the i9ios, state workmen's 
compensation statutes removed the most significant class of cases from 
tort law altogether.830 Nonetheless, the turn-of-the-century struggle to 
829 Cf Hanson & Logue, supra note 48I (arguing that, because of moral hazard and adverse se- 
lection problems, first-party insurance systems are in many instances inferior to enterprise liability 
supplemented by third-party liability insurance). First-party systems are especially vulnerable to 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, with the prominent exception of automobile in- 
surance - in which insureds' driving records may provide insurers with sufficient information to 
risk-rate. The automobile case is generally the favorite example for supporters of first-party sys- 
tems. See, e.g., Priest, Current Insurance Crisis, supra note i, at I558. 
830 See, e.g., Workmen's Compensation Law, ch. 8i6, I9I3 N.Y. Laws 2277 (abolishing the neg- 
ligence action for injured employees against their employers and replacing it with a no-fault ad- 
ministrative compensation scheme). 
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address the accident problem had lasting consequences for the shape of 
American accident law in the twentieth century. 
Indeed, it is not too far-fetched to suggest that at the turn of a new 
century, we find ourselves in a not dissimilar position. As massive 
class actions, toxic torts, and complex litigation push tort law into un- 
charted territory, we too will have to ask hard questions about what 
we want from our accident law regime. And, as in I900, it seems 
likely that the choices we make will have lasting consequences for the 
shape of American accident law in the century to come. 
